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ABSTRACT
NATURALNESS, INTRINSICALITY, AND DUPLICATION
MAY 1993
THEODORE R. SIDER, B.S., GORDON COLLEGE
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Phillip Bricker
This dissertation explores the concepts of naturalness,
intrinsicality, and duplication. An intrinsic property is had by an object
purely in virtue of the way that object is considered in itself. Duplicate
objects are exactly similar, considered as they are in themselves. The
perfectly natural properties are the most fundamental properties of the
world, upon which the nature of the world depends.
In this dissertation I develop a theory of intrinsicality,
naturalness, and duplication and explore their philosophical applications.
Chapter one introduces the notions, gives a preliminary survey of some
proposed conceptual connections between the notions, and sketches some of
their proposed applications. Chapter two gives my background assumptions
and introduces notational conventions.
In chapter three I present a theory of naturalness. Although I take
‘natural’ as a primitive, I clarify this notion by distinguishing and
explicating various conceptions of naturalness.
In chapter four I give a theory of various notions related to
naturalness, especially intrinsicality and duplication. I show that
‘intrinsic’ and ‘duplicate’ are interdefinable, and then give analyses of
these and other notions in terms of naturalness.
v
If, as I think likely, naturalness cannot be analyzed, then what is
the proper response? David Lewis suggests: accept naturalness as a
primitive. I am sympathetic to this proposal, but not to the form Lewis
gives it: chapter five contains an argument against Lewis’s theory of
naturalness.
In chapter six I reject the idea that naturalness is analyzable in
terms of immanent universals. I focus on the work of D.M. Armstrong. I
also criticize Armstrong’s arguments against transcendent universals.
In chapter seven I address criticisms of David Lewis’s definition of
‘intrinsic’ offered by Mike Dunn.
In chapter eight I discuss the possibility of analyzing our three
notions. I discuss defining ‘natural’ in terms of supervenience and other
concepts, and then criticize attempts by Jaegwon Kim and Michael Slote to
analyze intrinsicality in terms of "quasi-logical" concepts.
Finally, in chapter nine I present a new application for the notion of
naturalness: the statement of "metrical realism" in the philosophy of
space and time.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
iv
ABSTRACT
v
LIST OF FIGURES
viii
Chapter
1. INTRODUCING THREE NOTIONS 1
2. PRELIMINARIES
3. CONCEPTIONS OF NATURALNESS 32
4. INTRINSICALITY, DUPLICATION, AND OTHER NOTIONS 85
5. NATURALNESS AND ARBITRARINESS 108
6. PROPERTIES, UNIVERSALS, AND NATURALNESS ... 140
7. DUNN ON INTRINSICALITY 181
8. ANALYSIS OF THE NOTIONS 202
9. NATURALNESS AND METRICAL REALISM 233
BIBLIOGRAPHY 264
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
1 .
2.
Endlessly conjunctive properties
Particulars: TU vs. IU
Page
95
145
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCING THREE NOTIONS
1.1 Intrinsically and Duplication
Today my brother got a haircut. Yesterday Mike had the property
having long hair, today he does not. By losing this property my brother
changed.
When my only brother got his much-needed haircut, I too lost a
property: the property having a long-haired brother. But when the haircut
occurred, I did not change. Mike’s haircut changed Mike, not me, despite
the fact that we each thereby lost properties we formerly had (and gained
new ones as well). This is because the property Mike lost, having long
hair, is an intrinsic property, whereas the property I lost, having a long-
haired brother, is not.
Consider the property having long hair. When someone has this
property, he has it in virtue of the way he is in himself. In contrast,
when a person has the property having a long-haired brother, he does not
have this purely in virtue of the way he is himself; he has this property
partly in virtue of the way someone else is (namely, his brother) and
partly in virtue of the relations he bears to that someone else (namely,
the being the only brother of relation). When an object x has an intrinsic
property, then, this is in virtue of the way x is, and not a matter of the
ways other objects are, nor of the way x stands with respect to other
objects. Intrinsic properties are "non-relational" and "purely
qualitative". If an object has an intrinsic property, then so must any
"perfect duplicate" of that object. In contrast, extrinsic (non-intrinsic)
properties may differ between perfect duplicates. Marble A may be a
perfect duplicate of marble B despite the fact that A has, while B lacks,
1
the property being ten feet from Ted. Shapes, sizes, masses - these are
intrinsic properties. Locations, speeds, ownerships (e.g. being owned by
Ted) — these are extrinsic properties.
I hope that the preceding paragraph has helped you grasp the notion of
an intrinsic property, if you were not already familiar with that notion.
But I suspect that you distrust the value of what I have said as an
analysis of the notion, on grounds of circularity. You may ask me to
explain the locutions I used in that paragraph: ‘duplicate’, and ‘had in
virtue of the way an object is in itself, for example. What is the "way
an object is in itself', if not the conjunction of its intrinsic
properties? What is it for two objects to be "duplicates", if not for them
to have exactly the same intrinsic properties?
Let us focus a little more closely on the notion of duplication , and
its relation to intrinsicality. Objects that are perfect duplicates are
exactly similar, down to the last detail of the smallest part. It is
likely that there are no actual pairs of macroscopic duplicates. Even two
marbles made by the best manufacturing techniques are bound to differ
slightly — a stray atom here or there. The differences may not be
perceptible, but if they are there then the marbles cannot be duplicates,
for duplicates may not have any (intrinsic) differences whatsoever. Of
course, no pair of objects, even a pair of perfect duplicates, will share
all properties. For consider any two objects a and b — only a will have
the property being a. Although it is likely that there are no two actual
macroscopic duplicates, it may be that there are pairs of actual
microscopic duplicates: perhaps pairs of duplicate electrons. And surely
every object, microscopic or macroscopic, has a duplicate in some other
possible world . 1
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One reason for the importance of the concept of duplication is that
‘intrinsic’ may be defined in terms of ‘duplicate’, as David Lewis has
proposed: 2
(Dl) Property P is intrinsic iff for any possible individuals x and
y, if x and y are duplicates then x has P iff y has P
In fact, the direction of definition can be reversed: ‘duplicate’ is
definable in terms of ‘intrinsic’:
(D2) Possible individuals x and y are duplicates iff for any intrinsic
property P, x has P iff y has P
We have a circle of interdefinability between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘duplicate’. 3
Some philosophers claim to be able to break into this circle and define
‘intrinsic’ merely in terms of "quasi-logical" (e.g. modal, part/whole) and
spatiotemporal concepts. I discuss this claim in Chapter 8; my verdict is
negative. Some might claim that intrinsicality is relative to human
interests or cognitive capabilities. A related proposal would be that
certain properties are singled out by context as those we "count as
intrinsic" for the purposes of conversation. But on these views there
would be no "objective" intrinsic/extrinsic distinction; there would merely
be our conventions. I reject this option; I will mention below the reason
for this rejection. What, then, is the remaining option? To take the
distinction (or a related distinction — see below) as a primitive
distinction.
Some, I know, will find this ludicrous. When I discuss
intrinsicality and duplication they will refuse to understand my words; for
them, my arguments will be impossible to evaluate, my claims ultimately
3
groundless. Until I can define my terms they will reject them. But I say
that the notions of intrinsicality and duplication are pre-analytically
understood, and are therefore as fit a foundation for philosophical
theorizing as we can reasonably demand. Go back and re-read the example of
my long-haired brother. Can you honestly claim not to see the difference
between having long hair and having a long-haired brothefl
Of course, it would be rash to suppose that understanding of the
word ‘intrinsic’ in precisely the sense that I intend is a part of everyday
wisdom, for it is not. Many have never thought of the concept of
intrinsicality, and it often requires a little "coaching" to introduce the
notion to someone who is not familiar with it. Moreover, some philosophers
may use ‘intrinsic’ to mean something different from what I mean by that
word, so I should not claim that intrinsicality is commonly known by that
name. It may be that ‘intrinsic’ has several meanings . 4 But I do claim
that there is a notion that is properly called ‘intrinsicality’ that is
easily fixed on, given a few phrases (e.g. "purely qualitative", "non-
relational", etc.) and suggestive examples.
In particular, I regard definition (Dl) as doing the lion’s share of
the work in picking out the intended sense of ‘intrinsic’, for the notion
of duplication is, I think, clear and unambiguous. Consider the claim of
Mike Dunn, for example, that the property being a is intrinsic, for it
"depends on a and on no other thing ". 5 Dunn, I think, has simply got a
different notion of intrinsicality in mind, and we can clear things up by
stipulating that the notion of intrinsicality we are here concerned with
may be defined in terms of duplication via (Dl). Additionally, I exclude
this property because it is not purely qualitative . 6
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To forestall certain objections to my claim that the notions of
intrinsically and duplication are well-understood, consider an example.
Let us grant ourselves talk of the colors of visual "sensations" or
"qualia". Thus, red things cause me to experience "red" qualia when I look
at them in the appropriate light. Some philosophers (notably Locke)
thought that color properties are somehow not as real as other properties
of physical objects - they are "secondary qualities". One could interpret
this as involving a claim that color properties are not intrinsic. For
suppose, simplistically, that Locke’s view is that x is red iff x causes
"red" qualia in people. According to this view, redness is clearly
extrinsic. For let x be any actual red object; we can imagine a world
containing a perfect duplicate of x that causes no "red" qualia (perhaps
that world contains no people, or perhaps the people there have "inverted
spectra"). Since x and a perfect duplicate of x differ over redness, that
property turns out extrinsic on Locke’s view.
Another theory according to which color properties are extrinsic
says that the color of an object is determined by the wavelength of the
light it scatters. Since the wavelength of light scattered by an object is
partly a matter of the laws of nature, colors on this view are extrinsic as
well. For consider some actual red ball B. We can imagine a possible world
with different laws governing the interaction of light with material
bodies, a result of which is that a certain duplicate of B scatters light
with the same wavelength as that scattered by blue objects in the actual
world. The theory we are considering has the result that this duplicate of
B has a different color from B: blue.
Others claim that color properties are intrinsic. One such theory
holds that the color of an object is determined by the physical and
5
microphysical properties of its surface. Since the latter properties are
intrinsic, this theory entails that color properties are likewise
intrinsic.
One might think that the fact that it is controversial whether color
properties are intrinsic falsifies my claim that the intrinsic/extrinsic
distinction is pre-analytically understood. Not so. All agree on the
intrinsic/extrinsic status of the relevant properties here. Having surface
structure S is intrinsic. Reflecting light of wavelength A is extrinsic.
Causing "red" qualia is extrinsic. No disagreement there. The
disagreement is over what property is expressed by the word ‘red’, and not
over the intrinsicality of any one property. Similarly, I might know each
person in the room, and still not able to answer when you ask: who is the
richest person in the room?
Similar considerations arise for the case of words referring to
"artifacts". Consider a chair made of homogeneous matter, and also a slab
of solid homogeneous matter of the same kind. If the slab is large enough,
then, given certain assumptions, there is a duplicate of the chair inside
the slab . 7 Indeed, there will be many. Let us call these objects inside
the slab "pseudo-chairs". Are pseudo-chairs chairs? I do not know. Since
I do not know, I do not know whether being a chair is intrinsic. If
pseudo-chairs are not chairs then the chair has non-chairs for duplicates,
and hence being a chair is extrinsic. On the other hand, if pseudo-chairs
are chairs, then perhaps being a chair is intrinsic
.
8 But again, my
uncertainty is not uncertainty over the extension of ‘intrinsic’. I am
uncertain because I do not know precisely which property is expressed by
‘chair’.
6
Let us consider another example to clarify the concepts of
intrinsicality and duplication. Consider a ball made of sponge into which
I am pressing my finger. That ball has a shape that we might call "S":
somewhat spherical, but deformed at the place where my finger presses in.
Someone might say: "Having shape S is not an intrinsic property.
Surely everything is a duplicate of itself. But before I pressed my finger
into the ball, it had a different shape. Hence, having shape S can differ
between duplicates - namely, between the ball and itself - and so is
extrinsic." This would clearly be a mistake. To fix it, let us speak of the
various "temporal parts", or "time slices" of the ball. Let si be a time
slice of the ball when I am pressing on it, and let s2 be a slice of the
ball when I am not pressing on it. si has shape S, whereas s2 does not.
But si and s2 are not duplicates. Certainly, everything is a duplicate of
itself, but this does not imply that si is a duplicate of s2, for si and s2
are distinct.
Someone might say: "The property of being pushed on is intrinsic.
Any duplicate of the ball would have to have something pushing on the spot
of the deformation to give it shape S." This too would be a mistake. To
see that this property is extrinsic, consider a possible world w containing
only a ball with shape S. Since the ball is alone in w, nothing is pushing
on it, but we may stipulate that this ball is a duplicate of the actual
ball. It may be objected that the ball would not have shape S, for the
forces between the molecules constituting the ball would force it into a
circular shape in the absence of a force deforming it. But this objection
assumes that the causal laws of w are the same as those of our world, and
there is no reason to suppose this. It surely is metaphysically possible
that a ball have shape S without any force being exerted on it at all. This
7
example reminds us that in definitions (Dl) and (D2), we are told to
consider all possible objects, and not just objects in worlds with the same
causal laws as the actual world. 9
In intuitively conveying the concept of intrinsically, I have relied
heavily on David Lewis’s words in Lewis (1986c) pp. 61 ff., and in Lewis
(1983a) p. 197. (For a radically different conception of intrinsically,
see Sydney Shoemaker (1980).) G. E. Moore has an account similar to that
of Lewis. Moore characterizes the notion of an "intrinsic kind of value": 10
To say that a kind of value is "intrinsic " means merely that the
question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses
it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question.
He then says that x’s having P "depends solely on the intrinsic nature" of
x iff in any circumstances, an object that is either i) identical to x, or
ii) "exactly like x" must of necessity have P iff x has P. 11 The first
clause, that any object identical to x must have P iff x has P, may seem
odd. But it is clear that for Moore, any object not exactly like x would
necessarily be distinct from x. 12 Thus, it seems not unfair to attribute to
Moore the view that a "value" is intrinsic just when it never differs
between objects that are exactly alike — i.e. are duplicates. His notion
of an intrinsic kind of value, then, seems near to Lewis’s notion of an
intrinsic property.
It must be cautioned that Moore uses the term ‘intrinsic property ’ in
such a way that not all properties had solely in virtue of the intrinsic
natures of their instances are intrinsic properties. Moore claims that
goodness is not an intrinsic property despite the fact that it depends on
the intrinsic natures of the things that have it. 13 All intrinsic
properties are properties that depend on the intrinsic natures of their
instances, according to Moore, but not vice versa. Moore has an
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interesting struggle with the question of the difference between these two
notions, and admits that he cannot draw the distinction. He says:
I can only vaguely express the kind of difference I feel there to be
by saying that intrinsic properties seem to describe the intrinsic
nature of what possesses them in a sense in which predicates of value
never do. If you could enumerate all the intrinsic properties a given
thing possessed, you would have given a complete description of it
and would not need to mention any predicates of value it possessed;
whereas no description of a given thing could be complete which
omitted any intrinsic property. 14
You cannot say that an intrinsic property is a property such that, of
one thing possesses it and another does not, the intrinsic nature of
the two things must be different. For this is the very thing which we
are maintaining to be true of predicates of intrinsic value, while at
the same time we say that they are not intrinsic properties. 15
It may be that by ‘intrinsic property’ Moore meant to express something
like what I would express by ‘perfectly natural property’. However, I
would say that to completely describe an object, one must do more than say
what perfectly natural properties it has - one must say what perfectly
natural properties are had by its parts and in what perfectly natural
relations those parts stand. (In fact, even this is not enough — see
Chapter 4 section 2.1).
1.2. Naturalness
I believe that it would be permissible to take one of our two
notions as a primitive. But a similar option, the one I will take in this
dissertation, is to take the related notion of a natural property as a
primitive, and to define ‘intrinsic’ and ‘duplicate’ in terms of ‘natural’.
This is the suggestion of David Lewis. I share Lewis’s enthusiasm for the
importance of naturalness. Indeed, this dissertation is foremostly devoted
to extending Lewis’s project of introducing naturainess into ontology as a
primitive notion and harvesting the theoretical benefits.
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In chapter 3 I will devote significant effort to explaining the
notion of naturalness; for now, the following important quotation from
Lewis will serve to introduce the notion: 16
Sharing of [the perfectly natural properties] makes for qualitative
similarity, they carve at the joints, they are intrinsic, they are
highly specific, the sets of their instances are ipso facto not
entirely miscellaneous, there are only just enough of them to
characterise things completely and without redundancy.
Physics has its short list of ‘fundamental physical
properties’: the charges and masses of particles, also their so-
called ‘spins’ and ‘colours’ and ‘flavours’, and maybe a few more that
have yet to be discovered.... What physics has undertaken... is an
inventory of the [perfectly natural properties] of this-worldly
things.
Naturalness is best thought of as coming in degrees, the most
natural properties being the perfectly natural properties. The perfectly
natural properties are an elite minority of the intrinsic properties - the
most fundamental properties. They are nature’s most basic "building
blocks". Naturalness applies to relations as well: the perfectly natural
relations are the most fundamental relations. Roughly speaking, 17 the
entire qualitative character of our world is fixed once we fix the
distribution of the perfectly natural properties and relations over its
objects. If present-day physics is on the right track, then the properties
of charge
,
spin, mass, the quark flavors, colors, etc. are among this
world’s perfectly natural properties, and the spatiotemporal relations are
perfectly natural relations.
It should be highlighted that the notions of intrinsicality,
naturalness, and duplication are not thought of as being tied to the
perceptual or scientific capabilities of humans. Intrinsic properties need
not be detectable, even in principle. Two objects might appear to all of
our best efforts, scientific or otherwise, to be perfect duplicates; they
may yet fail to be duplicates because they differ with respect to some
10
intrinsic property that utterly evades our capabilities. If this strange
property is, in some sense, a "non-physical" property, then the hope of the
materialist that the world be completely describable in physical terms
would be dashed, but this would not disqualify the property from being
intrinsic. The same remark applies to natural properties; these too may
transcend our ability to detect them; these too need not be "physical".
In Chapter 3 I say more about just what the notion of naturalness
comes to, but for now let us press on to the definition of ‘intrinsic’ and
‘duplicate’ in terms of ‘natural’. We begin first with the definition of
duplicate
. In fact, this definition is not irrelevant to characterizing
the primitive notion of naturalness, for one way to elucidate a primitive
notion is to define other notions in terms of it, notions of which we have
a prior grasp.
According to Lewis, we may define ‘duplicate’ as follows: 18
(D3) Possible objects x and y are duplicates iff there is a one-to-
one correspondence between x’s parts and y’s parts such that
corresponding parts stand in the same perfectly natural
relations and have the same perfectly natural properties
‘Intrinsic’ may then be defined by (Dl).
I do not claim that the notion of naturalness is as near to
commonsense as that of intrinsicality or duplication. Still, I think it is
reasonable to adopt it as a primitive. First, I do think that naturalness
is reasonably commonsensical. We do have a notion of the fundamental
properties after which physics seeks; I hope to convince you of this in
chapter 3. Secondly, naturalness seems to have vast philosophical utility;
I take it that this is a good reason for adopting the notion. For example,
11
it enables analysis of intrinsicality and duplication. The notion bears
other fruit as well; various applications of naturalness are discussed by
Lewis in "New Work for a Theory of Universals", and by Anthony Quinton in
"Properties and Classes-.*’ In Chapter 9 I discuss yet another application:
in the philosophy of space and time.
Now it can be seen why I do not think the notions of this
dissertation are "subjective". If naturalness, for example, were
subjective then so too would be all the distinctions drawn in terms of
naturalness, and this is something I would not want to admit. For example,
I use naturalness in Chapter 9 to characterize the facts about the
geometrical structure of physical space. If naturalness were subjective,
then so too would be the geometry of physical space.
Although Lewis has been instrumental in bringing the notion of
naturalness to the attention of contemporary writers, others have discussed
related notions. Demopoulos and Friedman (1985) pp. 635-637 discuss a
notion of "foundedness" that Carnap introduced in Carnap (1929).
Foundedness applies to the extensions of relations that are "experienceable
and ‘natural’" (quotation from Demopoulos and Friedman p. 636). The tie
between foundedness and experienceability is a point of difference between
foundedness and Lewis’s naturalness. Quinton (1957) introduces a
distinction between natural and unnatural classes. Quinton’s naturalness
comes in degrees (p. 47). Flowever, Quinton links naturalness with human
capabilities — he says of natural classes that "people who are introduced
to a few of their members can go on to pick out others without
hesitation...” (p. 47). George Bealer has a related distinction: among
the properties and relations are to be found an elite minority of
"qualities" and "connections". However, Bealer’ s distinction does not
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admit of degrees and is tied to human perception. See Bealer (1982) pp.
177-183. Quine ties the notion of a natural kind to similarity,
subjunctive conditionals, and causation in Quine (1969). He takes a
characteristically dim view of these notions. Also, D.M. Armstrong’s
theory of sparse universal, as presented in Armstrong (1978a) and (1978b),
has commanded a good deal of attention, and many of the philosophical jobs
for naturalness are likewise jobs for sparse universal. See Chapter 6 of
this dissertation on sparse universals.
1.3. The Structure of the Dissertation
In this dissertation I will explore various issues surrounding our
three notions. I hope that this chapter has at least convinced you of the
existence and potential importance of the notions. Chapter 2 makes
explicit my background metaphysical assumptions and introduces the language
I will be using throughout the dissertation to talk about entities and
their properties.
In Chapter 3 I take up the task of presenting a theory of natural
properties and relations. I do not define ‘natural’ - rather, I
distinguish and elaborate different conceptions of naturalness, and select
one on which to focus in this dissertation.
In Chapter 4 I produce a theory of various notions related to
naturalness: the notions of intrinsic properties, duplicates, internal and
external relations, intrinsic profiles, and qualitative properties and
relations. I follow David Lewis in analyzing these notions in terms of
naturalness. However, because of an issue raised in Chapter 3, Lewis’s
account of the relation between naturalness and duplication is too
simplistic. One task of Chapter 4 is to make the necessary complications.
13
Further tasks include investigating the relation between duplication and
intrinsically, and stating various consequences of the definitions that I
offer.
If, as I think likely, naturalness cannot be analyzed, then what is
the proper response? David Lewis expresses sympathy with the project of
including naturalness in our ontology as an unanalyzed concept. I call
this approach primitive naturalism , and while I am sympathetic to primitive
naturalism, I do not believe it can be incorporated into Lewis’s
ontological system. In particular, Lewis’s "class nominalism" is the
culprit; Chapter 5 develops this objection.
The question of whether we can analyze a notion is vague until we
have specified what concepts may be employed in the analysis. In Chapter 8
I will consider some proposed analyses of our concepts using only "quasi-
logical" notions such as modal and mereological concepts, and also
spatiotemporal concepts. But an analysis of naturalness may be possible in
terms of a sparse theory of universal.
The distinctive feature of a sparse theory of universals is that a
universal is not admitted for every meaningful predicate or every class of
possible objects; only a select few classes of objects and predicates
correspond to universals. Intuitively, a predicate expresses a sparse
universal only if whenever it applies to two objects, those objects must
thereby be genuinely similar. ‘Having unit positive charge’ may express a
universal, but ‘not having unit positive charge’ would not; neither would
‘having unit positive charge or having unit negative charge’. Certainly,
‘having a friend named "George"’ would not express a universal.
The concept of genuine similarity just alluded to perhaps requires
comment. Genuine similarity is not just a matter of shared properties. Two
14
objects can share the property being owned by Ted and still not be truly
similar in any respect. Neither is genuine similarity a mere matter of
shared intrinsic properties, for completely dissimilar objects may share
the intrinsic property not being spherical™ Now it must be granted that
there are everyday uses of the word ‘similar’ that do not express this
concept that I have called "genuine similarity". The sentence "John and
Jane are similar in that each has a doctor for a father" seems to be
capable of expressing a truth, given an appropriate context. The meaning
of the word ‘similar’ is context-dependent. Still, I think there is an
intuitive notion of genuine similarity that is appropriately "objective",
and it is this sort of similarity that concerns us here. Consider two
perfect duplicate black marbles, x and y, and a pink elephant z. I find it
compelling to say that it is an objective fact that x and y resemble each
other perfectly, but neither resembles z.
If there are universal and they are properly sparse, then, it is
claimed, they may afford definition of ‘perfectly natural’: 21
(D4) Property P is perfectly natural iff there is some universal U
such that the set of P’s possible instances is identical to the
set of U’s possible instances
Chapter 6 critically discusses this project of analyzing naturalness in
terms of sparse universals, focusing primarily on the work of D.M.
Armstrong. In that chapter I also defend the theory of "abundant
transcendent" universals against attacks from Armstrong, for that account
of universals seems well-suited to my purposes.
15
In Chapter 7 I will address Michael Dunn’s criticisms of Lewis’s
definition of ‘intrinsic’. I conclude that the criticisms are largely
based on misunderstanding.
In Chapter 8 I ask questions of analysis. First, I ask whether
naturalness can be analyzed purely in "quasi-logical" terms, then whether
it can be analyzed in terms of the notion of "qualitative" properties and
relations. Then I consider the question of whether intrinsically can be
analyzed in "quasi-logical" terms. To each question I answer "no", but in
each case my evidence is rather meager: the failure of a few proposed
attempts. In the second half of chapter 8 I consider proposals by Jaegwon
Kim and Michael Slote.
In Chapter 9 I will present a new application for the notion of
naturalness: the statement of "metrical realism" in the philosophy of
space and time. We realists who believe in facts about the metric
structure of space, time, and spacetime have a challenge: in what do these
facts consist, and how does our language express them? Naturalness
provides a solution.
16
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
I ignore sets, numbers, and the like. See Chapter 2 section 1.
See Lewis (1986c) p. 62, and (1983a) p. 197.
In Chapter 4 section 1 I show that ‘intrinsic’ and ‘duplicate’ areindeed interdefinable via (Dl) and (D2).
F
See G.E. Moore (1951a), esp. p. 262.
Dunn (1990) p. 186.
See Chapter 2 section 2.2 for a definition and explanation of
‘qualitative’.
7 assumPti°ns ^ two
- The first is the assumption that for any
objects whatsoever, there is an object that is their mereological sum.
Peter van Inwagen, for example, would deny this. See van Inwagen
(1990), esp. pp. 74-80. The second is that the chair-shaped objects
inside the slab are not disqualified from being duplicates of the
original chair by the fact that they are surrounded by matter. The
issue here involves "local properties". Under the rubric of "local
properties" go not only properties had by an object in virtue of what
that object is like, but also properties had by an object in virtue of
what goes on in its infinitesimal neighborhood. Must all local
properties be intrinsic? If all are, then a chair cannot have a
duplicate that is surrounded by matter. But I assume that not all local
properties are intrinsic - thus, chair-like entities inside the slab
are duplicates of the original chair.
8 Other cases, such as one involving a duplicate of the chair that happens
to materialize in outer space, might be relevant as well. I am inclined
to think that pseudo-chairs are not chairs, and hence that chairhood is
extrinsic. But there may be no determinate fact of the matter.
9 We needn’t have considered a world with different laws. Suppose I
squeeze the ball even harder until it reaches an even more deformed
shape S'. Now I let it go. While returning back to sphericality, we
may suppose that the ball momentarily assumes shape S. Its stage at
that moment has shape S, and may be stipulated to be a duplicate of the
original stage of the ball, but it has nothing pressing on it.
10 Moore (1951a), p. 260.
11 Moore (1951a), pp. 260-261.
12 Moore (1951a), p. 261.
13 Moore (1951a), p. 273.
14 Moore (1951a), p. 274.
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15 Moore (1951a), p. 275.
16 Lewis (1986c) p.60.
17 See chapter 3 sections 2.1 and 2.2.
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(1986C) P ' 61 ' ^ Chapter 4 section 3A 1 argue that (D3) must be
19 See also Phillip Bricker (1992) and (1991), although the notion of
naturalness Bncker employs is an extension of the notion I consider
since it applies to "mathematical" objects.
20 In Chapter 4 section 2.3, principle A3, which states that the set of
intrinsic properties is closed under the Boolean operations, is shown to
follow from the definition of ‘intrinsic’.
21 A variant on the universal definition of ‘perfectly natural’ should be
mentioned. Some theorists replace universal, which are supposed to
identically recur as non-spatiotemporal parts of their instances with
"particularized properties" called tropes
. See Stout (1923), Williams
(1953), and Campbell (1981). Suppose the universals theorist explains
the similarity of two unit positively charged protons by postulating a
shared universal of unit positive charge. The tropes theorist would say
rather that there is a distinct trope of unit positive charge for each
proton. Each trope of unit positive charge is exactly similar to every
other - indeed, the similarity relation among tropes is taken as a
primitive equivalence relation. The tropes theorist offers an analoe of
(D4): 6
(D5) Property P is perfectly natural iff there is a family of similar
possible tropes S such that the set of P’s possible instances is
identical to the set of possible objects that instantiate members
of S
I will not discuss tropes further in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Metaphysical Assumptions
I want to lay out some metaphysical assumptions that I will make in
this dissertation. Or rather, they will appear to be my metaphysical
assumptions. On many I have no opinion, and most have no effect on the
arguments in the dissertation. Even though I do not commit myself to these
assumptions, there is still value in "taking a stand". The alternative
would be a dissertation cluttered by endless qualification, restatement,
etc. Better to make some (somewhat arbitrary) assumptions. As will be
clear, paraphrase of what I say will usually be possible for those whose
favorite metaphysical doctrines are slighted. I will note some possible
paraphrases in this chapter, and then ignore them for the rest of the
dissertation.
The assumptions are, for the most part, those in David Lewis’s On the
Plurality of Worlds. There are two reasons for this. The first is that I
have found this framework convenient. The second is autobiographical: my
thinking about the topics in this dissertation has been influenced at every
turn by what Lewis has said.
First, there are possible worlds. I presume the existence of the
usual plenitude of possible worlds: one for every way the world could
possibly have been.
Most believe that possible worlds talk is in need of paraphrase. One
way is to find suitable entities to play the role of possible worlds. For
example, if our ontology contains propositions then we might choose to call
maximal consistent propositions "possible worlds". 1 In contrast, David
Lewis notoriously takes possible worlds talk at face value: as making
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reference to full blooded "concrete" entities. I do not defend Lewis’s
modal realism, but I will talk as if Lewis is right in his claim that other
possible worlds are "of a kind with" the actual concrete world. (For
example, I will treat non-actual possibilia as being parts of the worlds
they inhabit.)
I need a blanket term for "concrete particular". I choose ‘object’,
reserving the broader terms ‘thing’ and ‘item’ to apply to anything
whatsoever. The actual objects include tables, people, electrons, etc. If
there are points and regions of space, electromagnetic fields, etc., then
these too are objects. If there are gods, souls, etc., then these are also
objects. However, sets are not objects, nor are properties, propositions,
numbers, etc.; nor are universal (see below).
I accept talk of non-actual objects. Excepting Lewis and a few
others, the usual wisdom is that talk of other-worldly objects is in need
of paraphrase. One strategy identifies these objects with certain
properties: their essences
.
2
I make no commitment either way on this
issue.
I assume the usual characterizations of modal notions in terms of
possible worlds and objects. A statement is necessarily true if true at
all possible worlds, possibly true if true at some possible world,
impossible if true at no world. Similarly, a property is impossible if no
object has it, possible if some object has it, and necessary if every
object has it . 3 (By ‘object’ here I do not mean merely ‘actual object’; I
mean to be quantifying over all objects.) Two properties are incompatible
if no object has both; one property entails another if every object with
the first has the second; two properties are necessarily coextensive if
each entails the other.
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I assume the existence of properties. Moreover, I assume that these
are properties construed "abundantly”-, and so I make no assumption that
objects that share a property need be genuinely similar. I make a strong
assumption about the abundance of properties:
Abundance: for any class S of things (actual or otherwise) there is a
property P had by all and only the members of S
P may be extremely unnatural, "disjunctive", or "gerrymandered", but it
will still count as a property.
I will also assume that properties are individuated by necessary
coextension:
Individuation
:
if properties P and Q are such that for any object u
(actual or otherwise), u has P iff u has Q, then P=Q.
This is convenient, for it means that we may specify a property by
specifying which things have it. Again, paraphrase is available for
dissenters. Where I speak of the property had by exactly the things in set
S, I can be interpreted as referring to the conjunction of all such
properties.
I make analogous assumptions for relations. Relations are
individuated by necessary coextension, and for any n^2, and any class S of
n-tuples of things, there is a relation R such that S is the set of n-
tuples that stand in R. Moreover, I assume that for every relation R,
there is an integer n^2, and a class of n-tuples that is the class of all
and only the ’tuples that instantiate R. 5
The two assumptions, Abundance and Individuation, guarantee a one-one
correspondence between the properties and the classes of possible
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individuals. This means that the finitary and infinitary Boolean
operations are well-defined. For example, the conjunction of the
properties in a (possibly infinite) set S is the property that corresponds
to the set of possibilia that is the intersection of the sets of possibilia
that correspond to members of S. I will make free use of facts about these
operations on properties. Mutatis mutandis for relations. 6
A terminological note regarding ‘universal’ and ‘property’. Sometimes
these terms are used interchangeably. I reserve the word ‘property’ for
the abundant properties - the properties that obey the abundance
assumption. When I discuss ‘universals’, I leave it open whether or not
they obey this abundance assumption. Some, like D.M. Armstrong, construe
universals "sparsely". For example, on Armstrong’s view, distinct
universals do not have disjunctions. 7 When I discuss sparse universals in
Chapter 6, ‘universal’ must be taken to refer to a different sort of entity
than the abundant properties.
Note, however, that in chapter 6 I also discuss universals construed
abundantly, so that they do obey the abundance assumption. Then, I may
simply be taken to be discussing the abundant properties. I keep the term
‘universal’ for that discussion since Armstrong uses it in his criticisms
of that view.
At times I will need to make certain "abundance" assumptions for
possible worlds and possible objects. I quoted the customary slogan above:
there is a possible world "for every way the world might have been". But
what are the different ways the world "might have been"? "Recombination
principles" are principles that help to specify what possibilities there
are. They take the form "if such and such is possible, then such and such
must also be possible". They tell us when we can "recombine" possibilities
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to obtain more possibilities. David Lewis has an excellent discussion of
principles of recombination in Lewis (1986c) section 1.8. I do not commit
myself to any general principle of recombination; rather, when the need for
recombination arises, I will help myself to whatever particular principles
seem useful and plausible.
For each possible world, there are some objects, properties, and
relations that exist at that possible world. The objects that exist at a
world are exactly the parts of that world. I discuss existence at as
applied to properties more fully in Chapter 3 section 2.1.
In the previous paragraph and throughout the dissertation I use the
notions of mereology: the theory of the part/whole relation. 8 In
particular, whenever there are some objects, I accept the existence of the
mereological fusion, or sum, of those objects - the smallest thing that
contains those objects as parts. I assume that the mereological sum of
some objects is itself an object.
When I accept arbitrary mereological sums I introduce the possibility
of an object that does not exist at any one world. For if there is no
world at which both x and y exist, then their fusion exists at no world,
for it is a part of no world. If an object exists at some world, I call it
a possible object, otherwise it is impossible
.
9
In this dissertation I will be concerned only with properties and
relations of possible objects, since I am not interested in properties and
relations of impossible objects, nor in properties and relations of sets,
properties, universals, etc. 10 When I quantify over properties and
relations, I mean to quantify only over properties and relations of
possible objects. Moreover, my object-quantifiers will always range over
possible objects only; after this chapter I will sometimes drop the
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qualifier ‘possible’. I will sometimes say ‘possibilia’ in place of
‘possible objects’.
I will also assume the existence of times (both intervals and
instants) and places (both points and regions). Again, I invite
disbelievers to paraphrase.
I will assume the concepts of set theory, along with the assumptions
about those concepts that are captured in the Zermelo Frankel system. 11 I
will make free use of set theoretic notation, concepts, and principles.
For example, "AnB" denotes the intersection of A and B; "AcB" means that A
is a proper subset of B. A function is a set f of ordered pairs such that
no two pairs have the same first member. If <x,y>ef, we say f(x)=y, or
that y is the "value of f for argument x". The set of arguments of f is
its domain
;
the set of values for f is its range
;
f is said to be a
function from its domain onto its range. If we never have f(x)=f(y) unless
x=y, then f is one-one. "fog" denotes the composition of f with g: the
function h with the same domain D as f such that for any xeD, h(x)=g(f(x)).
Where A is the domain of function f and BeA, the "restriction of f to B" is
the function h with domain B such that for any xeB h(x) = f(x).
So much for the entities I will accept and the concepts I will employ.
Next I want to discuss two metaphysical issues. Above, I said things like
"object u has property P", rather than saying "u has P at time t" or "u has
P at t at world w". Throughout this dissertation I will always speak of
properties (and relations) of objects simpliciter, rather than relative to
world or time. This involves taking a (nominal) stand on two metaphysical
issues, one involving time, the other involving modality.
The temporal issue is that of identity through time. My assumption
will be that objects do not endure identically through time; rather, an
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object "persists" through an interval of time by having instantaneous
temporal parts in all the instants that comprise the interval
.
12 This
assumption allows me to re-interpret claims that are apparently about
properties had at times by continuants as claims about properties had
simpliciter by time-slices.
The modal issue is that of transworld identity. My assumption will be
that each possible object exists at exactly one world. Each possible
object is confined to its own world, and hence has its properties
absolutely, not relative to one world or another.
It is standard to use "counterpart theory" to analyze de re modal
predication, if possible objects are thought of as worldbound
.
13 On such a
view, an object possibly has property P just in case that object has some
counterpart in some possible world with property P. However, de re
modality will seldom be mentioned and so counterpart theory need not
concern us much.
Those who disagree with these assumptions should be able to easily
paraphrase my remarks. They may construe my talk of properties had
simpliciter by time-slices as talk of properties had relative to time and
world by continuants. For example, suppose Fred sits at time t in the
actual world. Let F be the time-slice of Fred at time t. I would say that
F has the property sitting. But one who disagrees with my assumptions
could say rather that Fred has the property sitting in the actual world, at
time t.
The doctrine of temporally bound individuals raises an issue that
requires clarification. Most philosophers who accept the doctrine of
temporal parts believe that references to ordinary objects are references
to fusions of many temporal parts: "four dimensional space-time worms ". 14
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‘Ted Sider’, on this view, refers to the fusion of all my instantaneous
time-slices throughout my life. Consider a property I currently have: the
property of sitting. According to temporal parts theorists, what makes the
sentence ‘Ted is sitting now’ true is that the current temporal part of the
referent of ‘Ted’, that is, my current temporal part, has the property of
sitting. Remember that the referent of ‘Ted’ is, on this view, a 4D space-
time worm that is not itself in any particular posture simpliciter
;
rather,
it has temporal parts in various postures. The point I want to stress here
is that many properties we attribute in common speech, like the property of
sitting, are had by instantaneous time-slices, and not by the space-time
worms we commonly refer to.
Of course, temporal continuants stand in relations corresponding to
properties attributed in commonsense speech. I stand in the relation
sitting at to the time that is now current — I do this in virtue of my
current time-slice possessing the property sitting. Moreover, the space-
time worms themselves have properties as well as standing in relations.
Consider the property of having a temporal part that exists at time t and
is sitting, or the property of having temporal parts that span seventy
years. But even for these trans-time fusions, the properties are had
simpliciter, and not relative to any time.
There is an analogous modal point. Most properties with which we are
concerned are had by worldbound objects. The property living 70 years is
had by continuant persons bound to a world, not by transworld fusions of
persons. Moreover, that property is had by those worldbound objects
simpliciter, and not relative to this world or that. There is a
corresponding relation we might define for transworld fusions of persons,
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lmng 70 years at
’
which holds between a transworld object x and a world w
iff x has a part in w that is a person who lives 70 years.
Although time and modality are analogous in many ways, there is an
interesting disanalogy. It is common among those who believe in temporal
parts to take ordinary references to physical objects as being references
to temporally extended 4D worms. But few modal realists would take
ordinary references to physical objects as being references to transworld
entities (and not merely because there are few modal realists to begin
with!). 15
These, then are my metaphysical assumptions. As noted, many are made
for convenience only, and for the sake of definiteness. But even given
this disclaimer, I realize that some will find my assumptions unacceptable.
Perhaps some will find possible worlds talk, say, as being utterly
incapable of being paraphrased into an ontologically acceptable language.
There is no space here to argue this point, so this dissertation must be
seen as beginning:
"if you can accept my framework, then And even
those who cannot accept my assumptions can perhaps find arguments that are
analogous to mine within their own systems. In sum, I hope that my
discussion of naturalness, intrinsicality, and duplication is independent
of most of the metaphysical assumptions I have made.
2.2 Language
Next I want to get clear (informally) on the language I will be using
to talk about possible worlds and their contents. Here and elsewhere, I
will engage in some use-mention sloppiness in the interest of smooth
exposition.
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My primary language is a possibilist language much like that discussed
by David Lewis in ‘Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic’. It
contains no modal operators; in their place we have quantifiers that range
over possible worlds (variables: w, w', etc.) and quantifiers that range
over all possible objects (variables: x, y, z, u, v, etc.). (Notice that
I restrict the latter quantifiers to possible objects.) So the sentence
"VxFx" says that every possible object, both actual and merely possible
,
is
F. Usually, I will use English phrases like ‘for every possible object x’
instead of ‘Vx’; the latter is only an abbreviation - it does not indicate
any increased formality or level of rigor.
Occasionally, I will make modal claims using the language of "boxes
and diamonds"; I will use locutions like "necessarily", "possibly",
"entails", etc. This will usually take place when I am discussing the work
of a philosopher who uses this sort of language. In such cases, my words
should be interpreted in the way David Lewis outlines in his 1968 paper
Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic". For example, a de re
modal claim like "x might have had property P" means that a counterpart of
x in some possible world has property P. Moreover, when I use the language
of boxes and diamonds, my quantifiers are actualist, not possibilist. For
example, if I say "3xFx" in such a context, this means that at every
possible world w, there is some possible object in w that is F.
I will also permit quantifiers ranging over properties and relations,
and corresponding variables ‘P’, ‘Q’, ‘R’ etc. These range over all
properties and relations that are had by nothing other than possible
objects. I will often use variables that have properties or relations as
values as if they were predicates. Thus, to assert that object x has
property P, I will say simply "Px". When discussing universal, I will use
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variables like ‘U’ and ‘V’; it will be clear from the context whether the
universals quantified over are sparse or abundant.
I will also employ "lambda abstraction". For example, where
<t> is some
formula with exactly one free variable, x, the expression "Xxp shall be
understood as denoting the property expressed by rbeing an x such that <p\
Finally, I will employ the "description operator". Thus, the term
‘ixFx’ refers to the F if there is exactly one F. Whether this is
interpreted possibilist ("the one possible object that is F") or actualist
("the one possible object in such and such possible world that is F") will
depend on context. I take no particular stand on the fate of a sentence
containing such a term when there is not exactly one F.
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Notes
1 See Plantinga (1977b) and Plantinga (1974) pp. 44-45.
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and Plantinga(19 7b) pp 268-272 for an account of the reduction of possibilia to
essences. Actually, Plantinga reduces possible objects to essences. Seebelow tor the distinction between objects and possible objects.
Notice that on this terminology, a possible property might be such that
it is not possible that it is instantiated, for it might be had only by
impossible objects (fusions of objects from distinct worlds). See below
for the distinction between possible and impossible objects.
4 This is Lewis’s terminology -- see Lewis (1986c) p. 59 ff.
5 With this last assumption I eliminate infinite-place relations and
multi-grade relations. This I do for simplicity.
A succinct summary of the formal properties of the structure consisting
of the set of properties together with the operations of finitary
conjunction and disjunction, and negation is to say that it is a
complete atomic Boolean Algebra
. For this structure is isomorphic to
the Boolean algebra of the class of subclasses of the class of possible
objects, and so by Theorem 5 from Halmos (1963) is a complete atomic
Boolean algebra. See Halmos pp. 3-9 on Boolean Algebras, and p. 25 for
material on infinitary conjunction and disjunction in Boolean Algebras.
7 See Armstrong (1978b) p. 19 ff.
8 See Goodman and Leonard (1940) on mereology. Also see Lewis
(1991) p. 72 note 5 for more references on mereology.
9 An object that is the fusion of several possible objects, but does not
itself exist at any world is one example of an impossible object. Though
this will not concern us, it is natural to assume that there are no
other kinds of impossible objects. That is, I assume that every object
is the fusion of some possible objects. Equivalently, the fusion of all
the objects is identical to the fusion of all the possible worlds.
10 Exceptions: I am, of course, interested in the naturalness of
properties and relations, and I will be interested, for example, in the
property making for similarity which is had by properties (see Chapter 3
section 3.1). But I will not be interested in these when I quantify
over properties and relations.
11 See, for example, Mendelson (1987) pp. 222-224.
12 See Lewis (1986c) p. 202 for the "endurance'V'persistence" terminology.
13 See Lewis (1968).
14 Lewis is a representative example. See Lewis (1986c) pp. 202-204.
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15 See Lewis (1986c) pp. 218-220.
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CHAPTER 3
CONCEPTIONS OF NATURALNESS
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I distinguish and discuss different conceptions of
naturalness.
Naturalness is to be taken as a primitive, but even without giving
reductive analyses it is still possible to clarify and distinguish
different notions of naturalness. I will choose one conception of
naturalness as primary, and attempt to give a rationale for this choice.
I should note that I do not intend what I say about naturalness to
extend to "abstract" entities such as numbers. This is not to say that
naturalness does not apply to abstract entities. I simply do not know how
to illuminate the application of naturalness to these items. 1
I assume that naturalness comes in degrees (in section 4 I justify
this assumption). The primitive I will elucidate is the relation at least
as natural as, from which the relations more natural than and equally as
natural as may be defined. I discuss these relations in detail in sections
2.3 and 3.2.
The most natural properties and relations will occupy much of our
attention; these are perfectly natural. A fundamental assumption about
perfectly natural properties that I will not question is the following:
(0) Every perfectly natural property is intrinsic2
However, the "converse" of (0), the claim that every intrinsic property is
perfectly natural, is implausible. The property having unit positive
charge seems intrinsic, and if it is then so is its negation, the property
not having unit positive charge . 3 But only the former would be a serious
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candidate for perfect naturalness. 4 The set of perfectly natural
properties, then, is a proper subset of the set of intrinsic properties.
Which proper subset? David Lewis has the following to say:*
Sharing of [the perfectly natural properties] makes for qualitative
similarity, they carve at the joints, they are intrinsic, they are
highly specific, the sets of their instances are ipso facto not
entirely miscellaneous, there are only just enough of them to
characterise things completely and without redundancy....
Physics has its short list of ‘fundamental physical
properties’: the charges and masses of particles, also their so-
called spins and colours and ‘flavours’, and maybe a few more that
have yet to be discovered.... What physics has undertaken... is an
inventory of the [perfectly natural properties] of this-worldly
things.
This passage seems to me to contain the seeds of two distinct conceptions
of naturalness:
Conception 1: naturalness as fundamentalness
Conception 2: naturalness as the source of similarity
In what follows I investigate how Conceptions 1 and 2 characterize
the notion of naturalness. Each Conception will be explicated. As I will
show, the Conceptions are inconsistent with each other, but parts of the
Conceptions can be shared. The goal will be to clarify the Conceptions of
naturalness, partly in an informal intuitive fashion, and partly through
articulating various principles suggested by the Conceptions.
Section 2 contains my explication of Conception 1. In section 2.1 I
clarify the conception of naturalness as fundamentalness by relating the
concept of fundamentalness to the concepts of supervenience and
microphysicality, and by discussing the naturalness of "combinations" of
properties. In section 2.2 I discuss an important complication in a
principle from section 2.1. Whereas in section 2.1 I focus mostly on
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perfect naturalness, in section 2.3 I discuss relative naturalness as
conceived by Conception 1.
Section 3 deals with Conception 2. In Section 3.1 I articulate
Conception 2 of perfect naturalness, and show its relation to that of
Conception 1. In section 3.2 I do the same for relative naturalness.
In Section 4 I discuss the choice of a Conception, and I conclude
in section 5.
Before I begin, I want to make a methodological point. The goal of
this chapter is clarification of naturalness, not analysis. I take
naturalness as primitive because I cannot analyze it. Therefore, do not
look for non-circular necessary and sufficient conditions for a property’s
being perfectly natural, or for one property’s being more natural than
another. At times I will say things that are "circular" in the following
sense: I will characterize naturalness by relating it to notions that I
ultimately analyze in terms of naturalness. Another kind of "circularity":
sometimes I will relate naturalness to naturalness itself, or to near
relatives. If such "circularity" enables the reader to fix on naturalness,
then it has achieved its purpose. Since my goal is clarification rather
than analysis, this is fair play. 6
3.2 Conception 1
3.2.1 Supervenience. Microphysicalitv. and Property "Combinations"
The first component of Conception 1 is that the perfectly natural
properties and relations are the most "fundamental" properties and
relations. In the actual world, these seem to be those investigated by
physics - the "most basic building blocks of the universe". However,
perhaps at some other worlds the most fundamental properties are, in some
34
sense, "non-physical". I seek clarification of ‘fundamental’, but I will
not offer any definition. Since I cannot define ‘natural’, neither can I
define any of its synonyms.
It will be seen that the notion of the most fundamental properties
and relations is exceedingly difficult to specify. Ultimately, all I will
do is discuss principles that seem to "flow from" the identification of
naturalness with the intuitive notion of fundamentalness. The ideal
situation would have been to come up with a precise version of the notion
of fundamentalness, and then to derive the principles, but this was not to
be.
I turn first to the relationship between supervenience and
fundamentalness. Supervenience is a relation of functional dependence. 7
When A supervenes on B, this means that the instantiation of the B-
properties and relations in some sense functionally determines the
instantiation of the A-properties and relations.
The precise concept of supervenience I employ is one of
global supervenience. 8 For any world w, denote the set of w’s
objects by "D(w)".
Where A and B are sets of properties and relations, A supervenes on B
iff for any possible worlds wl and w2, any B-isomorphism between D(wl)
and D(w2) is also an A-isomorphism.
We say that property P supervenes on set B iff {P} supervenes on B.
We must define the notion of an A-isomorphism between sets SI and S2
for a set of properties and relations A. I will use boldface letters as
variables over finite sequences of possibilia. When "x" stands for a
sequence <x ...x > and R is a relation such that Rfa^.-.x^), then I will
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wnte "R(x)’\ When f is a one-place function defined over the members of a
sequence x, I will use "f(x)" to denote the sequence gotten from x by
replacing each member of x by the value assigned to it by f. A function f
is a part-whole isomorphism iff for any x,y in f s domain, x is a part of y
iff f(x) is a part of f(y) (note that such a function is guaranteed to be
one-one). A function f is an A
-isomorphism iff f is a part-whole
isomorphism such that i) for any x in the domain of f and property PeA, x
has P iff f(x) has P, and ii) for any sequence x of objects from f s domain
and relation ReA, R(x) iff R(f(x». Finally, f is an A
-isomorphism between
SI and S2 iff f is an A-isomorphism from SI onto S2.
I will appeal to a few facts about (global) supervenience: 9
(51) If A supervenes on B, and B^C, then A supervenes on C
(52) If A supervenes on C, BsC, and B supervenes on C-B, then A
supervenes on C-B
(53) If property P is (finitely) "definable" in terms of the
properties and relations in set S plus the part-whole relation,
then {P} supervenes on S.
(54) Supervenience is transitive and reflexive
Where A and A' are sets of properties and relations, say that A and A' are
"negation-images" "^(AjA')" iff for every property or relation P in either
set, the other set contains either P or ~P (or both). The final principle
is:
(55) If yV(A,A') and A(B,B'), then A supervenes on B iff A' supervenes
on B'
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Conception 1 involves a supervenience relation between the perfect
natural properties and relations and certain other properties and
relations. Once you fix the distribution of a world’s perfectly natural
properties and relations over its objects, you have fixed the distribution
of a certain wider range of properties and relations over those objects.
But, as we will now see, it is a tricky matter to say exactly which
properties and relations those are.
For example, we should not claim that all properties instantiated at
a world supervene on the set of perfectly natural properties and relations
at that world, for haecceities do not supervene on the perfectly natural
properties and relations. Consider a world w containing two objects a and
b, neither with any proper parts, and no other objects. For simplicity,
let us suppose that the binary spatial distance relations are the only
perfectly natural relations at w, and that the only perfectly natural
property at w is property P. Suppose further that objects a and b are 1
meter apart, and that each has property P. Let R be the set of perfectly
natural relations at w, and let N = Ru{P}. Thus, N is the set of perfectly
natural properties and relations at w. Call the fusion of a and b "a+b".
Notice that D(w) = {a,b,a+b}. Let set B contain just one property: the
property of being identical to a. The following function f is an N-
isomorphism between D(w) and itself, but it is not a B-isomorphism. Hence,
B does not supervene on N:
f:
a — > b
b — > a
a+b — > a+b
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Function f is clearly a part-whole isomorphism. Since a and b each has P,
the only property in N, f preserves the properties in N. As for the
relations, by the symmetry in the world the function f preserves these as
well. For example, since a and b stand in the relation being 1 meter from,
b and a stand in this relation as well. So f is an N-isomorphism. But it
is clearly not a B-isomorphism, for a has the property being identical to
a
,
whereas f(a) (that is, b) does not.
The natural conclusion to draw from this example is that we should
require only qualitative properties and relations to supervene on the
perfectly natural properties and relations. ‘Qualitative’ here is not
supposed to be opposed to ‘quantitative’. Rather, ‘qualitative’ is
intended in the sense of "purely descriptive", "purely general", and "non-
haecceitistic". Qualitative properties and relations do not "involve"
particular objects. The idea is that specifying the distribution of
perfectly natural properties and relations need not fix the identities of
the objects that exist there, but only the qualitative facts about the
world, such as the number of objects that exist there and their qualitative
properties and relations. See Chapter 4 section 2.2 for information on
qualitativeness.
Say that a set S is an Q-base for a world w iff the set of
qualitative properties and relations at w supervenes on S. Conception 1
seems to involve the claim that to fix the qualitative properties and
relations of a world, you need only fix that world’s perfectly natural
properties and relations:
(1) for any world w, the set of perfectly natural properties and
relations at w is a Q-base for w.
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There are complications with (1), however. One of these involves
the possibility of worlds with no perfectly natural properties, but I defer
discussion of this issue until the next section since there is a more
pressing problem. (1) employs the notion of a property existing at a
world. This notion requires comment.
In one sense of "exists at", a property exists at a world iff it has
an instance in that world, but this is not the sense I intend. I will show
that, thus interpreted, (1) would be equivalent to the following:
(1?) The set of all qualitative properties supervenes on the set of
all perfectly natural properties and relations
For any world and any property or relation P, either P or its negation will
be instantiated at that world (I assume for simplicity’s sake that every
world has at least one object) 10
. So the set of qualitative properties and
relations at a given world will contain, for each qualitative property or
relation whatsoever, either it or its negation. Similarly, the set of
perfectly natural properties and relations at a world will contain, for
each perfectly natural property whatsoever, either it or its negation. By
(S5), (1) is equivalent to (1?).
(1?) is not what I intend. I do not deny (1?), but I want to assert
something stronger. I want to assert that properties like being a hydrogen
atom, being within 10 feet of something cubical, etc. supervene on the
properties and relations of physics alone, the actual perfectly natural
properties and relations, without the help of alien perfectly natural
properties and relations.
What, then, is it for a property to exist at a world? I myself have
no analysis of this notion, and if none is to be had it should be taken as
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primitive. This is not suspect, I say, for existence-at seems to be an
extremely basic, quasi-logical notion. Other such basic notions, such as
the part-whole relation, are legitimately taken as primitive. Each
possible world has various items that exist at that world. There are the
concrete objects that exist at that world. But there are also the
properties and relations that exist at that world. And it seems to make
good sense to say that not all the properties and relations that there are
exist at the actual world, just as it makes sense to say that not all the
possible individuals exist at the actual world.
Though I cannot define ‘exists at’, I can say a bit about it. The
properties that exist at a world should be closed under the (infinitary)
Boolean operations. They should also be closed under structural
combinations (see the end of this section). Moreover, if a perfectly
natural property is instantiated at a world, then it exists at that world.
If this notion of existence at makes sense, then (1) does not
collapse to (1?), for it is not true, given this notion of existence at,
that for every property and every world, either the property or its
negation exists at the world.
Let us return to the elaboration of Conception 1. Conception 1 says
more than (1). (1) merely says that the set of perfectly natural
properties and relations at a world is a Q-base for that world. But each
world has many Q-bases. For example, by the reflexivity of supervenience
(see (S4)), the set of any world’s qualitative properties and relations
will be a Q-base for that world; moreover, if S is a Q-base for w, then by
(SI) any superset of S will be as well. The set of w’s perfectly natural
properties should be the "most fundamental" Q-base for w. As Lewis says in
the quotation above, there are only enough perfectly natural properties to
40
characterize the qualitative character of the world without redundancy.
But what is meant by this?
If S and S are each Q-bases for w, and S' is a proper subset of S,
then S seems less fundamental than S'. We do not need to make reference to
all the properties in S to characterize w qualitatively. Call S a minimal
Q-base for w iff S is a Q-base for w and no proper subset of S is a Q-base
for w. We might think to cash out the non-redundancy intuition as follows:
(!') for world w, the set of perfectly natural properties and
relations at w is a minimal Q-base for w.
However, there is a complication, which we can call the "problem of
minimality". Suppose we have some properties or relations that are,
intuitively, equally natural. Yet, given some of them, we can define the
others. Suppose for example that P, Q, and R are perfectly natural, and
yet P is definable from (and hence supervenes on, by (S3)), {Q,R}. This
will violate (1'). For suppose that S is the set of perfectly natural
properties at w, and suppose that P, Q, and R are members of S. Since {P}
supervenes on {Q,R}, by (SI) and (S2), anything that supervenes on S
supervenes on S-{P} as well. Hence S is not a minimal Q-base for w.
Here is a concrete instance of the problem of minimality. We need a
perfectly natural asymmetric relation. The relation temporally earlier
than seems a likely candidate. But if earlier than is perfectly natural,
then surely its converse, the relation later than, is also perfectly
natural. But since earlier than and later than are interdefinable, by (S3)
each supervenes on the other. Thus, the argument in the previous paragraph
refutes (1'). This is an instance of what we can call "the problem of
permutation", a subproblem of the problem of minimality.
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Let us introduce the concept of a "permutation" of a relation.
Earlier than is a permutation of later than. If relation B is the temporal
betweenness relation, holding between x, y, and z iff x is earlier than y
which in turn is earlier than z, then the following relation would be a
permutation of B: the relation holding between x, y, and z iff y is
earlier than x which in turn is earlier than z. Generalizing, let R be an
n-place relation. R' is a permutation of R iff i) R' has n places, and ii)
there is a one-one function f from {l,..,n} onto itself such for any
possibilia x...x
,
R(x ...x ) iff R'(x ...x ).
We might try to protect (1') from the problem of permutation by
revising the definition of ‘minimal Q-base’ as follows. A set S would be
taken to be a minimal Q-base for world w iff S is a Q-base for w, and for
every S' that is a proper subset of S and a Q-base for w, S-S' contains
only permutations of members of S'. Intuitively, this revision says that
the only redundancy allowed in the set of perfectly natural properties and
relations at a world is the redundancy of containing both a relation and
one of its permutations.
I do not think that this revision would be ad hoc. Suppose I
describe the world by saying that a certain event el happened earlier than
another event e2. Suppose you say instead that e2 happened later than el.
In a sense, we said the same thing — our sentences had the same factual
content. There is a single fact about the world that we described in
different ways. I am quick to grant that there is a clear sense in which
we do not say the same thing. On one sense of the word ‘proposition’, we
expressed distinct propositions: the proposition that el is before e2, and
the proposition that e2 is later than el. 11 But there is also a sense of
‘proposition’ according to which the propositions that el is before e2 and
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the proposition that e2 is later than el are identical: the sense of
‘proposition’ on which necessarily coextensive propositions are always
identical. So, allowing R and also a permutation of R in the set of
perfectly natural properties and relations at a world seems not too distant
from the intuition that this set shouldn’t be "redundant".
This revision to the definition of ‘minimal Q-base’ would be
unnecessary if relations were always identical to their permutations.
Timothy Williamson argues for a special case of this thesis in his
intriguing 1985 paper "Converse Relations": that a binary relation is
always identical to its converse. His defense of this view presumably
carries over to a defense of the stronger view that a relation is always
identical to each of its permutations. Though I believe that in his paper
Williamson answers the obvious objections to this thesis, I will stop short
of adopting this defense against the problem of permutations. 12
Even if we could solve the problem of permutation with the revision
to the definition of ‘minimal Q-base’, we would still have the more general
problem of minimality. Though I have no detailed example of which I am
certain, I cannot rule out the possibility of a violation of (T).
For example, perhaps there are a number of spatial relations that
are perfectly natural:
point x is linearly between points y and z
points x and y are equidistant from point z
segment x is the segment between points y and z
segment x is congruent to segment y
segment x is longer than segment y
etc.
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It seems open that some of these are definable in terms of others. Perhaps
there are numerous proper subsets of this set of relations, each sufficient
to define the entire set. And yet all the listed items seem equally
natural.
In conversation, Phillip Bricker has emphasized a formal analogy
between the problem of minimality and the familiar existence of multiple
bases for the definition of the truth functions. We can start with
negation and conjunction, and define disjunction, material implication, and
the rest. We can instead begin with disjunction and negation. And there
are other bases. None of these choices seems the most "natural". Perhaps
there is an analogy in the realm of natural properties.
Thus, I am unwilling to affirm (1'). The problem of minimality
remains unsolved, and I come to a disappointing conclusion of my discussion
of the relation between fundamentalness and supervenience.
Next, I want to discuss microphysicality
. In our world at least,
microphysicality and fundamentalness seem to go hand in hand. For example,
having spin 1/2 seems more microphysical than, and also more fundamental
than, redness. I think we should entertain, then, the following claim:
(2) If property or relation P is more microphysical than Q, then P is
more fundamental and hence more natural than Q
But (2) contains a term whose meaning is less than transparently
clear: ‘more microphysicaT . Note the following example: let P=being an
electron that is a part of a friend of George Bush; let Q= redness. P is
clearly less natural than Q, and yet those objects that instantiate P are
electrons, whereas the objects that instantiate Q are macroscopic objects.
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The moral is that ‘P is more microphysical than Q' had better not mean
merely that P’s instances are smaller than Q’s instances.
Instead of attempting a definition of ‘more microphysical’, I would
rather consider a more precise principle. The following principle flows
naturally from the intuition that greater microphysicality entails greater
fundamentalness, and hence greater naturalness according to Conception 1:
(3) If object x has proper parts, then some proper part of x has a
property P that is more natural than any property of x
A possible ambiguity should be pointed out. The property having
unit negative charge seems like a perfectly natural property. But we often
say that macroscopic objects have a "negative charge of one" if their net
charge is equal to that of an electron. Does this force us to give up (3)?
No. We should distinguish the property of having unit negative charge from
the property having net unit negative charge. Net charge and charge may be
related as follows:
x has charge r iff x has net charge r and no proper part of x has
any net charge
x has net charge r iff the sum of the charges of parts of x is r
Macroscopic objects have net charge but not charge. As I see it, charge is
more fundamental and hence more natural (on Conception 1) than net charge.
Principle (3) has the virtue of circumventing the problem of
defining ‘more microphysical’. It also has the virtue of bringing out
possible objections to the connection between microphysicality and
naturalness. Imagine a very bland possible world called "Vanilla". 13 I
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call Vanilla "bland" (and "Vanilla") because the only intrinsic properties
that exist at Vanilla are those that involve mass. 14 Properties such as the
properties of charge, spin, charm, etc. are alien to Vanilla. An objector
to (3) might argue as follows. Consider an object x from Vanilla that has
proper parts. Suppose that x has mass m. It seems that x’s most natural
property would be having mass m. The objector would ask: what proper part
of x could have a property that is more natural than this? The only
possible candidates are other mass properties, and surely every mass
property is as natural as every other.
I regard this as a formidable objection to (3), but I do not think
it is conclusive. The defender of (3) could make a distinction analogous
to my distinction between unit negative charge and net unit negative
charge. Let us suppose that Vanilla can be decomposed exhaustively into
(mereological) atoms - objects with no proper parts. In other words,
Vanilla contains no "atomless gunk". 15 There is, then, a certain subset of
the mass properties instantiated at Vanilla that we might call the
micromass properties. Micromass is had only by atoms, whereas mass is had
by atoms and non-atoms alike. More carefully,
x has micromass m = x has mass m and x is a mereological atom.
(Indeed, by analogy to ‘net charge’, mass might be more properly called
‘net mass’.) It could be argued that the micromass properties are more
fundamental and natural than the other mass properties. If this is
correct, then every non-atom x of Vanilla will have a proper part with a
property more natural than any of x’s properties. The part is any of x’s
atoms, and the property is that atom’s micro-mass. So principle (3) yields
the correct result in this case.
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The evaluation of this response is a tricky affair, but I will not
pursue it further, for I think that (3) is in trouble on independent
grounds. (3) entails the following:
(3') Perfectly natural properties are had only by mereological atoms
-- that is, by objects without proper parts.
But (3') seems overly bold. Couldn’t there be a world in which a certain
perfectly natural property P holds independently of the perfectly natural
properties of parts of its instances? P might, for example, be an
irreducibly mental property. 16 We believe the macroscopic qualitative
properties of the actual world to depend on the more fundamental properties
of microscopic entities, but I see no reason why this must be true of
necessity. Thus, at such a world, an object with proper parts could have a
perfectly natural property. Hence, (3') is false. The problem with (3')
(and also (3)) is that it makes a contingent feature of our world into a
necessary feature. Insofar as I understand (2), I reject it also. The
connection between naturalness and microphysicality is contingent.
So much for the relation between naturalness and microphysicality.
Next I want to look at the naturalness of "combinations" of perfectly
natural properties and relations. Intuitively, the perfectly natural
properties and relations should be "simples", not combinations. But more
precision is needed.
First, Boolean combinations. 17 Say that a property is conjunctive
iff it is the conjunction of two other properties (similarly for
‘disjunctive’ and ‘negative’). We must not be tempted by the following:
(?) If P is a conjunctive, disjunctive, or negative property then P
is not perfectly natural
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for almost every property is conjunctive, disjunctive, and negative. 18
Consider the property having unit negative charge. It seems likely that
this property is perfectly natural, and yet it is the conjunction of having
unit negative charge or being a part of a green thing and having unit
negative charge or not being a part of a green thing. Also, it is the
disjunction of having unit negative charge and being part of a green thing
and having unit negative charge and not being part of a green thing, and it
is the negation of not having unit negative charge.
However, I do think that Boolean combinations of distinct perfectly
natural properties are less fundamental and hence less natural than the
originals. I cannot derive this result. But on Conception 1 there are
only supposed to be enough perfectly natural properties to characterize
things "without redundancy". Including P&Q as well as P and Q among the
perfectly natural properties seems to go against this spirit. Moreover,
the property having unit negative charge and having spin 1/2 seems,
intuitively, less fundamental than both having unit negative charge and
having spin 1/2. Physics textbooks mention only the latter.
There are non-Boolean ways to "combine" properties and relations to
form properties. Supposing unit positive charge to be a perfectly natural
property and being ten feet from to be a perfectly natural relation, we
have the following:
being such that something has unit positive charge
being ten feet from something
being ten feet from something with unit positive charge
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These properties should not turn out perfectly natural. However, this
needs no special provision. These properties are not intrinsic and are
thus ruled out by principle (0). Clearly, each can differ between perfect
duplicates.
There are, however, non-Boolean combinations that are not ruled out
by (0): structural combinations. Given certain properties and relations,
we can combine them to form a property had by an object when its parts
instantiate those properties and relations in a certain way. 19
This is best introduced by example. Begin with the properties of
electronhood, protonhood
,
and a relation bonded. The property being an
Hydrogen atom is had by an object x iff x is composed of a proton and an
electron bonded to each other. In such a case, we say that being a
Hydrogen atom is a "structural combination" of electronhood
,
protonhood,
and bonded. 20
More precisely, say that P is a structural combination of the
properties and relations in set A iff P is denoted by some sentence of the
following form:
the property of being the fusion of n possible objects x ...x
1 n
such that <p(x ...x )v
1 n
where n^l and <p is a conjunction containing only i) conjuncts with purely
mereological terms, and i) conjuncts of either of the following forms:
Fx
i
Rx ...x
il im
where i, and il...im are between 1 and n (inclusive), F expresses some
property in A, and R expresses some m-place relation in A. 21 Say that P is
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a proper structural combination of the members of A if P is a structural
combination of the members of A, but P is not a structural combination of
the members of any proper subset of A. Henceforth, by "structural
combination" I mean "proper structural combination".
The importance of structural combinations of perfectly natural
properties and relations is that they are intrinsic. This seems intuitively
correct, and is a straightforward consequence of the definition of
‘intrinsic’ offered in Chapter 4 section 2.2. 22 So, principle (0) does not
rule out the possibility that structural combinations of perfectly natural
properties are themselves perfectly natural. And yet I think that such
structural combinations are not perfectly natural. Again, I cannot prove
this. It simply seems to me that the property of being a Hydrogen atom is
less fundamental than electronhood, protonhood
,
and bonded.
Thus, I accept:
(4) Boolean combinations of other perfectly natural properties, and
structural combinations of other perfectly natural properties and
relations, are less natural than those perfectly natural
properties and relations, and hence are not perfectly natural
I would like to be able to derive (4) from a general principle stating that
the perfectly natural properties are "non-redundant", but I failed to state
such a principle when I failed to solve the problem of minimality. (4)
must therefore stand on its own. Indeed, by making this claim, I intend to
partially specify what I mean when I say that the perfectly natural
properties and relations are the "most fundamental" properties and
relations.
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3.2.2 A Complication
In this section I want to consider the possibility of a world at
which there are no perfectly natural properties. This will require
modification of principle (1).
It seems possible that the world might be endlessly complex.
Consider a possible world that we may call "Onion". At each level,
physical properties decompose into still more basic physical properties.
There are macroscopic physical properties, micro-physical properties,
micro-micro-physical properties.... and so on forever. 23
Let me describe Onion in detail. Intuitively, every fairly natural
property at Onion is a structural combination of more fundamental
properties and the spatiotemporal relations. More carefully: i) Onion has
perfectly natural relations : the spatiotemporal relations, ii) for all
intrinsic properties PI and P2 at Onion, either PI is at least as natural
as P2, or P2 is at least as natural as PI (or both), iii) there is an
intrinsic property P at Onion such that for every intrinsic property Q at
Onion that is at least as natural as P, Q is a structural combination of
properties at Onion that are at least as natural as Q and perhaps
spatiotemporal relations.
Here is a more concrete way my description of Onion could be true.
For any intrinsic property P at Onion that is at least as natural as the
one mentioned in clause iii) above, the following sort of description is
true. P is the property of being composed of two parts separated by n
feet, one with some property PI, the other with some property P2, where PI
and P2 are at least as natural as P. PI in turn is the property of being
composed by two parts separated by n/4 feet, one with some property P3, the
other with some property P4, where P3 and P4 are at least as natural as PI.
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P3 in turn is the property of being composed of two parts separated by n/16
feet, one with some property P5, the other with some property P6, where P5
and P6 are at least as natural as P3. And so on.
I believe that such a world is possible. First, there seems to be
no inherent contradiction in the idea. Second, we seem to be able to
conceive what such a world would be like in some detail. Such a world
would be like an onion, with the layers going on forever. Imagine
scientists at such a world engaged in a futile quest to discover a "bottom"
to the complexity. Every property they discover would be found to be
composed of still more basic properties. Finally, the possibility of
endless complexity seems like an open possibility even for the actual
world. Once we thought that atoms were mereological atoms. For all we
knew, the smallest bits of matter were atoms of Flydrogen, Helium, etc. -
hence, we called them "atoms". Then we learned that these "atoms" have
proper parts (protons, neutrons, and electrons), the properties of which
determine the properties of atoms. Still later we learned that protons and
neutrons have still more basic parts (quarks), the properties of which
determine the properties of protons and neutrons. Perhaps this will go on
forever.
The importance of Onion is that no perfectly natural properties
exist at Onion, at least on the Conception 1 conception of naturalness.
For suppose that PI is a perfectly natural property at Onion. By (0), PI
is intrinsic. Let P be an instance of the existential quantifier in clause
iii) of the description of Onion. By clause ii), one of P and PI is at
least as natural as the other; since PI is perfectly natural, P cannot be
more natural than PI, so PI is at least as natural as P. 24 So by iii), PI
is structurally composed of properties that are at least as natural as it
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(and perhaps spatiotemporal relations). These latter properties cannot be
more natural than PI since PI is perfectly natural, so they are as natural
as PI. Thus they are perfectly natural.* But this violates principle (4)
from section 2.1, which says that structural combinations of perfectly
natural properties are not perfectly natural.
This spells trouble for principle (1). Principle (1) entails that
N, the set of Onion’s perfectly natural properties and relations, is a Q-
base for Onion. But if there are no perfectly natural properties
instantiated at Onion, then N just contains the spatiotemporal relations,
and hence is clearly not a Q-base for Onion. For surely there could be two
worlds satisfying my description of Onion, each with objects standing in
exactly the same spatiotemporal relations, but with objects instantiating
different intrinsic properties. Of course, in each world these intrinsic
properties will divide endlessly into more basic intrinsic properties, but
surely there could be different intrinsic properties of this kind.
It will not do to restrict (1) by saying that if the set of w’s
perfectly natural properties is nonempty, then the union of it and the set
of that world’s perfectly natural relations is a Q-base for w. Consider
the following possibility. World w has two regions: one region resembles
Onion in having no perfectly natural properties, but the other region does
have perfectly natural properties.
The solution I propose is to weaken principle (1) as follows:
(la) If the set N of perfectly natural properties and relations at
world w is such that for every qualitative property or relation P
at w, some member of N is at least as natural as P, then N is a
Q-base for w
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To see the idea behind (la), consider how it applies to Onion. N, the set
of perfectly natural properties and relations at Onion, contains only
spatiotemporal relations. Is it the case that for every qualitative
property P at Onion, some relation in N is as or more natural than P? I
think not, because of considerations that arise at the end of the next
section. Consider properties from Onion’s infinite sequence of
increasingly natural properties. Because of principle (e) from the next
section, none of these properties could be equally as natural as any member
of N. So each would have to be less natural. I find this implausible, and
I motivate this intuition at the end of the next section. So, Onion
doesn t satisfy the antecedent of (la), and hence we do not get the
incorrect result that N is a Q-base for Onion.
Notice that I have not argued for the existence of a world with no
perfectly natural relations. The existence of a possible world like Onion,
but in which the relations come in a never-ending sequence of increasing
naturalness, seems more controversial. I do not deny the possibility of
such a world; I merely do not assert its existence. Onion has importance
beyond (la). We will return to it.
3.2.3 Relative Naturalness According to Conception 1
In section 2.1 I focused mainly on perfect naturalness. I turn now
to what Conception 1 has to say about relative naturalness. Our basic
relation is as or more natural. I symbolize this relation ">". We have
made use of the relations equally as natural as ("« ") and more natural than
(">"). These may be defined in a familiar way:
Definition: P* Q = P^Q & Q>P
Definition: P^Q = P>:Q & ~Q>:P
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Conception 1 equates naturalness with fundamentalness, but what does
relative fundamentalness amount to? As elsewhere in this chapter, I have
no analysis, only intuitive pictures. I will first attempt to illuminate
relative naturalness and fundamentalness by using an intuitive notion of
"distance". Then I will clarify the relation further by discussing its
formal properties.
Again, I draw on a quotation from David Lewis: 26
Some few properties are perfectly natural. Others, even though
they may be somewhat disjunctive or extrinsic, are at least
somewhat natural in a derivative way, to the extent that they can
be reached by not-too complicated chains of definability from the
perfectly natural properties.
To elaborate the idea in this passage I invoke an intuitive notion of
"distance" of a property from a set of properties (suggested by Phillip
Bricker). Property or relation P is "at least as close" to a given set as
property or relation Q if P can be at least as directly and non-
disjunctively defined from that set’s members as Q (that is, if there is no
definition of Q from S that is more direct and non-disjunctive than every
definition of P from S). Finite definability in terms of a set makes for
closeness; if a property can only be defined using infinitary means, this
makes for greater distance. Disjunctive definitions make for more distance
than non-disjunctive ones of equal length. (I make no attempt to say how
these factors weigh off against each other in determining closeness.)27
We can define ‘closer than’ and ‘equally as close as’ as we
defined ‘more natural than’ and ‘equally as natural as’ above.
The working idea is that relative fundamentalness is relative
distance from N, the set of perfectly natural properties and relations.
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Consider the properties of the actual world as an example. I
suppose that the most fundamental properties of the actual world are the
charges, masses, spins, and the quark charms, flavors, etc., and that these
are members of N. Likewise, I assume that the spatiotemporal relations are
the most fundamental actual relations, and that they are also members of N.
Of the actual properties, closest to N (excepting the members of N
themselves) are properties like being a proton
,
being a neutron, and being
an electron, for these can be defined directly from N. As the distance
from N increases, properties get less fundamental. In decreasing order of
fundamentalness: having unit positive charge, being a proton, being a
hydrogen atom, being a water molecule. Properties like blueness and
greenness will presumably admit of no finite definition (although they
presumably supervene on N) and will thus be further from N. And even
further than these will be Nelson Goodman’s properties of grueness and
bleenness, in virtue of their disjunctiveness. 28 At the bottom are
properties that do not even supervene on N at all, and hence cannot be
defined from N at all, for a property is not definable by any means,
finitary or infinitary, from a set on which it does not supervene. 29
So, the following principle initially seems attractive:
(5) property or relation P is at least as natural as property or
relation Q iff P is at least as close to N as Q is
We have the following corollaries:
(5') P 5" Q iff P is closer to N than Q is
(5") P * Q iff P is equally as close to N as Q is
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However, (5) is incorrect. In worlds like Onion without perfectly natural
properties, (5) breaks down. Properties at Onion are not supervenient on N
at all, and hence not definable from it at all. So no property from Onion
will be closer to N than any other. But surely some properties at Onion
are more natural than others. This violates (5').
There is another difficulty with (5). Every perfectly natural
property is equally as close to N as every other, since each perfectly
natural property is a member of N and is therefore maximally close to N.
(5") implies, therefore, that every perfectly natural property and relation
is equally as natural as every other. I worry that this result is too
strong, and so I offer the following weakened version of (5), which takes
into account both of (5)’s problems:
(5a) For any set N of pairwise-equally natural perfectly natural
properties and relations, and any properties or relations P and Q
that supervene on N, ?>Q iff P is as least as close to N as Q is.
Why not hold that all perfectly natural properties and relations are
equally natural? A stronger version of (5a) would have this consequence:
(5a?) For any properties or relations P and Q that supervene on N, the
set of all perfectly natural properties and relations, P^Q iff P
is at least as close to N as Q is.
Well, I do not want to claim that the view that perfectly natural
properties and relations are equally natural is false, but neither do I
want to rely on its truth. I would like to stay neutral with respect to
this view, since I feel some inclination towards the view that some
perfectly natural properties are incomparable in terms of naturalness with
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some other perfectly natural properties. Consider, for example, perfectly
natural properties that are alien to our world. I see no good reason to
say that those properties are equally as natural as our world’s quark
properties.
One potential reason for claiming that an alien perfectly natural
property P is equally as natural as, say unit negative charge, is that each
one has a maximal degree of naturalness. We might put this point by saying
that P and unit negative charge play identical roles in the structure of
naturalness. But I don’t think this is a good reason for claiming that P
and unit negative charge are equally natural. The fact that P and unit
negative charge are each maximally natural does not formally entail that
they are equally natural, 30 for the field of a transitive and symmetric
relation can have the structure of a forest, with different "trees" having
"trunks" with bottoms (the perfectly natural properties and relations) that
are nonetheless incomparable in terms of that relation. Perhaps there is a
sense in which the degree of naturalness P has "relative to its tree" is
equal to the degree of naturalness unit negative charge has relative to its
tree (in spelling out this notion in detail, the "tree" of a property or
relation R would be taken to be the set of properties R' comparable to R
(that is, such that either R^R' or R'hR)). But the original question
involved comparisons of naturalness directly, and not "relative to trees". 31
So, to maintain neutrality about the question of whether all
perfectly natural properties are equally natural, I endorse (5a) rather
than the stronger (5a?). (5a) falls sadly short of offering fully general
necessary and sufficient conditions for the t relation. It leaves many
questions unanswered. Suppose property P supervenes on one set of pairwise
equally natural properties, whereas Q supervenes on another; suppose
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further that neither P nor Q supervenes on the set associated with the
other property. Is either P or Q as or more natural than the other? (5a)
is silent. Worse, it gives us no answer to the question of when one
perfectly natural property is equally as natural as another. Still, it has
value, for it relates the more natural than relation to distance-from-a-set
in a special case -- with this I must be content. The answer that (5a?)
gives to the last question (namely, the answer that perfectly natural
properties are always equally natural) seems to me to be incorrect -
better not to take a stand than to take a dubious stand.
(5a) does not concern properties from Onion, for those properties,
presumably, do not supervene on any set of perfectly natural properties.
Intuitively, however, the notion of closeness should apply to properties
from Onion in the following way. If we consider a set of all the
properties from Onion with a certain degree of naturalness or more, then
the rest of the properties at Onion should be more or less natural
depending on how close they are to that set. This idea may be specified as
follows. For any properties or relations P, Q, let ^(P,Q) be the set of
properties and relations that are more natural than both P and Q.
(5b) For any properties P and Q, if P and Q both supervene on y(P,Q),
then P^Q iff P is at least as close to y(P,Q) as is Q.
(5b) seems to have correct consequences for Onion’s properties. Given a
pair of properties P and Q from Onion, y(P,Q) will contain an infinity of
properties of which P and Q are structural combinations. It seems that
distance from this set will determine the relative naturalness of P and Q.
(5b) also seems to have acceptable consequences for worlds containing
perfectly natural properties. When we compare, say, blueness to grueness
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in terms of naturalness, (5b) instructs us to look at y(,blueness
,
grueness). This set will contain the perfectly natural properties and
relations of the actual world, and all properties definable from them that
are more natural than both blueness and grueness. It seems plausible that
blueness is closer to this set than grueness. Thus, (5b) has the correct
result, blueness is more natural than grueness.
We must include in (5b) the requirement that P and Q supervene on
y(P,Q) for various reasons. For one, if P and Q are each perfectly
natural, then ^(P,Q) will be empty; if every property is as close to the
null set as every other (as seems plausible), it would then follow that
perfectly natural properties are always equally natural. Or suppose that
neither P nor Q is perfectly natural, and yet P and Q are incomparable in
terms of naturalness. It seems plausible that no property is more natural
than both P and Q, and so ^(P,Q) would again be the empty set.
The purpose of (5b) is to help us fix on the notion of relative
naturalness. However, it employs that very notion in doing so. While this
perhaps limits its value, it does not make it worthless. (5b) is a
substantive principle governing naturalness, and is therefore worth
asserting in an attempt to illuminate naturalness.
So much for the intuitive picture of relative fundamentalness. Next,
let us focus on the formal properties of our three naturalness relations.
Here are some principles governing these notions:
(a) > is reflexive and transitive
(b) * is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric
(c) > is transitive and irreflexive
(d) VP,Q ~(P>Q & P* Q)
(e) VP,Q [?>Q « (?>Q v P* Q)]
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(0 VP,Q,R{(P« Q)->[(P^R «* Q^R) & (R^p « R^Q)]}
I assume (a) as a constraint on the intended interpretation of ‘fc’
;
the
rest follow from (a) and the definitions of ’ and V.
Equally as important as principles we should accept are those that
we should reject. I think we should reject the following principle:
Connectedness
:
VP,Q (P^Q v Q>P)
Let us return to Onion, the world of endless complexity. There are no
perfectly natural properties at Onion, only an infinite sequence S of
properties of increasing naturalness (this sequence need not increase
monotonically, but for every member of the sequence there is another more
natural member). Let us compare the naturalness of the members of this
sequence and P, one of our world’s perfectly natural properties. Either it
is, or it is not the case that P is more natural than each property in S.
One of the following two alternatives holds:
i) VQ
€S P>Q
iia) 3QeS ~P>Q
(The here stands for sentence negation, not property negation).
Because of the definition of V, iia) is equivalent to the following:
iib) 3QeS (~P^Q v QhP)
But no member of S could be at least as natural as P. For suppose QeS and
Q^P. Since P is perfectly natural, Q cannot be more natural than P; hence,
by (e), P» Q. But there are properties in S that are more natural than Q,
and so by (f) more natural than P, contradicting P’s perfect naturalness.
So iib) is materially equivalent to:
ii) 3QeS (~P>Q & ~Q>P)
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But 11 ) contradicts Connectedness, so if we can rule out i), then
Connectedness is false.
I think that i) is false. Unfortunately, it is difficult to argue
rigorously for this since neither (5a) nor (5b) apply here. I must rest
with an intuitive judgment that it is not the case that P is more
fundamental than all of the properties from Onion. After all, the
properties from Onion bear no interesting supervenience relations to P. Why
would they all be less fundamental? I find it more intuitive to claim that
P is incomparable in respect of naturalness with some properties at Onion.
I deny i). But it might be objected that by definition P is more
natural than all the properties at Onion since it is perfectly natural
whereas the latter are not. A perfectly natural property, according to the
objection, is one that is at least as natural as every other property or
relation.
To evaluate this objection, we must resolve an ambiguity in the term
‘perfectly natural’ that we have not yet discussed. We should distinguish
between strong and weak perfect naturalness:
P is strongly perfectly natural = vQ P^Q
P is weakly perfectly natural = ~3Q Q^P
If by ‘perfectly natural’ we mean ‘strongly perfectly natural’, then i) is
indeed true by definition. For if P is strongly perfectly natural, then
(by (e)) for every property QeS, either ?>Q or P« Q, and as we argued above,
P cannot be equally as natural as any property from Onion.
But of course I do not grant that P is strongly perfectly natural.
When I assumed that P is perfectly natural, I meant that it is weakly
perfectly natural. And since the very point I am arguing for is that P is
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not more natural than all of Onion’s properties, to assert that P is
strongly perfectly natural would beg the question against me.
In fact, I don t think there are any strongly perfectly natural
properties. A strongly perfectly natural property P would have to be at
least as natural as every property at Onion, and I don’t think there are
any such properties. P could not be from Onion (since for every such
property there is one more natural). On the other hand, I reject the
existence of a property, P, alien to Onion that is at least as natural as
each of Onion’s properties. P would have to be more natural than each of
Onion’s properties, because if it were equally as natural as one, it would
be less natural than some other property at Onion (remember principle (f)).
And I reject P’s being more natural than each of Onion’s properties for the
same reasons I had for rejecting i). Properties alien to Onion do not seem
intuitively to be more fundamental than all of Onion’s properties. After
all, the properties at Onion do not supervene on such alien properties.
In this dissertation, by ‘perfectly natural’ I always mean
‘weakly perfectly natural’.
Let us return to my denial of i). I have responded to one
objection: that i) is true by definition since P is perfectly natural. I
now want to respond to another objection. Someone might claim that, while
i) is not true by definition , still it is evident. P has a maximal degree
of naturalness, whereas for any property at Onion, there are still more
natural properties. Doesn’t this make P more natural than every property
from Onion?
I don’t think so. Perhaps there is a sense in which P is more
natural relative to the actual world than any property from Onion is,
relative to Onion. After all, P occupies a distinguished position in the
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actual world - unexceeded naturalness. No property from Onion occupies
this position. But this has nothing to do with Connectedness.
Connectedness concerns comparisons of naturalness directly between
properties, not "naturalness relative to worlds". 32
3.3. Conception 2
3.3.1 Perfect Naturalness
I hope that section 2 has helped to fix the notion of naturalness as
fundamentalness. I turn now to Conception 2, which construes naturalness
in terms of similarity. I remind the reader that the project here is to
illuminate the primitive notion of naturalness. Thus, when I relate
naturalness to similarity, this is not to be taken as an analysis, but
rather as an intuitive aid in grasping just what this notion of naturalness
is.
I need to say a bit about the relevant notion of similarity. Given
the abundant construal of properties I accept, every two objects share
infinitely many properties, and differ with respect to infinitely many
more, since every object is a member of infinitely many sets of possibilia,
and likewise fails to be a member of infinitely many sets of possibilia.
But not all these shared properties count as genuine similarities. Some
properties have this feature: when they are shared between two objects,
this counts as a genuine intrinsic similarity. Other lack this feature.
For short, some properties make for similarity. (Let us stipulate that a
property P such that there are no two possible objects x and y such that Px
and Py does not make for similarity).
I remind the reader of my Chapter 1 section 3 remarks on the
contextual dependence of the word ‘similarity’. In some contexts one might
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say that two people are similar in that each was bom in California. This
is not the sort of similarity I mean. The notion here is one of
"objective" intrinsic similarity.
At the very least, to make for similarity, a property must be
intrinsic. But not all intrinsic properties make for similarity.
Disjunctions and negations of properties that make for similarity will
usually not make for similarity, and yet disjunctions and negations of
intrinsic properties are intrinsic. Which intrinsic properties make for
similarity? According to Conception 2, it is exactly the perfectly natural
properties that make for similarity:
(6) A property or relation is perfectly natural iff it makes for
similarity
(In this section I will focus on properties, although I intend the
discussion to carry over to relations. But what does it mean to say that a
relation R makes for similarity? To every n-place relation R there
corresponds a property: being the fusion of n objects that stand in R. To
say that R makes for similarity is to say that this property makes for
similarity in the sense already introduced for properties.)
The first thing to note is that part of Conception 2 must be
rejected, for it is at odds with Conception 1. Principle (4), which flows
from the intuition behind Conception 1, implies that conjunctions of
distinct perfectly natural properties are not perfectly natural. But (6)
implies that conjunctions of consistent perfectly natural properties are
perfectly natural, for if two consistent properties make for similarity,
then their conjunction will as well.
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(6) also seems to violate the other half of principle (4), which
states that structural combinations of perfectly natural properties and
relations are not natural. Suppose properties P and Q make for similarity.
Surely the property being the fusion of two objects x and y such that x is
1 millimeter from y and x has P and y has Q also makes for similarity (if
it is not the impossible property).
The most dramatic difference between the Conceptions, however,
emerges when we consider intrinsic profiles. Intrinsic profiles are
maximally specific intrinsic properties; they are shared by perfect
duplicates, and perfect duplicates alone (see Chapter 4 sections 2.2 and
2.3 for more on intrinsic profiles). Clearly, intrinsic profiles make for
similarity, and are therefore perfectly natural according to (6).
The situation is different with Conception 1. Intrinsic profiles
are typically structural combinations of perfectly natural properties and
relations. To see this, consider a very simple object x. Let x have only
two proper parts that stand in just one perfectly natural relation: being
1 millimeter apart
;
one has perfectly natural properties P and Q; the other
has perfectly natural properties R and S. Then, the intrinsic profile of x
is the property of being composed of two mereological atoms separated by 1
millimeter, one of which has P and Q, the other of which has R and S. This
is x’s intrinsic profile since an object has this property iff it is a
duplicate of x. 33 And notice that it is a structural combination of P, Q,
R, S, and the relation being 1 millimeter apart.
Thus, the intrinsic profiles of certain objects are structural
combinations of the perfectly natural properties of their atomic parts, and
the perfectly natural relations between those parts. (Exceptions occur for
objects with no atomic parts, and also for objects from Onion.) Principle
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(4) implies that the intrinsic profile of such an object is not perfectly
natural.
Moreover, it is clear that the intuition behind Conception 1 bans
intrinsic profiles from being perfectly natural. Consider the property
that specifies the intrinsic nature of the Eiffel Tower in complete detail.
Surely, this extremely specific property would not be counted as
fundamental furniture of the universe. Rather, the properties of the
Eiffel tower’s small parts - charges, spins, masses, etc. - are more
fundamental.
The Conceptions can incorporate elements from each other. Although
Conceptions 1 and 2 are incompatible, each can accept a part of the other.
When I argued that Conceptions 1 and 2 are incompatible, I appealed to the
fact that (6) makes making for similarity sufficient for perfect
naturalness. But it is consistent with Conception 1 that making for
similarity, while not sufficient, is nonetheless necessary for naturalness.
So I build the following thesis into Conception 1:
(7) All perfectly natural properties and relations make for
similarity
(7) joins (4) in ruling out perfectly natural properties that are
negations of perfectly natural properties. Suppose that unit positive
charge is perfectly natural. It is plausible that sharing of the negation
of this property does not count as a similarity. Surely, two objects that
fail to have unit positive charge need not resemble each other in the
slightest. (Be sure not to confuse the negation of unit positive charge
with the property unit negative charge. Most things have neither.) (7)
also implies that disjunctions of perfectly natural properties will not in
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general be perfectly natural, although it seems consistent with (7) that
the disjunctions of some pairs of distinct perfectly natural properties are
perfectly natural. Suppose, for example, that P and Q are two perfectly
natural "very similar to each other" in the following sense: intuitively,
every instance of P resembles closely every instance of Q. Perhaps we’d
then want to say that when objects share PvQ, this counts as a similarity.
Since Conception 1 now contains (7) and Conception 2 contains (6),
it follows that the set of perfectly natural properties and relations as
conceived by Conception 1 is a subset of the perfectly natural properties
and relations as conceived by Conception 2. (Moreover, we can say "proper
subset since Conception 2 allows perfectly natural conjunctions and
structural combinations of perfectly natural properties.)
(Note: (7) is all that David Lewis clearly affirms in the quotation
at the beginning of this chapter, so I do not attribute Conception 2 to
him. But he does express agnosticism on the question of whether structural
combinations of perfectly natural properties are perfectly natural, 34 so it
may be that he does not reject Conception 2. I cannot tell for sure.)
So Conception 1 can incorporate part of Conception 2. Likewise,
Conception 2 can incorporate part of Conception 1. I have in mind
principle (1), which states that the set of perfectly natural properties at
a world is a Q-base for that world.
In section 2.3 I argued that, given Conception 1 of naturalness,
Onion is a world at which there are no perfectly natural properties. This
required me to take back (1) and substitute the more complicated (la). But
given (6) as a characterization of perfect naturalness, we can take these
moves back. Any object at Onion has an intrinsic profile -- its most
specific intrinsic property, 35 and it was argued above that intrinsic
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profiles are perfectly natural, given (6). Onion, then, does have
Conception-2 style perfectly natural properties. Thus, I build (1) into
Conception 2 of perfect naturalness.
3.3.2 Relative Naturalness According to Conception 2
In section 3.1 I discussed only perfect naturalness. We must now
consider how to strengthen Conception 2 to apply to the more natural than
relation.
First, I want to note an extreme method, which is actually a
departure from the Conception 2 of the previous section, rather than an
extension of it. We must shift to a different similarity notion, the
relation of one property making for more similarity than another. Then we
give up (6) in favor of characterizing more natural than directly: one
property is more natural than another iff it makes for more similarity than
the other. 36 (Weak) perfect naturalness is then defined as unexceeded
naturalness.
The extreme version of Conception 2 differs starkly from Conception
1, and also from what I called "Conception 2" in the previous section.
According to the new version of Conception 2, only intrinsic profiles will
be perfectly natural, for intrinsic profiles make for the highest possible
degree of similarity — duplication. 37 Properties like charge, spin, mass,
etc. - which are perfectly natural according to (6) as well as Conception
1 — will not be perfectly natural on this extreme version of Conception 2.
What I will henceforth call "Conception 2" is not the extreme view.
Rather, it contains (6) as a characterization of perfect naturalness, and
uses the section 2.3 notion of distance from a set to characterize relative
naturalness. Thus, Conception 2 accepts principles (6) and (5a):
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(6) A property or relation is perfectly natural iff it makes for
similarity
(5a) For any set N of pairwise-equally natural perfectly natural
properties and relations, and any properties or relations P and Q
that supervene on N, P>Q iff P is as least as close to N as Q is.
In the previous section, I showed how Conception 1 could incorporate
a part of Conception 2 that dealt with perfect naturalness
— principle
(7). One might hope for a similar thing for relative naturalness.
Specifically one might hope that the comparative similarity relation, which
was employed in stating the extreme version of Conception 2, could
constrain Conception l’s more natural than relation.
Unfortunately, I doubt that this is possible. The only
potential principles of this kind seem to be the following:
(?) If P makes for more similarity than Q, then P is more natural
than Q.
(??) If P is more natural than Q, then P makes for more similarity
than Q
But each contradicts the claim of Conception 1 that conjunctions of
perfectly natural properties are less natural than their conjuncts.
3.4 Choosing a Conception of Naturalness
We have a primitive, the relation more natural than, and two
main competing Conceptions of that primitive. 38 Let me summarize them.
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On Conception, 1, ‘more natural than’ means ‘more fundamental than’.
The most natural properties are the most fundamental properties - at our
world, the fundamental properties of physics. As well as being most
fundamental, these properties make for similarity. Boolean and structural
combinations of perfectly natural properties are not perfectly natural. For
properties in worlds like the actual world, if one property requires a more
lengthy or disjunctive definition from the perfectly natural properties
than another, then it is less natural. In many worlds, the set of
perfectly natural properties and relations is a Q-base for that worlds. But
some worlds, like Onion, do not contain any perfectly natural properties,
only a sequence of properties with ever-increasing naturalness. The set of
perfectly natural properties at such a world is not a Q-base for it.
On Conception 2, ‘perfectly natural’ means ‘makes for similarity’.
Conception 2’s perfectly natural properties include the perfectly natural
properties of Conception 1, and more besides. While negations and
disjunctions of perfectly natural properties are not perfectly natural,
conjunctions and structural combinations of perfectly natural properties
are perfectly natural. 39 As for other properties, they are more or less
natural depending on how directly and non-disjunctively they may be defined
in terms of the perfectly natural properties. At any world, the set of
perfectly natural properties and relations is a Q-base for that world.
We also have a dark horse in the competition: the extreme version
of Conception 2. On this version, ‘at least as natural as’ means ‘makes
for at least as much similarity’. So, the more intrinsically specific a
property is, the more natural it is. The perfectly natural properties are
the intrinsic profiles; properties like charge, mass, etc. lag far behind.
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One could accept three notions of naturalness, one for each
Conception. But economy would have us choose. I choose Conception 1. What
reasons could there be for favoring one Conception over another?
The less we understand a primitive, and the less we can
illuminatingly characterize it, the worse it is to accept. Each Conception
has deficiencies on this score. First, the notion of closeness to a set,
which was used to characterize more natural than for Conceptions 1 and 2,
is suspect. I said that disjunctiveness and length of definition made for
greater distance. But how do these factors play off each other? Let N be
the set of perfectly natural properties. Is a simple disjunction of two
members of N closer to or farther from N than a more complicated structural
combination of members of N? I don’t know.
Conception 1 employs the notion of fundamentalness, and our grasp of
this notion might be doubted. The paradigm cases for comparisons of
fundamentalness come from the actual world: redness is less fundamental
than being a hydrogen atom which is less fundamental than having unit
negative charge. But we must abstract away from various features of the
actual world to form the general concept of fundamentalness. For example,
this sequence of increasingly fundamental properties from the actual world
also seems to be one of increasingly "microphysical" properties, and I
claimed in section 2.1 that microphysicality and fundamentalness are only
contingently coincident. Moreover, the properties in the example are all
physical. Can we be sure that we have a general concept of
fundamentalness?
Likewise, Conception 2’s notion of making for similarity seems
questionable. First, the very notion of objective similarity is dark to
some. Moreover, even though I do not suppose the all-or-nothing notion of
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making for similarly to be defined in terms of an underlying notion that
comes in degrees, it still seems fair to ask: how much similarity must a
property guarantee to make for similarity? For example, does crimson make
for similarity? What about redness? What about still more broad color
ranges?
Consider a world that we might call "Color". Color is somewhat like
Onion in that it has a long sequence of properties that divide into other
properties (but unlike Onion, this sequence comes to an end — see below.)
In Color, properties (beyond a certain point of naturalness) are
determinables of more specific determinates. (I call this world "Color"
because the properties are like colors - determinables of determinates.)
So, for example, P is a disjunction of P
,
P ....P
. But each of the P is
1 2 n
i
a disjunction of Q.s, each of which are disjunctions... until finally we
reach properties that are maximally specific: intrinsic profiles. We may
stipulate that as we continue along this sequence, the properties make for
more and more similarity.
To accept Conception 2, we must accept that at some point along the
sequence, the properties begin to make for similarity. Unless by ‘makes
for similarity’ we mean ‘makes for perfect similarity’, the cutoff point
must be before the end of the sequence. But surely this is arbitrary.
There is no privileged cutoff point before the endpoint. So the primitive
notion of perfect naturalness, on Conception 2, is suspect.
If we do place the cutoff point at the only non-arbitrary place, the
endpoint, then we will have collapsed Conception 2’s notion of perfect
naturalness into that of the extreme version of Conception 2 from section
3.2. For according to the extreme version of Conception 2, the perfectly
natural properties are those that make for the maximum amount of
73
similarity, namely, the intrinsic profiles. By ‘Conception 2’, I will
continue to mean the more moderate version which allows perfectly natural
properties that do not make for perfect similarity. This version is the
one that is subject to the objection.
It might be replied that making for similarity is vague, but that
this does not mean that the notion is ill-understood. We understand plenty
of vague notions just fine. 40 I find this response objectionable for two
main reasons. First, vagueness in the concept of naturalness might
translate into vagueness of concepts that are analyzed in terms of
naturalness, and some of these do not seem vague. For example, in Chapter
4 section 2.2, I give an analysis of duplication in terms of naturalness.
In Chapter 9 I give an account of physical distance in terms of
naturalness. David Lewis characterizes notions of lawhood, causation, and
materialism in terms of naturalness in "New Work for a Theory of
Universals".
Secondly, I find it misleading to call the dubiousness of makes for
similarity "vagueness". This gives the impression that the only trouble is
that we cannot find a precise cutoff point - we have a rough idea of how
much similarity a property must ensure to count as making for similarity;
we just can’t say exactly how much. This isn’t the right picture at all.
We have a continuum of amounts of similarity ensured. At one end are
properties that ensure perfect similarity. At the other end there are
properties that ensure no similarity. There are no distinguished halfway
points, not even distinguished halfway regions. So, it seems to me that
the "looseness" in Conception 2’s perfect naturalness is severe, and thus
it is unfit to take as primitive. We wouldn’t understand the primitive.
74
How does this affect Conception 1? I related Conception 1 perfect
naturalness to the all-or-nothing notion of similarity by accepting (7).
Since I have argued that the notion of making for similarity is ill-
understood, (7) can do its part of illuminating naturalness less well than
we might have thought. Fortunately, (7) is not at the heart of Conception
1. The heart of that Conception is the notion of fundamentalness, which is
unaffected by trouble with similarity.
Notice that the extreme version of Conception 2 is not affected by
this problem, since it doesn’t appeal to an all-or-nothing notion of
similarity. All it appeals to is the relational notion makes for at least
as much similarity as.
My first reason to prefer Conception 1 over Conception 2, then, is
that Conception 2’s notion of making for similarity is ill-understood and
arbitrary seeming. I have a second reason for preferring Conception 1 that
involves the nature of its primitive notion. Primitive naturalness on
Conception 1 is a more "natural" and "unified" notion than on Conception 2.
Perfect naturalness on Conception 2 involves similarity. But relative
naturalness on that conception seems entirely different — it was
illuminated by appeal to distance from N, the set of perfectly natural
properties and relations. Distance from N seems to have nothing to do with
similarity.
In contrast, I think there is a certain unity to the overall
explanation of Conception 1 naturalness. Throughout I invoked the
intuitive notion of fundamentalness. The most natural properties are the
most fundamental properties, and a property is at least as natural as
another when it is at least as fundamental. True, to explain relative
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naturalness I appealed to distance from a set. But this, it seems to me,
just was an explanation in terms of relative fundamentalness.
The extreme version of Conception 2 has this same unity, since it
explains both relative naturalness and perfect naturalness in terms of
similarity. So again, the extreme version of Conception 2 fares better
than its more moderate cousin.
After considering the nature of a primitive itself, we may consider
the nature of the resulting theory. One consideration is the simplicity of
that resulting theory. On the surface, the honors here go to Conception 2,
because of the existence of Onion, the world of endless complexity. On
Conception 1, there are no perfectly natural properties at Onion; this
required jettisoning the simple principles (1) and (5). Moreover, it
complicates other theory besides; see Chapter 4 section 2, especially the
definition of ‘duplicate’.
However, I think that this is not a real advantage for Conception 2.
Onion represents a genuine complication in the theory of naturalness, and
Conception 2’s way around it is cosmetic. As we saw, Conception 2 patches
over the problem by its dubious all-or-nothing primitive makes for
similarity.
The extreme version of Conception 2 affords a very simple definition
of ‘duplicate’. As we noticed in section 3.2, perfectly natural properties
on this view will be, simply, intrinsic profiles. Objects are duplicates
iff they share intrinsic profiles (see principle (C2) from section 2.3 of
the next chapter); moreover, each object has exactly one intrinsic profile
(this, too, follows from (C2) — assuming as I do that necessarily
coextensive properties are identical). Therefore, every object has exactly
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one perfectly natural property on this Conception, and duplicates are those
objects that have the same perfectly natural property.
The final and most important consideration in deciding on a
Conception is the strength of the resulting theory. Here, I have a
programmatic reason for preferring Conception 1. I suspect that Conception
1 is more powerful than Conception 2, and more powerful than the extreme
version of Conception 2. (This latter claim is important, since the
extreme version of Conception 2 has, so far, high marks in this
competition.)
Some of the tasks accomplishable by Conception 1 seem beyond the
reach of both versions of Conception 2. For example, the very notion of a
most fundamental property is intuitive. It is a natural and common view of
physics that its goal is to seek out a complete description of the world in
terms of the most fundamental properties. We have here a concept that
should be acknowledged by ontology. Conception 1 acknowledges it (albeit
by taking it as a primitive). But it is hard to see how Conception 2 can
reconstruct this notion. According to Conception 2, the set of perfectly
natural properties contains many properties in addition to the most
fundamental properties. How could we sort out the most fundamental? And
according to the extreme version of Conception 2, the perfectly natural
properties are intrinsic profiles, which are not very fundamental at all.
In each case, we are left without the notion of the most fundamental
properties.
On the other hand, I suspect that Conception 1 can do all the work
of Conception 2. The theoretical complications introduced by Onion, while
irritating, seem surmountable (see Chapter 4 section 2 in addition to
principles (la), (5a), and (5b) from this chapter). And I have hopes that
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making for similarity can be analyzed using Conception 1 naturalness, at
least after the "looseness" in the notion is resolved. We have two clear
sufficient conditions for P’s making for similarity, however the looseness
is resolved: P’s being perfectly natural, and P’s being an intrinsic
profile. We know that consistent conjunctions and structural combinations
of properties that make for similarity themselves make for similarity.
Here, however, the presence of Onion complicates matters. A full
discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
(A final aside: at this point we can make good on an earlier
promise. In section 1 I said that naturalness is best thought of as coming
in degrees. Now we can see why. Whether we accept Conception 1 or
Conception 2, if we accepted only an all-or-nothing notion of naturalness,
we would be committed to an unappealing arbitrary cutoff point. For
Conception 1
,
it would mean accepting an arbitrary cutoff point of
fundamentalness in the sequence of properties from Onion. For either the
extreme or the moderate version of Conception 2, it would be an arbitrary
cutoff point of amount of similarity ensured in the sequence of properties
from Color. 41 )
3.5 Conclusion
I have chosen Conception 1. But I must admit that my grasp of the
notion of naturalness is uneasy. The project of clarifying naturalness was
fraught with difficulty -- I seemed to get as many negative results as
positive. The possibility of Onion, the world of endless complexity,
further complicated matters. In the next chapter I analyze duplication,
intrinsicality
,
and other notions in terms of naturalness, but why not
forget about naturalness altogether, and take one of those notions as a
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primitive instead? The leading candidate, I think, is duplication. We
could go straight to duplication, rather than taking the long road through
naturalness. In contrast to the notion of a natural property, the notion
of duplication, to me at least, is perfectly clear.
This would be a bad idea, for we need naturalness. It does work
that duplication and intrinsicality do not. First, some conception of
naturalness seems to be required to analyze making for similarity (after
the looseness in that notion has been eliminated). Any two objects will
share an infinity of intrinsic properties; moreover, objects can share a
property that makes for similarity without being duplicates. How to
analyze similarity in terms of intrinsicality and duplication, then, is at
least not obvious. Secondly, as I claimed in the previous section, the
concept of fundamentalness is an intuitive one that must be acknowledged
by ontology. Finally, Lewis’s solution to the problem of the content of
thought and language requires naturalness
.
42
Naturalness will not go away. But if it could be analyzed in terms
of intrinsicality or duplication plus concepts of supervenience and the
like, then we could have a clear primitive — duplication — and still reap
all the benefits of naturalness. It would be nice, then, to have a
principle of the form:
P is more natural than Q iff
where the right side is stated in terms of duplication, supervenience, the
part-whole relation, etc. However, I have found such a principle hard to
come by . 43 So it seems that we’d better stick with naturalness as our
primitive and make sense of it as best we can.
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Notes
f^ipt Bricker pointed out that my conceptions of naturalness do notseem to apply to abstract entities.
2 A related principle, which I also affirm, is that every perfectly
natural relation is external. See sections 2.2 and 2.3 of chapter 4.
3 The closure of the set of intrinsic properties under the Boolean
operations is discussed in sections 1 and 2.3 of chapter 4.
Tliis is so on either Conception. The property not having unit positive
charge is clearly not one of the most fundamental properties nor does
it make for similarity.
5 Lewis (1986c) p.60.
6 Compare what Sydney Shoemaker has to say about similar "circularities"
in Shoemaker (1980) pp. 123-124.
7 See R. Cranston Pauli (1993) chapter 7.
8 For references on global supervenience see Chapter 4 section A. of Pauli
(1993). The sets A and B need not be closed under the Boolean
operations (see Pauli and Sider (1992) Appendix). Pauli calls my
formulation of global supervenience (minus the built-in part-whole
relation) "strong" global supervenience, and distinguishes it from other
formulations. See Pauli (1993) Chapter 4 section B.
9 (SI) and (S4) are trivial. (S3) is proved in the appendix of Sider
(1991).
(S2): assume the antecedent, and let f be a C-B isomorphism. Since
B supervenes on C-B, f is a B-isomorphism; thus, f is a C isomorphism.
Thus, by the supervenience of A on C, f is an A-isomorphism.
(S5) follows from the fact that if A(C,C'), then any C-isomorphism
is a C'-isomorphism.
10 Even without this assumption, (1) is equivalent to (1?). Assume (1).
Take any world w with at least one object; since for every property
either it or its negation is instantiated in w, we can apply (S5) to
derive (1?). Now assume (1?), and let w be any world. If w has at
least one object, then we may again use (S5) and (1?) to derive that the
set of perfectly natural properties and relations at w is a Q-base for
w. On the other hand, if w does not have at least one object, then the
same result holds, for the set of qualitative properties and relations
at w is then the null set, which trivially supervenes on every set. So,
(1) follows.
11 A discussion with Fred Feldman was helpful here.
12 If this route were taken, my assumption governing the abundance of
relations from chapter 2 section 1 would have to be revised.
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v2K£
DaVid C°WleS and PhmiP Bricker f0r hdpful di^ussions about
I assume the spatiotemporal relations apply to the objects at Vanilla.
An object is atomless gunk iff it contains no atoms; i.e. iff it has noparts (proper or otherwise) that lack proper parts.
16 Phillip Bricker made this point.
17
I intend what I say about Boolean and structural combinations to carrv
over to relations. y
I say almost because the universal property had by everything is not
conjunctive, and the empty property had by nothing is not disjunctive.
19 This discussion could be generalized easily to apply to structural
relations.
20 For a related example, see Lewis (1986a) p. 27.
21 This definition could be generalized by allowing infinitary definition.
I do not claim that this definition accords exactly with D. M.
Armstrong’s usage of ‘structural universal’. Notice that since I do not
require n to be greater than 1, I count the conjunction of P and Q as a
structural combination of P and Q.
22 Consider a pair of perfect duplicates. Their parts have the same
perfectly natural properties and stand in the same perfectly natural
relations. Thus, they could not differ with respect to any structural
combination of perfectly natural properties and relations. Therefore,
such properties are intrinsic.
23 Armstrong considers such a world in Armstrong (1978b) pp. 67-68.
24 Here I rely on principle (e) from section 2.3.
25 Principle (f) from section 2.3 guarantees the acceptability of the
inference from ‘P is equally as natural as a perfectly natural property’
to ‘P is perfectly natural’, whether we mean strong or weak perfect
naturalness (see section 2.3 for this distinction).
26 Lewis (1986c) p. 61.
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The closeness relation deserves its name because of features it shareswith spatial distance. A property is maximally close to itself(actually, to its unit set). Distance from a set was, in essencedefined as distance "along the shortest path" when I said that P is asclose as Q to S if it can be defined from S at least as directly and
non-disjuncUvely (the "paths" here are particular definitions).
Moreover Phillip Bncker pointed out that there is a sort of triangleinequality for particular paths. Suppose that property P is definable
via Path T froni set S and that Q is definable via path T' from Su{P}Hence Q is definable from S via what we might call the "concatenation"
of pathsJP and path Think of ?+?' as being a definition ofQ according to the following directions: "first define P from S using
definition T. Then keep going using definition T‘ to get Q" The
triangle inequality says that the shortest path from S to O must be at
least as short as T+P'.
28 See Goodman (1983) p. 74. Let tO be a certain fixed time. An object x
1S at
,
time } lff t< tO and x is green at t, or tetO and x is blue at
t. Similarly, x is bleen at t iff t< tO and x is blue at t, or tetO and x
is green at t.
29 This follows from an infinitary version of (S3), which I do not prove.
It is crucial here that by ‘perfectly natural’ I mean 'weakly perfectly
natural (see below for the distinction). Strongly perfectly natural
properties would indeed have to be equally natural.
31 Suppose an actual property P is perfectly natural, but is not comparable
in terms of naturalness with some alien perfectly natural property Q.
Given certain plausible recombination principles, it follows that there
is some world at which both P and Q are instantiated. So, at some
worlds, properties that are incomparable in terms of naturalness will be
instantiated. I owe this observation to Phillip Bricker. It seems to
me that there is nothing objectionable in this.
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I have argued that there are no strongly perfectly natural DroDerties
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’ V 5eply is that the Property Bricker imaginesthat divides into more fundamental properties is not P the same
property from the actual world, since "second level" properties likebemg a structural combination of Q and R are essential properties of
those properties that have them.
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for ™°re Precision. My definition of ‘structural combination’
entails biconditional of the form ‘P is a structural combination of Q
and R iff P is the property of...'. Now, my assumption is that a
phrase such as ‘the property of ...’ picks out a property with the
eature expressed by the ... in every world. This sort of assumption
is commonplace. For example, most people would assume that the phrase
the property of having both P and Q’ picks out a property that is not
merely the actual conjunction of P and Q, but rather is essentially the
conjunction of those properties. To deny this assumption would be to
introduce obscurity in the notion of transworld identity for properties.
The objection, as I construe it, involves a rejection of this
assumption. It runs as follows, i) First, we redo the definition of
structural combination to make it world-relative — P is a structural
combination of such and such properties relative to world w iff P is the
property of ... at w. ii) Then we claim that P (the alleged perfectly
natural property from the actual world) is a structural combination of Q
and R at some other world w. iii) finally, we claim that it follows
that P is less natural than Q and R.
I object to step ii), for I claim that if P is a structural
combination of some properties at one world, then it is essentially so.
So, if P were a structural combination of some other properties at w, it
would have to be at the actual world as well - but by hypothesis it is
not.
33 See the definition of ‘duplicate’ in Chapter 4 section 2.1.
34 Lewis (1986c) p. 62.
35 Principles (C2) and (Al) from the next chapter together imply that every
object has an intrinsic profile.
36 From his remarks on the upper end of naturalness in Armstrong (1989b) p.
24, Armstrong seems to conceive of primitive naturalness in this way.
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It is crucial here that we are concerned only with intrinsic
the maximum degree of resembla^wol m\he
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be n°ted thf by accePtinS a Conception, one does more thansingle out a notion of naturalness. The Conceptions relate natundnes^to many different concepts, thus relating the latter concepts to eachother. For example, by accepting the existence of the Conception 1otion of perfect naturalness, one would thereby assert that the mostfundamental properties make for similarity.
Exceptions: as noted in section 3.1, there may be a case for someperfectly natural disjunctions of perfectly natural properties. And if
a conjunction or structural combination of perfectly natural properties
is the impossible property, then it is not perfectly natural.
P ^
I do not mean to suggest the existence of vague properties. When I savthat a notion is vague, what I mean is that we have a phrase such that
Y
it is vague exactly which property is expressed by it. To me, the idea
or real, non-linguistic "vagueness in the world" is unintelligible.
41 Another impetus for degrees of naturalness is that they seem to be
required for one of the applications of naturalness: in determining the
nTfu
1 ’ See
^,
Wis (1983b)
-
pp ‘ 37°-377 ^ Lewis (f984) pp.
k d?ii : 5
ut
,
the ae^Ptobdity of Lewis’s solution has been questionedby Phillip Bncker in conversation, at least given Conception 1 of
naturalness. The worry is that naturalness conceived as fundamentalness
might not match up with eligibility for being thought about. Perhaps a
property that clearly is not expressed by one of our predicates is more
fundamental than the intuitively correct candidate.
42 See Lewis (1983b) pp. 370-377, and especially Lewis (1984). But see the
previous note on the content of thought.
For example, in Chapter 8 section 1 I show how various attempts to
define ‘natural’ in terms of ‘supervenience’ and ‘qualitative’ fail.
These attempts fit the schema in the text since ‘qualitative’ is
definable in terms of ‘duplicate’ - see section 2.2 of chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
INTRINSICALITY, DUPLICATION, AND OTHER NOTIONS
In this chapter I lay out a theory of intrinsically, duplication, and
other notions based on the notion of naturalness. In section 1 I
investigate the claim that ‘intrinsic’ and ‘duplicate’ are interdefinable;
it turns out that they are, given the intended interpretation of those
terms. So, if we succeed in defining either we thereby define both. In
section 2, following the strategy of David Lewis, I use naturalness to
analyze these two notions, as well as the notions of internal and external
relations, intrinsic profiles, and qualitative properties and relations. In
particular, it will be seen that the definition of ‘duplicate’ is not as
straightforward as Lewis suggests. Finally, in section 3 I derive various
consequences of the definitions.
4.1 Intrinsicality and Duplication Are "Interdefinahle"
Lewis says there is a "circle of interdefinability" between the terms
duplicate and intrinsic
.
1 We may begin with the notion of a duplicate
and go on to characterize intrinsic properties as follows:
(Dl) P is intrinsic iff P can never differ between duplicates
Or, we may begin with intrinsically, and define ‘duplicate’:
(D2) x and y are duplicates iff they have the same intrinsic
properties
We have given two equivalences relating intrinsicality and
duplication. To say that these notions are "interdefinable" via these two
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equivalences is to say that whichever of the equivalences we regard as a
definition, the other may be derived as a consequence of that definition.
Suppose we begin with one of the equivalences as a definition. In
what sense must we be able to "derive" the other? The material conditional
whose antecedent is (Dl) and whose consequent is (D2) is no theorem of
formal logic; neither is its converse.
Background principles constraining the interpretation of ‘intrinsic’
and duplicate’ must be used. I intend to investigate just what
assumptions about the notions of duplication and intrinsicality must hold
in order for intrinsic’ and ‘duplicate’ to indeed be interdefinable. These
assumptions must be weak in order for us to legitimately regard ‘intrinsic’
and ‘duplicate’ as being interdefinable via (Dl) and (D2). In fact, I
think that the assumptions must be analytic - true in virtue of the
intended meanings of ‘intrinsic’ and ‘duplicate’. Fortunately, the
necessary assumptions are indeed analytic.
First some terminology. When x and y are duplicates, I will say
"Dup(x,y)". When x and y share all properties in a set S (that is, when
VPeS (Px«Py)) I will say that x and y are S-indiscemible (”S-?ad(x,y)".
Let I be the set of intrinsic properties.
Suppose we take ‘duplicate’ as undefined. We then regard principle
(Dl) as a definition of the term ‘intrinsic’. The task is to derive
principle (D2). It is trivial to show one direction of the equivalence: if
x and y are duplicates, then it follows from (Dl) directly that they have
the same intrinsic properties.
The other direction is less trivial: if x and y share all intrinsic
properties, then they are duplicates. The assumption we need is:
(Al) duplication is an equivalence relation
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For suppose that Mmi(x,y), and consider the property being a duplicate of
X
;
(i ' e
-
^(®^(x,y))). 2 By (Al), the duplication relation is reflexive,
so x has this property. If we can show that this property is intrinsic,
then since I-?mi(x,y), y has the property as well, and hence £up(x,y).
The proof that being a duplicate of x is intrinsic uses (Al);
specifically, the transitivity and symmetry of duplication. Recall that we
are presently regarding ‘intrinsic’ as being defined by (Dl), so we must
show that this property can never differ between duplicates. So suppose
Z)up(z,w); we show that z has the property being a duplicate of x iff w has
this property. Suppose that z has the property; i.e. Z)up(x,z). By
transitivity, Dup(x,w), so w has the property being a duplicate of x as
well. On the other hand, if w has the property, then Dup(x,w); by
symmetry, Dup(w,x); by transitivity, Kup(z,x); by symmetry, Z)up(x, z);
hence, z has the property.
Assumption (Al), we have seen, is sufficient for deriving (D2) when we
assume (Dl). Indeed, it is necessary as well. (D2) trivially implies
(Al), since the relation having the same intrinsic properties is an
equivalence relation.
(Al) is not news. Anyone who understands the concept of duplication
knows that it is an equivalence relation. So, it seems that when we take
‘duplicate’ as a primitive and define ‘intrinsic’ as in (Dl), an analytic
assumption governing the behavior of our primitive concept guarantees the
desired relation between duplication and intrinsicality.
Now let us take ‘intrinsic’ as the primitive and regard (D2) as the
definition of ‘duplicate’. We must derive (Dl) from (D2). As before, one
direction is easy: if P is intrinsic then it follows trivially from (D2)
(now taken to be a definition) that P can never differ between duplicates.
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The other direction is less trivial. We must show that any property
that can never differ between duplicates is intrinsic. The conjunction of
the following two assumptions is necessary and sufficient for this
derivation:
(A2): If property P is necessarily coextensive with an intrinsic
property then P is intrinsic.
(A3): The set of intrinsic properties is closed under negation and
(infinitary) conjunction 3
Notice that (A2) is a direct consequence of an assumption from Chapter 2:
that necessarily coextensive properties are identical. Notice also that an
equivalent way of stating (A3) is that I is identical to its Boolean
closure.
We need more terminology. Let us write "^(P,Q)" when Vx(Px«Qx) (that
is, when properties P and Q are necessarily coextensive). Let us write
"*(?)" when p is intrinsic. For any set of properties S, let £E(S) be the
Boolean closure of S -- the smallest superset of S that is closed under
negation and (infinitary) conjunction.
For brevity I use the concept of strong supervenience. For any sets A
and B, A strongly supervenes on B ("mj(A,B)") iff VxVy [B-?mi(x,y) -> A-
?mf(x,y)]. It is well known that: 4
(K) if <us(A,$g(B)) then VPeA 3QeBt?(B) A^(P,Q)
First, we need to show that (A2) and (A3) together are sufficient for
the derivation. Let P be a property that never differs between duplicates;
we must show that P is intrinsic:
88
1. VxVy [Z)up(x,y)
-> (Px«Py)]
Ass.
2. VxVy [I-5ml(x,y) (Px«Py)]
1, (D2)
3. ({P},I)
2
4. I = m([)
(A3)
5. ms ({P},Bg(I))
3,4
6. 3QeB£?(I) Ag(P,Q)
5,(K)
7. 3QeI yVi?(P,Q)
4,6
8. 7(P)
7,(A2)
Next, we show that (A2) and (A3) are individually necessary for
deriving (Dl), when we assume (D2). That is, we show that the conjunction
of (Dl) and (D2) implies each. First, (A2):
1. ^(P,Q)
Ass.
2. HQ) Ass.
3. VxVy [Dup(x,y)
-> (Qx«Qy) 2,(D1)
4. VxVy [Dup(x,y)
-> (Px«Py) 1,3
5. *(P) 4,(D1)
Next, (A3). We must show that I = BG(I). Trivially, IsBg(I). It remains to
show BS(I)ci:
1. Pe££(I) Ass.
2. VxVy [SBG(I)-*nd(x,y)
-> (Px«Py)] 1
3. VxVy [B£(I)-.7/id(x,y) « I-.7nd(x,y)] Fact5
4. VxVy [I-5nd(x,y) (Px«Py)] 2,3
5. VxVy [Dup(x, y) (Px«Py)] 4,(D2)
6. Pel 5,(D1)
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Are these assumptions weak enough so as not to jeopardize the claim
that intrinsic and ‘duplicate’ are interdefinable via (Dl) and (D2)? I
think they are. Just as assumption (Al) was a consequence of the intended
meaning of ‘duplicate’, assumptions (A2) and (A3) are consequences of the
intended meaning of ‘intrinsic’: a property "had purely in virtue of its
instances intrinsic natures". Of course, there may be other conceptions
of intrinsicality according to which (A2) and (A3) fail. On these
conceptions, perhaps ‘intrinsic’ and ‘duplicate’ are not interdefinable. 6
When we take ‘duplicate’ as a primitive and define ‘intrinsic’ via
(Dl), we can de~ve (D2) using (Al), a consequence of the intended meaning
of ‘duplicate’. When we take ‘intrinsic’ as a primitive and define
‘duplicate’ via (D2), we can derive (Dl) using (A2) and (A3), consequences
of the intended meaning of ‘intrinsic’. Thus, the assertion that
‘duplicate’ and ‘intrinsic’ are interdefinable via (Dl) and (D2) is
justified.
4.2 Duplication and Beyond
In the present section I use naturalness to define various terms I use
in this dissertation: ‘duplicate’, ‘intrinsic’ ‘intrinsic profile’,
‘qualitative’, etc. Some of these definitions have already been discussed.
I will then note various consequences of the definitions.
4.2.1 Duplication.
Following David Lewis, I begin by defining ‘duplicate’ in terms of
‘natural’. But I do not accept Lewis’s definition: 7
...two things are duplicates iff (1) they have exactly the same
perfectly natural properties, and (2) their parts can be put into
correspondence in such a way that corresponding parts have exactly the
same perfectly natural properties, and stand in the same perfectly
natural relations.
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I state Lewis s definition as follows. For simplicity, in this chapter I
count properties as 1
-place relations and take a one place sequence <x> to
be simply x.
(DPI) x and y are duplicates =
df
there is a one-one correspondence f
between x’s parts and y’s parts such that for any perfectly
natural relation R and for any sequence x of parts of x, R(x) iff
R(f(x»
In what follows I would like to discuss various aspects of (DPI).
First, I would prefer to add the condition that the correspondence f be a
part-whole isomorphism (see section 1.1). This requirement would be
redundant if the part-whole relation is perfectly natural, but since I am
not sure of this, I think it should be built in explicitly.
Secondly, Lewis suggests that the definition might be simplified if we
allowed that structural combinations of perfectly natural properties are
perfectly natural. The simplified definition says that x and y are
duplicates iff they have exactly the same perfectly natural properties. 8
Without structural perfectly natural properties, we cannot simply require
that duplicates share all perfectly natural properties. For example, if
the perfectly natural properties in the actual world are properties
involving charge, spin, charm, etc., then actual macroscopic objects will
not have any perfectly natural properties. Any two macroscopic objects
would vacuously be duplicates. But if there are structural perfectly
natural properties, then differences in the perfectly natural properties
and relations of the parts of macroscopic objects will translate into
differences in the structural perfectly natural properties of those
macroscopic objects. Hence, the possibility of simplification of (DPI).
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However, in chapter 3 section 2.1 I argued that structural combinations of
perfectly natural properties are not perfectly natural, and so I do not
simplify the definition of ‘duplicate’.
In fact, considerations raised in Chapter 3 section 2.2 by Onion, the
world of endless complexity, show that (DPI) is too simple. Consider any
two objects from Onion whose parts stand in the same perfectly natural
relations (that is, spatiotemporal relations, as these were stipulated to
be the only perfectly natural relations at Onion). Recall that no
perfectly natural properties are instantiated at Onion, so no part of
either object has any perfectly natural properties. According to (DPI), it
follows that these objects are duplicates. But surely they need not be.
As we divide either of the objects up into smaller and smaller parts, there
will be a sequence of increasingly natural properties had by these parts.
The two objects could have entirely different sequences.
(DPI) implies that any two "spatiotemporal isomorphs" from Onion are
duplicates, so it must be modified. For x and y to be duplicates we ought
to require more than that the parts of x and y share perfectly natural
properties and relations. Objects from Onion have properties that come in
a never-ending sequence of naturalness. We ought to require of duplicates
from Onion that, roughly, at some point along this sequence their parts
begin to share all properties and relations, and continue to do so for the
rest of the sequence.
However, it is not a trivial matter to make this intuition precise.
We might think to proceed as follows. Let the variables ‘R’, ‘R7 ’, and
‘R"’ range over all relations — including 1 -place relations as per our
convention for this chapter.
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(DP2?) x and y are duplicates =
-f
there is a part-whole isomorphism f
between the set of x’s parts and the set of y’s parts such that
VR BR'^R VR'^R', for every sequence x of parts of x, R"(x) iff
R"(f(x))]
To get an idea of how (DP2?) is supposed to work, consider first how
(DP2?) applies to a simple case, a case that the original definition (DPI)
handles correctly. Let x be composed of two mereological atoms x, and x2
similarly, let y be the fusion of two atoms y, and y2 . Suppose that
neither x nor y has any perfectly natural properties. Suppose further that
x, and x2 stand in perfectly natural relation R, as do y, and y2 ; also
suppose that all four atoms have perfectly natural property P. Suppose
further that none of the four atoms have any other perfectly natural
properties, nor do they stand in any other perfectly natural relations.
Finally, suppose that none of these objects have any Onion-like properties
or relations that divide endlessly into increasingly natural properties and
relations.
In this case, (DP2?) has the intuitively correct result: that x and y
are duplicates. For let f be the following part-whole isomorphism between
the set of x’s parts and the set of y’s parts:
f(*i) = Yi
f(*2) = yi
f(x) = y
It is clear that the right hand side of (DP2?) holds for this choice of f.
The parts of x and y have the same perfectly natural properties and stand
in the same perfectly natural relations, under this function f. So, if the
first variable ‘R’ on the right side of (DP2?) is assigned any
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property/relation Q such that some perfectly natural property or relation
Q is at least as natural as it, then we satisfy the rest of the right hand
side by assigning Q' to the existentially quantified variable ‘R'\ On the
other hand, if ‘R’ is assigned some property or relation Q such that no
perfectly natural property is at least as natural as it, then ‘R 7 ’ may
simply be assigned Q. Why? Because in this case, Q, and everything as or
more natural than Q, will be Onion-like properties or relations that
decompose endlessly into increasingly natural properties and relations,
and, by stipulation, the objects in question instantiate no such properties
or relations.
Secondly, consider in sketch how (DP2?) applies to two Onion-like
objects x and y. These objects will have no perfectly natural properties,
nor will their parts. But intuitively, if there is some degree of
naturalness such that the parts of x and y share all properties and
relations of that degree of naturalness or greater, then x and y turn out
duplicates. More carefully, the sufficient condition for duplication is
that for any property or relation R, there is some property or relation at
least as natural as R such that every property or relation as least as
natural as it is shared by the parts of x and y. On the other hand,
speaking intuitively again, if no matter how high a degree of naturalness
we choose, the parts of x and y still differ with respect to some
properties at least that natural, then x and y do not turn out duplicates.
However, I doubt that (DP2?) gives an acceptable sufficient condition
for duplication. Suppose that x and y are not duplicates, and suppose for
simplicity that each is a mereological atom. Suppose further that the only
intrinsic differences between x and y are those entailed by the fact that x
has, while y lacks, a certain intrinsic property P. Now suppose that P is
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the conjunction of two properties Q1 and Q2, and that both x and y have Ql,
a perfectly natural property. It follows that x has, while y lacks, Q2.
If Q2 is not as or more natural than Ql, then what we have said is
consistent with the right hand side of (DP2) being satisfied, despite the
stipulation that x and y are not duplicates, for when we assign P to the
variable ‘R’, we may assign Ql to the variable ‘R'\
Of course, if the right hand side of (DP2) is true, then it applies to
Q2. But can we not satisfy the right hand side of (DP2) in exactly the
same way as above? Let Q2 be the conjunction of two properties Q3 and Q4,
where Q3 is a perfectly natural property that both x and y have (it follows
that x has, while y lacks, Q4). When Q2 is assigned to ‘R’, we may satisfy
the right hand side of (DP2) by assigning Q3 to ‘R'\ The process then
will be repeated for Q4, for one of Q4’s conjuncts, for one of those
conjuncts... forever. The following diagram pictures these endlessly
conjunctive properties:
* boldface indicates perfectly natural properties
* lines (
—) move upwards from properties to more natural conjuncts
Figure 1
Endlessly conjunctive properties
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So, we have a pair of non-duplicates x and y that, it seems, satisfy the
right hand side of (DP2?).
This example is coherent only if we can claim both that VQ'>:Q1,
Qx&Q'y, and that y lacks Q2, Q4, Q6, etc., and we can make these claims
only if we claim that none of Q2, Q4, Q6... are equally as natural as Q1
(clearly, none can be more natural since Q1 is perfectly natural). I think
that we can make such a claim. In fact, we could make it in two ways. Q2,
Q4, Q6, etc. could be each be incomparable in respect of naturalness to Ql,
or each of these properties could be less natural than Ql. I have no
argument that either case is possible, but neither do I have an argument
that both cases are impossible. Thus, the acceptability of (DP2?) is at
least cast into doubt.
Think of sequences of increasingly natural properties as paths heading
upward (the upward direction is the direction of increasing naturalness).
Intuitively, (DP2?) says that if above every property or relation there is
some path along which x and y agree on all properties and relations, then x
and y must be duplicates. We have seen that this may be too lenient. The
example seems to show that we should make some requirement about every
path.
This may be accomplished with the following set of definitions:
C is a chain = df C is a sequence9 of properties such that:
a) every member of C is more natural than every previous
member of C (that is, naturalness of members of C increases
monotonically), and
b) there is no Q that is not a member of C, but is more
natural than every member of C
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Notice that every chain is either infinite, or has a perfectly natural
property or relation as its final member (or both). Notice also that an
upper segment of a chain is itself a chain.
Let C be a chain, A and B be sets of objects, and f be a part-whole
isomorphism between A and B. We define the notion of A and B agreeing on
chain C under function f (for short: "agree(A,B,C,f)"):
agree(A,B,CJ) = df for every property or relation R from C and every
sequence x of members of A, R(x) iff R(f(x))
Another preliminary definition. Let A and B be sets of objects:
f is a duplication isomorphism between A and B = df f is a part-whole
isomorphism between A and B such that every chain has some upper
segment or other C such that agree(A,B,C,f)
We are finally in a position to give our definition of ‘duplicate’:
(DP2) x and y are duplicates = df there is a duplication isomorphism
between the set of x’s parts and the set of y’s parts
The idea behind (DP2) is similar to the idea behind (DP2?), so the
motivating remarks for (DP2?) apply to (DP2). However, the revised
definition avoids the problem with (DP2?). Let X be the set of x’s parts,
and Y be the set of y’s parts; the chain <Q2,Q4,Q6... > has no upper segment
C such that agree(X,Y,C,f), since x and y (in that example) differ with
respect to every property in this chain. So there cannot be a duplication
isomorphism between X and Y.
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4.2.2 Other Concepts
In this section I state definitions of ‘intrinsic’, ‘internal’,
‘external’, ‘intrinsic profile’, and ‘qualitative’. For intrinsicality and
internal and external relations, I follow Lewis closely. Intrinsicality
may be defined in terms of duplication via (Dl):
(Dl) P is intrinsic = df P can never differ between duplicates
Lewis defines an internal relation as one that "supervenes on the intrinsic
nature of the relata." 10 This may be restated as follows:
(D3) A relation R (with two or greater places) is internal = df for any
sequence of objects x such that R(x), if f is a function such
that for any x in x, x is a duplicate of f(x), then R(f(x))
He then defines an external relation to be a non-internal relation R that
"supervenes on the intrinsic nature of the composite of the relata taken
together...". 11 We may elaborate on this as follows. An example of an
external relation might be the relation being ten feet from. The idea is
that if x is ten feet from y, then any duplicate of the fusion of x and y
will need to contain two parts, a duplicate of x and a duplicate of y,
separated by ten feet. Here is the definition:
(D4) R is external = df i) R is a relation (with two or more places)
that is not internal and ii) for any two objects x and y, any
duplication isomorphism f between the set of x’s parts and the
set of y’s parts, and any sequence x of parts of x, R(x) iff
R(f(x)).
It may not be evident that (D4) captures the intuitive notion of an
external relation expressed above. However, (D4) is equivalent 12 to:
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(D4') Relation R is external = df i) R is a relation (with two or more
places) that is not internal, and ii) for any sequence of objects
x such that R(x), and for any object y that is a duplicate of x,
the fusion of the members of x, and for any duplication
isomorphism f between the set of parts of x and the set of parts
of y, R(f(x))
(D4') seems closer to the intuitive characterization of externality: it
says that a non-internal relation is external if, when it holds between
some objects, it holds between "corresponding" parts of any duplicate, y,
of the fusion, x, of those objects (the "corresponding" parts here are the
images of the original objects under any duplication isomorphism between
the parts of x and the parts of y). I work with (D4) rather than (D4')
because it is simpler.
Next we turn to the concept of an intrinsic profile, a maximally
specific intrinsic property. This concept may be analyzed as follows:
(D5) P is an intrinsic profile = df P is an intrinsic property such
that for every intrinsic property Q, either P entails Q or P
entails ~Q
Finally, we give a definition of ‘qualitative’. Qualitative
properties and relations are "non-haecceitistic" properties. Intrinsic
properties should turn out to be qualitative, but so should non-intrinsic
properties such as being ten feet from something red. Roughly, a relation
is qualitative iff one can determine whether or not it holds between some
objects whenever one knows all the intrinsic facts about the possible world
containing those objects.
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Lewis says that:
Extrinsic qualitative character, wherein duplicates may differ
consists of extrinsic properties that are, though not perfectly’
natural still somewhat natural in virtue of their definability from
perfectly natural properties and relations. 13
I would alter this definition in two ways. First, let us move from
"definability" to (global) supervenience, if for no other reason than to
make it explicit that the kind of definability in question is infmitary. 14
Thus, as a first approximation, the qualitative properties and relations
are those that supervene (globally) on the set of perfectly natural
properties and relations. Unfortunately, this leaves out some qualitative
properties and relations because of the complications introduced by Onion.
Fortunately, we can avoid this problem by defining the qualitative
properties to be those properties that supervene on the set of intrinsic
properties and external relations. We thereby make use of the machinery in
(DP2) to get around the Onion problem, since the definitions of ‘intrinsic’
and ‘external’ make use of duplication. Thus, I accept:
(D6) Property or relation R is qualitative = df R supervenes on the set
of intrinsic properties and external relations
4.2.3 Consequences of the definitions
The consequences of our definitions are an important test of their
adequacy. These consequences show that the definitions preserve the
features we expect the definiens to have, prior to analysis.
First, I note that principle (0) from Chapter 3 section 1:
(0) Every perfectly natural property is intrinsic
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is a consequence of our definitions. 15 Suppose property P is perfectly
natural, and let x and y be any two duplicates. By (DP2), there is a
duplication isomorphism, f, between the set X of x’s parts and the set Y of
y' s P^- So every chain has an upper segment C such that X and Y agree
on C under f. But <P> is a chain, and has just one upper segment: itself.
So X and Y agree on C under f. But since every object is a part of itself,
xeX and yeY; since f is a part-whole isomorphism, f(x)=y. Hence, x has P
iff y has P. Since P cannot differ between duplicates, then, it is
intrinsic by (Dl).
A similar result holds for perfectly natural relations:
(Cl) every perfectly natural relation is either external or internal
Let R be any perfectly natural relation. We will prove that R satisfies
clause ii) of (D4) - thus, R is either internal or external. Suppose that
f is a duplication isomorphism between X, the set of parts of x, and Y, the
set of parts of y, and that x is a sequence of parts of x such that R(x).
As in the proof of (0), <R> is a chain with only one upper segment, so X
and Y agree on <R> under f. Therefore, R(f(x)). Our conclusion follows
without loss of generality.
Next, I show that (Al), (A2), and (A3), the conditions from section 1
under which ‘duplicate’ and ‘intrinsic’ are interdefinable via (Dl) and
(D2), follow from our definitions.
First, we prove (Al): duplication is an equivalence relation.
Reflexivity and symmetry are immediate; transitivity remains. Suppose x
and y are duplicates as are y and z. By (DP2), there is a duplication
isomorphism f between the set X of x’s parts and the set Y of y’s parts,
and a duplication isomorphism g between Y and the set Z of z’s parts. Now,
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f°g is clearly a part-whole isomorphism between X and Z. We will show that
every chain has some upper segment C such that agree(X,Z,C,fog) ; it then
follows by (DP2) that x and z are duplicates. Let C' be an arbitrary
chain. In virtue of f s existence, C has an upper segment C" such that
agree(X,Y,C",f); similarly, C has an upper segment C"' such that
agree(Y,Z,C" /
,g). If C" = C'" then let C=C"=C"'; if C"*C"' then one is an
upper segment of the other; in this case let C be the smaller of C" and
C"\ Either way, C is an upper segment of C\ Since agree(X,Y,C",f) and
agree(Y,Z,C"',g), we have agree(X,Z,C,fog). Q.E.D..
Next, (A2); anything necessarily coextensive with an intrinsic
property is intrinsic. If P is intrinsic, then it can never differ between
duplicates, by (Dl). But then any property necessarily coextensive with P
can never differ between duplicates, and hence is intrinsic by (Dl). Notice
that I do not rely on my Chapter 2 assumption that necessarily coextensive
properties are identical.
Lastly, (A3): I, the set of intrinsic properties, is closed under
negation and infinitary conjunction. Let Pel. Since P can never differ
between duplicates, neither can ~P; hence ~PeI. Now let the members of A
be in I, and let Q be the conjunction of the members of A. Q can never
differ between duplicates, and hence Qel. For suppose otherwise: let Qx,
~Qy, where x and y are duplicates. Since Q is the conjunction of the
members of A, x has every member of A, whereas y does not have every member
of A. Thus, some intrinsic property - a member of A - differs between
duplicates. Contradiction.
Since (Al) is a consequence of the definitions, so is (D2), the
principle that objects that share intrinsic properties are duplicates. For
we showed in section 2 that (Dl) and (Al) together entail (D2).
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Next we prove two principles for intrinsic profiles. First:
<C2) p is an intrinsic profile iff the set of P's instances is a
maximal set of possible duplicates
where by a "maximal set of possible duplicates" I mean a set S such that i)
every member of S is a duplicate of every other member of S, and ii) S is
closed under the relation duplicate of (remember the possibilist
quantifiers!).
First suppose that the set S of P’s instances is a maximal set of
possible duplicates. P can therefore never differ between duplicates since
if x and y are duplicates then either both or neither are in S. Moreover,
let P' be any intrinsic property, and let S' be the set of P’s possible
instances. Either S overlaps S' or it does not. If the latter, then P
entails ~P'. If the former, then S^S' and hence P entails P'. For suppose
otherwise: let xeS, xeS', yeS, y«*S'. Since x,y
€S, x and y are
duplicates. But since xeS' but y*S', P differs between duplicates. But
P' is intrinsic. Contradiction. Thus, P is intrinsic and for every
intrinsic property P', P entails either P or ~P. P, therefore, is an
intrinsic profile.
For the other direction, suppose that P is an intrinsic profile and
let S be the set of P’s (possible) instances. Let x,yeS and let P' be any
intrinsic property had by either x or y. Since x and y each has P, an
intrinsic profile, the other must have P' as well. So, x and y have the
same intrinsic properties, and hence are duplicates by (D2). Next, note
that if xeS, any duplicate of x must be in S — otherwise P, an intrinsic
property, would differ between duplicates. Thus, S is a maximal set of
duplicates.
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Next, we prove (C3):
(C3) For any object x, the conjunction of x’s intrinsic properties is
an intrinsic profile
Let P be the conjunction of A, the set of x’s intrinsic properties. By
(A3), P is intrinsic. Let Q be any intrinsic property - we show that
either P entails Q or P entails ~Q; it follows that P is an intrinsic
profile. Either x has Q or x has ~Q. If the former then QeA and hence P
entails Q. If the latter, then since ~Q is intrinsic (by (A3)), ~QeA, so P
entails ~Q.
Finally, we note that the following principles are consequences of the
definition of ‘qualitative’:
(C4) every intrinsic property is qualitative
(C5) every internal or external relation is qualitative
It is trivial that all intrinsic properties and external relations are
qualitative, since principles (SI) and (S4) from Chapter 3 together entail
that a property or relation supervenes on any set containing it. Internal
relations remain. Let I = the set of intrinsic properties; let E = the set
of external relations, and let R be an internal relation; we show that R
supervenes on IuE. Let f be an IuE-isomorphism between D(w) and D(w'), the
domains of possible worlds w and w'. Suppose R(x), where x is a sequence
of members of D(w). Since f is an IuE-isomorphism it is an I-isomorphism,
so for any x in x, x shares all intrinsic properties with f(x). Thus, by
(D2), for any x in x, x is a duplicate of f(x). Since R is internal, it
follows that R(f(x)).
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We have shown that our definitions entail many principles that
intuitively true of our notions. This is evidence that the definitions
correct.
seem
are
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Notes
1 Lewis (1983a) p. 197.
By ‘Ay(Dup(x,y))’ I mean the property had by object y iff v is adupheate of x not the property had by object y iff y is a duplicate ofthe counterpart of x in y’s world. See Chapter 7 station 1.3 for more
on this distinction.
3 Phillip Bricker pointed me in the direction of A3. Notice that (A3)
makes necessary and impossible properties intrinsic.
4 See Kim (1984) p. 49. This paper introduced the concept of strong
supervenience. The formulation of strong supervenience I use is fromKim (1987) p. 317.
5
It is a fairly straightforward consequence of the definition of ‘Boolean
closure’ that for any set S, S-7nd(x,y) iff ®e(S)-*ad(x,y). See Pauli
and Sider (1992) Appendix, part one.
6 See Chapter 7 section 1.2.
7 Lewis (1986c) p. 61.
8 Lewis (1986c) pp. 61-62.
9
I mean to allow a-sequences for any ordinal a, with the exception that I
do not allow a null-sequence.
10 Lewis (1986c) p. 62.
11 Lewis (1986c) p. 62.
12 Proof: We need a lemma, which follows immediately from the relevant
definitions:
Lemma: if f is a duplication isomorphism between A and B, CsA, and g
= f restricted to C, then g is a duplication isomorphism
between C and f[C].
That (D4) entails (D4') is evident. For the other direction, suppose R
is non-internal, that f is a duplication isomorphism between the set of
x’s parts, X, and the set of y’s parts, Y, that x is a sequence of parts
of x, and that R(x). Let x' be the fusion of the members of x, let X'
be the set of parts of x', let y' = f(x'), let Y' be the set of parts of
y', let g be f restricted to X'. By mereology, X'^X, so by the Lemma, g
is a duplication isomorphism between X' and f[X']. Since f is a part-
whole isomorphism, f[X'] = Y', so by (DP2), x' and y' are duplicates.
Hence, by (D4') R(g(x)). But g(x)=f(x), so R(f(x)). Without loss of
generality, (D4) follows.
13 Lewis (1986c) p. 63.
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14 Althoiigh Lems is not explicit on this point, it is clear that hvdefinability Lewis means to allow infinitary definition. Firsf heuses the word indiscernible’ in Lewis (1986c) p. 63 for things thathave exactly the same qualitative properties: surely one wouldn’t calltwo things "indiscernible" if they differed with respect to someproperty that is capable of being defined from the perfectly naturalproperties and relations, even if the definition must be infinite.
econdly in Lewis (1986c) pp. 62-63, Lewis says that two objects have
character ’ they are duplicates
1 hat is, the intrinsic qualitative properties are exactly the intrinsic
properties. However, intrinsic properties needn’t be finitely definablefrom the perfectly natural properties and relations: all that is
required of intrinsic properties is that they never differ between
duplicates. Infinite Boolean combinations of intrinsic properties for
example, are intrinsic (see (A3) of this chapter). So, intrinsic ’
qualitative properties needn’t be finitely definable from the perfectly
natural properties and relations; hence, it would be odd if Lewis
intended such a restriction on the extrinsic qualitative properties.
15 Another consequence is a more general version of (0): every chain has
an upper segment in which all properties are intrinsic.
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CHAPTER 5
NATURALNESS AND ARBITRARINESS
I claim that we should admit the notion of naturalness. Naturalness
comes in degrees, but in this chapter I consider only perfect naturalness,
which I call simply "naturalness".
David Lewis tentatively proposes taking naturalness as a primitive. 1
I have discussed and accepted this proposal in Chapter 3. But Lewis
proposes the conjunction of this claim with his "class nominalism",
according to which relations are classes of ordered pairs of possibilia. I
will argue that this combination of views is defective.
After introducing Lewis’s proposal in section one, I argue in section
two that we should reject it because of issues involving the nature of
ordered pairs (and ordered classes in general). Then, in section three, I
briefly examine a puzzle due to Kripke and Wittgenstein. I argue that a
proposed solution of the puzzle using the natural/nonnatural distinction
fails, at least if numbers are viewed, as they often are, as arbitrarily
constructible entities.
5.1 Primitive Class Naturalism
Class nominalism is a reductive theory of the abundant properties and
relations. The basic entities countenanced by the class nominalist are
classes and concrete particulars ("objects"). Properties and relations are
then constructed out of these entities. The properties are identified with
the classes of objects. The n-place relations are identified with the
classes of ordered n-tuples of objects, where these n-tuples are
constructed from classes according to any one of the various common
devices. An n-tuple instantiates an n-place relation R iff it is a member
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of R. An object instantiates a property P iff it is a member of P. For
example, the property redness is simply the class of all red things; the
relation being ten feet from is the class of all ordered pairs <x,y> where
x is an object that is ten feet from y, another object. For a class
nominalist, then, properties and relations are not primitive entities --
they are constructed from primitive entities using the methods of the set
theorists.
Class nominalism is most plausible it is coupled with possibilism : the
acceptance of non-actual possible objects. Otherwise, properties are
identified with the classes of their actual instances; thus, distinct
properties that just happen to be coextensive -- for example, the
properties of being George Bush and being the President of the United
States in 1992 — turn out identical. I will, therefore, address my
remarks to this version of class nominalism.
If every class of possibilia counts as a property, then the natural
properties are an exceedingly small minority of the properties. Every
possible object has infinitely many properties, since there are
(presumably) infinitely many possible objects and hence infinitely many
sets of possible objects containing a given possible object. In contrast,
on the conception of naturalness that I accept ("Conception 1" from Chapter
3), macroscopic actual objects, for example, do not have any (perfectly)
natural properties -- only their subatomic parts do. And it is plausible
that even these have only a few natural properties; charge, spin, mass,
etc.
We have a question: how do we account for naturalness in ontology? I
have discussed some of these options in chapter 1; the one I want to focus
on now is the option of primitive naturalism . The primitive naturalist
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takes the distinction between naturalness and unnaturalness as a primitive
distinction that is incapable of reductive analysis. What is more, the
distinction is in no way a matter of convention - it is an objective fact
about the world that some properties and relations are natural, while
others are not.
Lewis holds class nominalism and entertains primitive naturalism. 2 I
call the conjunction of these two views "primitive class naturalism", or
PCN for short. Thus, PCN is the view that i) reduces properties and
relations to classes of objects and ’tuples of objects, and ii) takes the
natural/non-natural distinction as an objective primitive distinction among
properties and relations. I will argue in the next section that PCN is an
unacceptable combination of views.
5.2 Against Primitive Class Naturalism
5.2.1 Pairs and Relations
According to PCN, a binary relation is a class of ordered pairs. For
example, the relation being ten feet from is the class of all ordered pairs
<x,y> of possible objects where x is ten feet from y. But what are ordered
pairs?
Ordinary classes are unordered. When we write the name of a class
thus: "{x,y}", the order in which we write the members is insignificant,
for the class {x,y} is identical to the class {y,x}. Classes are
individuated solely by their membership. For this reason, we do not
identify, for example, the relation taller than with the class of all
classes {x,y} where x is taller than y. Presumably, we would go on to
claim that the relation shorter than is the class of all classes {x,y}
where x is shorter than y. But since for any x and y, {x,y} = {y,x}, these
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two classes would be identical
,
and hence we would have identified two
distinct relations: taller than and shorter than.
In contrast, ordered pairs are ordered. When we write the name of an
ordered pair thus: "<x,y>", the order is significant, for <x,y> is not
identical to <y,x>. Ordered pairs are individuated by their membership and
the relative order of those members. That is, ordered pairs obey the
following identity condition:
<x,y> = <z,w> if and only if x=z and y=w.
But the notion of an ordered pair is not an undefined notion of typical
class theories. Ordered pairs are constructed from classes by any one of a
number of methods, each of which preserves the identity condition just
mentioned. To reap the benefits of having ordered pairs in our ontology,
all we need is the concepts of standard class theory and a little
ingenuity.
One method for constructing ordered pairs ("method" for short) was
introduced by Wiener. For any x and y, Wiener identifies <x,y> with the
class: {x,{y,0}}. Given the class {x,{y,0}}, we can "recover" the
information of which is the first member of the pair and which is the
second. We know, for example, that the second member is y since y is the
element paired with the null-class. The more common method is due to
Kuratowski, who identifies <x,y> with {x,{x,y}}. But there are countless
others — any method that yields one ordered pair for any two objects and
obeys the stated identity condition will do.
These methods should not be viewed as conflicting theories of the
nature of "the ordered pairs" conceived as a sort of entity with which we
have prior acquaintance. Rather, they are proposals for using certain
classes to do the work we require of "ordered pairs".
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Or rather, most of the work. Some of the work asked of the ordered
pairs cannot be done by their stand-ins. Constructions fail at certain
tasks because they are constructions. Since each method generates the
appropriate ordered pairs equally well, no one method generates classes
that deserve the title of "the ordered pairs" any more than any other
method. True, some methods are more common in mathematical and
philosophical writing while others are not even used at all, but these
differences among methods have no ontological significance, in a sense to
be discussed below. I will argue that this fact means trouble for PCN.
5.2.2 Benacceraf s Argument
First, however, let us rehearse informally a famous argument due to
Paul Benacceraf. 3 The multiplicity of methods has an analog in number
theory, the familiar reduction of numbers to classes can be carried out in
many ways. We might let zero be the null class, and let n + 1 be the unit
class of the class identified with n. This is the strategy of Zermelo. Or,
we might let the null class again be zero, but let n+ 1 be the union of n
and {n}, as did von Neumann. Or, we could employ any one of countless
other strategies. 4
Each such strategy provides adequate surrogates for the numbers. Each
can mathematically do the job, in the sense that the resulting "numbers"
provably have class-theoretic properties that are exactly isomorphic to all
the number-theoretic properties that numbers are supposed to have. The
strategies may differ one from another in terms of convenience, but they
seem to be "ontologically on a par". No strategy generates "the real and
true" numbers.
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What this means, argues Benacceraf, is that we cannot think of the
numbers as a single determinate class of objects, fixed once and for all.
Which classes are "the numbers"? Is the number 2, for example, {{a}}, as
Zermelo would have us believe, or is it {e>,{0}} as it is for von Neumann?
It cannot be both, for {{e>}}*{0
,{0 }}. But surely it cannot just be one of
them, since it would be arbitrary to grant one strategy the privileged
status of generating the true numbers. So neither can be the number 2. In
Benacceraf s words, this means we should not view the numbers "as objects".
That is, if we wish numbers to be reduced to other entities. As Linda
Wetzel and Michael Resnik have pointed out, if we believe in numbers as
objects in their own right, in no need of reduction, then we escape
Benacceraf s argument. 5 But many shy away from such a bold response.
This multiplicity of constructions of the natural numbers, argues
Benacceraf, does not matter for most contexts in which we use concepts of
number. But how can this be, if numbers are "not objects"?
An attractive answer is given by the "structuralist". Take the
natural numbers, for example, and ask yourself what is distinctive about
them. The structuralist answer is: structure alone. What is distinctive
about the natural numbers is that there is an initial element (0), and a
relation called the "successor relation" such that each number has a unique
successor, the initial element is the successor of no element, etc. But
exactly what the elements are does not matter, so long as there is enough
of them, and there is a relation among them to play the role of the
successor relation. A line of people that continued forever, with one
person first in line, could be the numbers. Any "w-sequence" -- any one-
one function from u, the class of finite von Neumman ordinals, onto any
domain has the appropriate structure. The number to which o is mapped
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plays the role of 0; the number to which {o) is mapped plays the role of 1,
etc. The image of the ordinal successor relation plays the role of number-
theoretic successor; the image of <= piays the role of <, etc.
Any u-sequence, then, is an adequate surrogate for the sequence of
natural numbers. A number-theoretic sentence 0, for the structuralist,
will be interpreted as a universally quantified claim:
for any w-sequence f, 0(f)
where 0(f) is the result of replacing the number-theoretic predicates,
constants, and functors in 0 with appropriate constructions in terms of f.
The quantifiers in 0 that supposedly range over numbers are in 0(f) allowed
to range over the range of f. Since each method faithfully preserves
number-theoretic properties, if 0 is an "ordinary" number-theoretic
sentence then the truth-value of rvf 0(f)"’ will always match the truth
value we would have intuitively assigned to <f>. And this, despite the fact
that we quantify over no numbers.
By an "ordinary" number theoretic sentence, I mean roughly a sentence
that concerns only the structural properties of numbers. For non-ordinary
sentences, structuralism gives somewhat odd results. Consider:
( 1 ) Ted Sider is distinct from the number 2
Structuralism interprets ( 1 ) as the claim that for any u-sequence, the
third member of the sequence is not identical to me (the first member is
identified with zero, remember). But this claim is not true, since I am
the third member of many w-sequences (consider: 0, {0}, Ted, {{0}},
{{{0 }}}>---)- So structuralism implies that ( 1 ) is false, and this is
certainly not an intuitive result. (Of course, structuralism does not
imply that (T) is true:
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(1') Ted Sider is identical to the number 2
since there are many w-sequences whose third member is not me.)6
Is (1) in fact true? Common sense would presumably answer "yes". But
the structuralist answer is that to think that (1) is true is to think of
numbers as being (particular) objects. Since there is no one object that
uniquely deserves the name ‘one’, this would be a mistake.
5.2.3 An Argument against Primitive Class Naturalism
Suppose for the moment that, contrary to Benacceraf, "numbers are
objects". Without worrying overmuch about just what this comes to, we may
simply take it to imply that either (1) or (F) is true. If this were the
case, then structuralism would be false. The question I want to pursue is
whether PCN runs into a difficulty of this kind. Put intuitively, the
question is: does primitive class naturalism require that relations "be
objects"? I think it does.
In this section, I will give my argument against primitive class
naturalism. The problem with PCN is, in a nutshell, that it applies one of
its primitive concepts (naturalness) to entities (ordered pairs) that are
neither primitive entities PCN accepts, nor are they uniquely constructible
in terms of such entities. The argument is related to arguments given by
D. M. Armstrong and Peter Forrest. 7
Let us continue for the moment at an intuitive level. The question of
which relations are natural is not a "structural" question about the set of
all relations. Rather, given a particular natural relation, it would seem
that PCN requires there to be a fact about that relation, namely, that it
is natural. Indeed, the question of whether a given relation is natural is
a bit like the question of whether I am identical to the number 2 - to
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answer either question we must be able to single out a particular entity
and ask a question about it. By countenancing primitive naturalness, the
class nominalist runs into the same difficulty that would beset the
structuralist if numbers were "objects".
Let’s look at this in more depth. PCN employs a primitive distinction
between natural and non-natural relations. But relations are identified
with classes of ordered pairs of possibilia. These classes of pairs are in
turn identified with classes of classes of possibilia since pairs are
constructed from classes. So, PCN invokes a primitive concept of
naturalness, which applies to classes of classes of possibilia. What is
more, this concept is taken to be an objective feature of the world.
Suppose I ask whether a given relation is natural. I have the concept
of naturalness as applied to classes of possibilia, on one hand, and a
question - Is being ten feet from natural? - on the other. How do I get
my answer to that question from facts about naturalness? Remember that the
relation being ten feet from will be identified with different classes,
depending on which method for constructing the ordered pairs we use. Do I
look at the class of Kuratowski pairs <x,y> where x is ten feet from y, and
see whether the concept of naturalness applies to it? Do I look at Wiener
pairs? Some other kind of pairs?
In outline, my argument against PCN runs as follows. I consider three
possibilities for formulating PCN and attempt to show that each is flawed.
As near as I can tell, I consider all plausible formulations. The
conclusion is that there is no acceptable formulation of PCN. The possible
formulations are distinguished by the way they answer the question — Is
relation R natural? -- based on the way the concept of naturalness applies
to classes of classes of possibilia.
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Throughout this section I assume that ordered pairs are indeed
arbitrarily constructive, and not in the primitive ontology of PCN. In
the next section I will consider the result of giving up this assumption.
Possibility 1: One method
One possibility would be that there is one method of constructing
ordered pairs such that the natural relations as constructed according to
that method are all and only the classes with the property of naturalness.
Let us suppose that method is Kuratowski’s. So, the natural relations are
sets of Kuratowski pairs.
Suppose we want to know whether the relation being ten feet from is a
natural relation. The present proposal instructs us to consider the class
of all pairs <x,y> where x and y are possible objects separated by ten
feet, constructed according to Kuratowski’s method. If and only if this
class has the property of naturalness, our answer is yes. And it is
crucial that we used Kuratowski’s method -- if we had used another method,
say Wiener’s, in constructing the class of pairs <x,y> where x is ten feet
from y, we might have gotten the wrong answer! The class obtained in each
case is different — perhaps exactly one has the property of naturalness.
I reject this answer since, I will argue, it contradicts the claim of
primitive naturalism that naturalness is objective, and not a matter of
convention.
Given a certain convention, I need a test for what is a matter of that
convention. As an example, let us look at the convention of naming. My
place of birth is not a matter of the convention of naming, for the
proposition that Ted was bom in New Haven has the same truth value as it
would have had if our convention of naming were different, and ‘Jeff were
my name. Contrast this with the proposition that Ted’s name has 3 letters,
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which has a different truth value than it would have had if my name were
Jeff instead of ‘Ted’. The moral: the number of letters in my name is a
matter of the naming convention.
I take it as a premise that the choice of a method for constructing
ordered pairs is conventional, just as the choice of what to name a person
is conventional. This is quite plausible. Surely, the various methods for
constructing ordered pairs are mathematical tricks for using classes to
explicate concepts involving order. Surely, there is no ontological
seriousness in our choice of whether to use this method or that method in
constructing pairs.
Since the choice of a method for making pairs is conventional,
propositions that change their truth value when we change our methods for
making ordered pairs are about matters of convention — specifically, they
are about matters of the pair-making convention. One proposition that does
not change its truth value in this way is the proposition that the earlier-
than relation is asymmetric. Suppose, for example, that this proposition
is true, when we make pairs according to Kuratowski’s method. This means
that (i) the set of sets {x,{x,y}} such that x is earlier than y is such
that for any x and y, if {x,{x,y}} belongs to it, then {y,{y,x}} does not
belong to it. Now, let us make pairs Wiener’s way instead. We must show
that (ii) the set of sets {x,{y,o}} where x is earlier than y is such that
for any x, y, if {x,{y,0}} is in the set then {y,{x,0}} is not. Clearly,
ii) follows from i). (From (i) it follows that for any x, y, if x is
earlier than y then y isn’t earlier than x, and (ii) follows from this.)
Since the truth value of the proposition that the earlier-than
relation is asymmetric does not vary when we change methods, this shows
that the asymmetry of the earlier-than relation is not conventional (at
118
least with respect to the convention of making ordered pairs). It should
be intuitively clear that most propositions about relations will not vary
in truth value when we switch methods of making pairs, since when we talk
about relations we don’t say things that depend on the quirks of a
particular method. Typically, when we make assertions about ordered pairs,
all we assume about the nature of pairs is that they obey the identity
condition listed above (pairs are individuated by their members and their
order). Of course, a proposition like the proposition that the transitive
closure8 of the earlier-than relation contains 0 will vary in truth value
when we switch methods (it will be true when we use Wiener’s method; false
when we use Kuratowski’s method). This just goes to show that whether or
not the transitive closure of the earlier-than relation contains 0 is a
matter of convention. 9
Back to naturalness. Clearly, the proposition that the earlier-than
relation is natural will vary in truth value when we switch methods. Only
sets of Kuratowski pairs have the property of naturalness. So, naturalness
turns out to be a matter of convention, on the interpretation of PCN that I
have called "Possibility 1". Thus, this version of PCN is contradictory,
since it is built into the statement of PCN (via the statement of Primitive
Naturalism) that naturalness is "objective", and not a matter of
convention.
Possibility 2: All methods
Here is an alternative proposal. Instead of there being one
distinguished method, surely every method is on a par. One way to develop
this thought is as follows. In possibility one, the property of
naturalness was had by all and only the classes that counted as natural
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relations according to one method. According to possibility 2, a class of
classes counts as natural just when it corresponds to a natural relation
under some method or other for constructing ordered pairs.
Suppose I ask: is being ten feet from natural? On this approach, to
answer this question I must first choose a method for making ordered pairs.
Think of this as an arbitrary choice of a language to discuss ordered pairs
-- I may choose any method I like. Suppose I choose some method M. I must
now construct the class of pairs <x,y>, where x is ten feet from y,
according to method M. Now, the answer to my original question is yes iff
this class has the property of naturalness. And since our naturalness
property now applies to any class of classes that corresponds to a natural
relation under any method, the answer to the question will be the same
whatever method I choose.
The problem here is that too many relations will turn out natural,
because a class of pairs that corresponds to a certain relation under one
method of constructing ordered pairs may correspond to an entirely
different relation under another method.
Suppose the relation being ten feet from is a natural relation. The
present proposal says that for any method M, the class of M-pairs <x,y>
where x is ten feet from y must have the property of naturalness. So,
using the Kuratowski method, the following class S has the property of
naturalness: S = { {x,{x,y}} : x and y are possibilia that are ten feet
apart}. Now let u and v be two objects that are ten feet apart, and let u'
and v' be two other objects that are not ten feet apart. We define a new
method X for constructing the ordered pairs. Intuitively, method X is just
like Kuratowski’s method, save that the pairs <u,v> and <u, ,v/ > are
swapped. Method X may be defined as follows:
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{u,{u,v}} if x=u' and y=v'
<x,y> = {u/
,
{u, ,v/ }} if x=u and y=v
{x,{x,y}} otherwise
Now consider the following relation R. R is just like being ten feet
from, save that u and v do not stand in R, and u' and v' do stand in R.
Plainly, R is not a natural relation. But the present proposal has the
consequence that R is natural. The present proposal says that to ask
whether a given relation is natural one must first choose a method for
constructing pairs. Let us choose method X. That proposal says next that
the relation is natural iff the class of ordered pairs of possibilia that
stand in that relation, as constructed according to that method, has the
property of naturalness. Well, the class of ordered pairs of possibilia
that stand in R, as constructed according to X, is exactly S! The tricky
clauses in the definitions of relation R and method X "cancel" each other,
and we get exactly the same class identified with being ten feet from by
the Kuratowski method. But S has the property of naturalness, and so R
turns out to be natural. The present theory must be disposed of. 10
Possibility 3: Naturalness is a relation between classes and methods
In light of the difficulty with possibility 2, perhaps we should keep
track of which method we are using when we evaluate the naturalness of a
class. Class S from the last section should count as a natural relation,
considered as a class of Kuratowski pairs, but considered as a class of X-
pairs (recall my method X), it shouldn’t be natural.
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As stated, this proposal is unacceptable. To say that a class is
natural considered as" a class of Kuratowski pairs, but non-natural
considered another way surely cannot be taken seriously. Naturalness is
supposed to be an objective feature of the world, so if a class has the
property of naturalness, then it has that property regardless of how it is
considered.
Of course, there is a serious proposal in the neighborhood. Perhaps
the property of naturalness isn’t a property at all, but rather a relation.
When we say a class is natural considered as a class of Kuratowski pairs,
what we mean is that the class bears the naturalness relation to the
Kuratowski method. Class S will count as natural with respect to method X,
but not with respect to the Kuratowski method. That is, S will bear
naturalness to method X, but not to the Kuratowski method.
On this view, what is taken as a primitive by PCN is a relation, the
naturalness relation, which holds between a class and a method iff the
class counts as a natural binary relation when interpreted as a class of
pairs constructed according to that method. Let us return to our question:
is the relation being ten feet from natural? On the present theory, we
must first choose a method M for constructing ordered pairs. Given this
choice, we form the class of all M-pairs <x,y>, where x is ten feet from y.
On the present theory, the answer to our original question is yes if and
only if this class bears the naturalness relation to our chosen method M.
To evaluate this proposal, we should draw a distinction we have
overlooked so far. Earlier I said that PCN reduces properties and
relations to classes — properties are classes of possibilia, relations are
classes of ’tuples of possibilia. This is not quite right. Most relations
are analyzed in this way, but not all. The relation € of class membership,
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for example, is not analyzed as a class of anything, for this would be
circular. In building an ontological theory, the champion of PCN appeals
to a very few primitive properties and relations, (e.g. class membership)
and to a group of entities (e.g. possibilia, classes). Most relations are
thereby analyzed, but not all. Class membership never gets analyzed. A
traditional terminology calls the primitive entities "ontology", and the
primitive concepts "ideology". 11 Most relations, such as the relation being
taller than, find a place in ontology, but e is a part of ideology. 12
When presenting Possibilities 1 and 2, I assumed that naturalness was
a property, but I never said whether the property was a part of ontology or
ideology. That is, I never said whether PCN identified the property with a
class. This is because the objections there did not depend on this
distinction. But there is a special objection waiting if the naturalness
relation of Possibility 3 is a part of ontology.
If naturalness is a class of ordered pairs then we have our trilemma
all over again. Which method for constructing the pairs shall we use? To
use only one would make naturalness a matter of convention. Instead, we
could use every method: the class corresponding to the naturalness
relation contains a subset for each method of constructing ordered pairs.
No good, for this would generate spurious naturalness relations as we saw
above. As a last resort we might appeal to a relation R between classes
and methods: class S bears R to method M iff S is the naturalness
relation, when interpreted as a class of ordered pairs according to M.
This, of course, is the beginning of a vicious regress: what method is
used for constructing R’s ordered pairs? The naturalness relation, then,
cannot be taken as a class of ordered pairs.
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So instead let us take Possibility 3 to place the naturalness relation
in ideology. Naturalness is a relation, but is no class of ordered pairs.
This would escape the previous objection. But in its place 1 have another
objection. The problem comes when we inquire into the nature of one of the
relata of the proposed naturalness relation.
Naturalness is supposed to be a relation between classes and methods
.
I ask what a "method" for constructing ordered pairs is. I suppose many
answers could be given. The Kuratowski method, for example, might be
identified with a two-place function f, where f(x,y) = {x,{x,y}}. But the
Kuratowski method could just as well be taken to be a different function g:
g(x,y)= the characteristic function of f(x,y). And in either case, the
functions will surely be construed as classes of ordered pairs. Since the
ordered pairs are capable of multiple constructions, the functions will be
as well. Or mightn’t the Kuratowski method be taken to be the sentence
‘let <x,y> be {x,{x,y}}’? Something else corresponding to the "directions"
given by that sentence?
Let’s face it. There is no one group of entities in the ontology of
PCN that uniquely deserves the name ‘the method of Kuratowski’. Rather,
there are a number of constructions, each capturing the relevant properties
of Kuratowski’s method. But these constructions reintroduce the old
difficulty. Our naturalness relation is supposed to apply to methods —
the Kuratowski method, for example. But the Kuratowski method can be
constructed according to many "meta-methods", so we have our trilemma all
over again. Can we use just one meta-method to construct the method of
Kuratowski? No - surely the choice of a meta-method is conventional, and
would therefore lead to conventional naturalness. Can we use all methods
to construct the method of Kuratowski, thus allowing the naturalness
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relation to relate any method that counts as Kuratowski’s method under any
meta-method? No (some entity might be interpretable as more than one
method). Can we let Kuratowski’s method be a relation between
constructions and meta-methods of interpreting those constructions? No; we
will have the same problem all over again on the next level when we inquire
into the nature of meta-methods.
As near as I can tell, I have considered and rejected all
possibilities for formulating PCN. I conclude that no version of PCN is a
viable theory, at least under the present assumption that ordered pairs are
not in the primitive ontology of PCN.
The following summary may help us see the forest through the trees. An
ontologist presents a total picture of reality in terms of some primitive
entities and primitive concepts. After giving a theory of the workings of
the primitive entities and concepts, constructed entities may be
introduced, but first we must have the theory of the primitives. The Class
Nominalist accepts possibilia and classes as the primitive entities, and
class membership as the primitive concept. PCN then adds a primitive
notion of naturalness. Naturalness must be a property or relation. If
naturalness is a property, then what primitive entities have it? We
rejected two possibilities here: classes of ordered pairs for one
distinguished method (Possibility 1), and classes of ordered pairs for each
method (Possibility 2). We rejected the first because it made naturalness
conventional, the second because it made an obviously nonnatural relation,
my concocted relation R, natural. On the other hand, if naturalness is a
relation, then we must ask whether that relation belongs to ontology or to
ideology. In the first case, we ran up against an infinite regress. In
the second case, where naturalness was construed as a primitive binary
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relation, we noted that its relata are methods; since methods are
arbitrarily constructible from the primitive entities of PCN (as are meta-
methods, and meta-meta-methods...), we found no acceptable entities for the
naturalness relation to relate.
Notice that other views about naturalness are unaffected by my
argument. For example, if relations are taken to be primitive entities,
rather than classes of ordered ’tuples, then there is no trouble. Even if
we take relations to be classes of ’tuples, the argument of this chapter
does not apply if, rather than taking naturalness as a primitive, we
analyze it in terms of universals. 13 With these real entities doing the
work of distinguishing between natural and unnatural relations, we need not
say that one class is privileged as the class of natural ordered pairs.
When we discuss relations, we must first pick a method M for constructing
the ordered pairs. This done, a natural relation is a class S such that
there is some dyadic universal such that S is the class of all pairs <x,y>
(constructed according to M) where x and y instantiate that universal. At
any time, we can switch to another method, because the universals are "out
there", independent of our methods of constructing ordered pairs, ready to
make the distinction among whatever entities we should propose as the
relations.
5.2.4 Response li "The Argument Proves Too Much"
In the next two sections I will consider responses to my argument. The
first response derives from a worry that my argument, if sound, would prove
too much. In philosophy and mathematics, the concept of an ordered pair is
frequently invoked. Surely, the fact that there is no uniquely
distinguished method for constructing the pairs does not mean that these
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uses of pairs by philosophers and mathematicians are faulty! But couldn’t
my argument be extended to show these uses illegitimate? And if not, then
what is so special about the use of pairs made by PCN?
I agree that most uses of pairs are legitimate. The case of PCN is
special. What is special about PCN is that it grants significance to the
particular objects to which pairs are reduced, by applying primitive
naturalness to classes of pairs. In fact, it seems to me that my argument
applies whenever a Class Nominalist postulates a non-conventional primitive
property or relation of relations. In contrast, everyday uses of pairs are
legitimate because on those uses no such significance is granted -- rather,
the pairs are only used to get a job done.
Let me illustrate my point with what I take to be a representative
example of an ordinary use of ordered pairs. Binary relations -- construed
as classes of ordered pairs - are often taken by formal semanticists to be
the meanings of dyadic natural language predicates. Imagine an objector
asking: "what set, exactly, is the meaning of ‘taller than’? What method
do you use to make the pairs?" Presumably, we will answer that it doesn’t
matter -- any method is fine. "But wait!", the objector will say. "This
means that what ‘taller than’ means is a matter of the convention of making
ordered pairs. Granted, word meaning is conventional in that we can choose
to make words mean anything we like. But word meaning isn’t a matter of
this convention, the convention of making ordered pairs. When we switch
methods for making pairs, ‘up’ doesn’t start meaning down. On to
possibility 2
I think we should stop this argument short right at this point. We
can accept the conclusion that what ‘taller than’ means is a matter of the
convention for making pairs, in the following sense: exactly what entity
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is assigned as the semantic value for ‘taller than’ depends on the
convention for making pairs. The conventionality conclusion that is
unacceptable for PCN is, I claim, innocuous in the present case.
This conventionality would be unwelcome only if we required semantic
theory to provide answers to questions like "what entity exactly is the
meaning of ‘taller than’", as if such questions are pre-theoretical and
demanding of an answer. But we can claim that semantic theory seeks to
provide a systematic account of certain intuitions speakers have about
their language, intuitions perhaps about the truth conditions of sentences
or about the validity of inferences. To accomplish this task, semantic
theory is free to employ whatever "internal concepts" it chooses, and this
choice is a matter of convention. What entities it uses in its modeling of
language is not part of the "ultimate output" of the theory. They are
"artifacts of the model". David Lewis agrees : 14
Semantic values may be anything, so long as their jobs get done.
Different compositional grammars may assign different sorts of
semantic values, yet succeed equally well in telling us the conditions
of truth-in-English and therefore serve equally well.... Likewise,
different but equally adequate grammars might parse sentences into
different constituents, combined according to different rules.
So, we only require our semantic theory to generate the correct results
with respect to validity and truth conditions. We don’t care about what
particular entities are assigned as the meanings of predicates. Hence, we
don’t mind when we learn that it is conventional what object is assigned to
be the semantic value of ‘taller than’.
Of course, there is a sense in which the meaning of ‘taller than’ is
not a matter of the pairs convention. ‘Taller than’ does not begin to
express the relation of being shorter than
,
no matter what convention for
making pairs we choose. But my argument does not contradict this
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intuition. For example, whether or not the following sentences are true is
not a matter of the convention of making ordered pairs:
(7a) The sentence ‘Ted is taller than Mike’ is true if and only if the
sentence ‘Mike is shorter than Ted’ is true
(7b) If a sentence ra is taller than p is true (where a and p are
proper names) then the sentence rp is taller than a 1 is false
(7c) The sentence ‘Ted is taller than Mike’ is true if and only if Ted
is taller than Mike
(7d) ‘is taller than’ applies to Ted and Mike (in that order)
I suggest that it is claims like these that we have in mind when we think
that what words mean is not a matter of the pairs convention. The phrase
‘what a word means’ is ambiguous. Are we discussing the entity that is
assigned to be that word’s semantic value? Then we are discussing
something that is (partly) a matter of the convention of making pairs. Or
are we discussing meaning relations between words as in (7a), formal
properties of a word’s meaning as in (7b), or relations between words and
the world as in (7c) and (7d)? Then what we are discussing is not a matter
of the pairs convention.
Similar responses, I think, will answer most worries of the effect of
the multiplicity of methods on uses of relations. The general idea is that
we have a particular task at hand. To accomplish this task, we need the
effect of entities that behave like ordered pairs, but we do not care what
particular entities we use. Kuratowski pairs would be fine, but so would
Wiener pairs. We don’t care how the job gets done, so long as it gets
done.
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5.2.5 Response 2l Primitive Ordered Pairs
The second response I will consider is analogous to Wetzel and
Resnik’s response to Benacceraf s argument. That argument does not touch a
believer in numbers as primitive, irreducible entities. In the present
case, the PCN theorist could countenance a new class of primitive entities,
the ordered pairs, and introduce a primitive ordered-pair forming
operation. For any objects u and v, there is exactly one entity that is
the true ordered pair of u and v. Granted, there are many class-theoretic
structures that are isomorphic to the true ordered pairs, but these are not
reductions of the ordered pairs. The property of naturalness, on this
view, is had just by classes of true ordered pairs.
The horn of my trilemma that would no longer be unanswerable would be
the first one. If ordered pairs are counted among the primitive
constituents of the world, then the choice of a method isn’t conventional
after all. One method is distinguished, only now it is misleading to call
it a method of construction : it is the "method" that identifies <x,y> with
the true ordered pair of x and y.
I take it that such a response can indeed escape my argument. Thus,
my argument should be taken as an argument against a particular version of
primitive class naturalism - that version that accepts the orthodox view
of ordered pairs according to which pairs are not primitive entities.
However, I do have some comments on the theory of primitive ordered pairs.
First, we should note that primitive ordered triples will have to be
accepted as well. In class theory, ordered triples are typically
constructed from ordered pairs, once the ordered pairs have been
constructed. We could construe the ordered triple of u, v, and w as
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< <u,v>,w>, but this is an arbitrary choice; we could have picked <w,< u ,v> >
or <u, <v,w> > instead. Perhaps some choices are more convenient than
others, but surely this has no real ontological significance. So the
trilemma above would apply to three-place natural relations. Primitive
triples, therefore, had better be accepted. Similar arguments would
require that that for every n, if there are any n-place natural relations
then primitive n-tuples must be accepted.
So it seems that PCN will require primitive n-tuples together with an
n-tuple formation operator for every number n such that there are natural
n-place relations. We should notice that these additions would diminish
the appeal of PCN, and specifically that of class nominalism. Class
nominalism attracts us by its simplicity. We need only believe in
possibilia and class theory, and in return we are promised ontological
heaven. Now we find ourselves postulating new entities and operations. The
price seems a high price to pay for the natural/nonnatural distinction.
Perhaps we should shop elsewhere.
So, when we consider this enhanced version of PCN, we should not
forget that PCN has competitors. The theory of universal, for example,
purports to give an analysis of naturalness, although it pays the price of
invoking universal. Then, there is a view that I favor: the combination
of primitive naturalism with the claim that properties and relations are
primitive entities . 15 We need to ask whether the addition of primitive
’tuples to PCN tips the scales of philosophical price against PCN in favor
of its rivals.
Finally, let us note that one particular (potential) defender of PCN
cannot take the way out offered by primitive ordered pair formation. David
Lewis defends the following principle: "the ‘generating’ relation of a
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system should never generate two different things out of the very same
material. There should be no difference without a difference in content." 16
As Peter Forrest and D. M. Armstrong have pointed out, primitive ordered-
pair formation would violate this principle. " To the extent that this
principle is attractive, this new version of PCN is unattractive.
5.3 Naturalness and 11Kripkenstein"
The natural/nonnatural distinction has been thought to help solve
Kripke’s version of a puzzle of Wittgenstein’s. 18 Surely, by using the word
plus
,
I express the plus function, which assigns to any two numbers their
sum. But my behavior seems to be consistent with my meaning something
different by ‘plus’: quus. Quus is a function that assigns to x and y
their sum if each is less than some suitably chosen number; seventeen
otherwise. If the chosen number is high enough, argues Kripke, nothing
about my behavior could constitute my meaning plus and not quus when I say
‘plus’. And surely my behavior determines what I mean. It seems we ought
to conclude that I do not mean plus any more than quus. But I do mean plus
and not quus.
Lewis proposes we solve the puzzle using naturalness. 19 Plus, but not
quus, is a natural function. Natural functions are prima facie more
eligible to serve as meanings for our words. This is why I mean plus and
not quus. Nothing about my behavior determines this. I may never have
heard of naturalness. It is simply a fact about reference that reference
goes to the most natural candidate — in this case, plus.
The importance of this example is that the notion of naturalness is
applied to numbers. But now a new problem arises. It will be analogous to
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the problem of the previous section, only now it will generate a difficulty
for all theories of naturalness, not just for PCN.
There is a difficulty with taking certain number-theoretic functions
as being natural functions, if numbers are constructions from classes and
are not primitive entities in their own right, for to countenance numbers
as entering into natural relations is, I say, to treat numbers "as
objects".
Suppose certain numeric functions are distinguished as the natural
ones. Suppose further that numbers are constructions from classes. So
certain class-theoretic functions are natural. We need to know to which
method for constructing the numbers these classes correspond. There are
three possibilities as before.
Possibility one: there is one privileged method. This I reject since
the fact that the choice of a method for constructing the natural numbers
is conventional would make naturalness as applied to numbers conventional,
which in turn would make it a matter of convention whether I meant plus or
quus by ‘plus’. That seems wrong.
Possibility two: naturalness is a property that applies to any class-
theoretic function that counts as a natural number-theoretic function under
some method for constructing the numbers. Here, whenever we choose a
method M for constructing the numbers, the natural number-theoretic
functions are those class-theoretic functions that have the property of
naturalness and are, according to M, number-theoretic functions. This is
no good, since it generates too many natural functions. For example, we
could construct the numbers in von Neumann’s way, except with two and
seventeen reversed. The class-theoretic function f that was the plus
function according to von Neumann will have the property of naturalness.
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But interpreted according to the new method, f will count as some bizarre
number theoretic function. So this bizarre number theoretic function will
turn out natural: an incorrect result.
Possibility three: naturalness is a relation that holds between
methods for constructing the natural numbers from classes and class-
theoretic functions (i.e. relations). This is rejected on the grounds that
methods" are arbitrarily constructible entities, and so the difficulty is
re-introduced. The Zermelo method for constructing the numbers might be
conceived as the appropriate function from the class u of finite ordinals
into the class Z of Zermelo numbers (i.e. {0>},{{0}}...}). Or it might
be conceived of as a similar function with a different domain (some well-
ordered class isomorphic to u). Or it might be a two-place function f from
wxZ into {0,1} (e.g. where a is the nth ordinal, f(a,s) = 1 if s is the
class Zermelo identifies with n; 0 otherwise). Or a similar two-place
function from uxZ into {T,F}. Maybe it is the "rule" by which we specify
the Zermelo numbers, whatever that is (i.e. something corresponding to the
directions: "let 0 be 0
,
and let n+1 be {n}").
Since the Zermelo method" is arbitrarily constructible, we have our
old trilemma. Is there one entity that is the method of Zermelo? No. Is
the method of Zermelo all of these entities? No. Is the method of Zermelo
a relation involving meta-methods? No.
It should be clear that this argument is not particular to numbers. It
generalizes whenever entities, like numbers, are capable of multiple
equivalent constructions. I conclude, therefore, that only bona fide
entities can enter into natural relations. "Entities" that are mere
constructions from other objects and capable of multiple equivalent
constructions cannot enter into natural properties or relations. More
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precisely, while most talk of mere constructs can be suitably paraphrased,
talk of mere constructs having natural properties and entering into natural
relations cannot be suitably paraphrased, and must therefore be abandoned.
There is no problem to the solution of the Kripkenstein puzzle, of
course, if numbers are taken as primitive entities. Furthermore, there may
be some other solution to the puzzle that invokes naturalness, but not of
number-theoretic functions. But if numbers are viewed as mere
constructions from classes, then the solution to the puzzle in terms of
natural functions is untenable.
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CHAPTER 6
PROPERTIES, UNIVERSALS AND NATURALNESS
The time has come to discuss a class of competitors to primitive
naturalism: "sparse theories of universals", especially a theory suggested
by the writing of D. M. Armstrong. As I have indicated in Chapter 1, it
has been thought to be possible to use sparse universals to analyze
naturalness. In this chapter I present these theories and examine the
possibilities for analyzing naturalness in terms of universals. The
outlook for a fully general analysis is not good. Finally, I criticize
Armstrong’s contention that immanent universals are superior to
transcendent universals.
b- 1 Sparseness vsl Abundance: Immanence vs. Transcendence
In this section I characterize various theories of universals by
focusing on two questions. The first is the question of whether universals
are sparse or abundant. The second is the question of whether universals
are immanent or transcendent.
I will approach these questions by considering how David Lewis’s D.M.
Armstrong answers them. Let me explain. In his two volume work Universals
and Scientific Realism
,
Armstrong laid out a theory of universals that was
vague and inexplicit on the question of immanence. David Lewis interprets
Armstrong in a certain way in On the Plurality of Worlds. Since then,
Armstrong has been more explicit: in his book A Combinatorial Theory of
Possibility. However, I find Armstrong’s version of his own theory
difficult to understand, and therefore difficult to critically evaluate. I
will therefore confine my remarks to Lewis’s clearer Armstrong, who I will
(somewhat unfairly) persist in calling "Armstrong". 1
140
The terms ‘universal’ and ‘property’ are often used interchangeably,
but I need to separate them when discussing sparse universal. I reserve
the words ‘property’ and ‘relation’ for entities that obey the abundance
assumption given in chapter 2: one property for every class of things; one
n
-place relation for every class of n-tuples. On some views of universal,
universal are identifiable with the properties and relations, but for now
let us forgo this simplification.
The distinction between universal and particulars is familiar.
Particulars include people, planets, protons, etc. Universal, such as
roundness
,
unit positive charge, etc. are instantiated by particulars. So
far, no surprises. But I want to look at two main differences between
Armstrong’s theory of universal and traditional theories. Armstrong’s
universal are sparse, and they are immanent, or "wholly present" in their
instances.
Universal are often taken to be abundant, rather than sparse. Exactly
what we take the term ‘abundant’ to mean is somewhat open. A universal may
be admitted for every meaningful predicate of ordinary language. We might
have a universal for "every way a thing could be", on some suitable
interpretation of this phrase. Abundant universal would surely be closed
under the Boolean operations.
For our purposes here, let us construe abundance broadly. Say that a
property P and a universal U correspond iff the set of U’s possible
instances is identical to the set of P’s possible instances. I take the
claim that universals are abundant to be the claim that for every property
there is a corresponding universal. Recall my Chapter 2 abundance
assumption for properties: one for every class of things.
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In contrast, on a "sparse" view of universal, only a select minority
of properties have corresponding universal*.* Like 'abundant',
‘sparse’ is
schematic. I will characterize sparseness in roughly the same way that
Armstrong does, although no precise criterion is given. One non-negotiable
constraint on the sparseness of universal* for Armstrong is the following:
(S) A property (relation) has a corresponding universal only if
that property (relation) makes for similarity
(See chapter 3 section 3.1 on the notion of making for similarity.)
As an example of the application of (S), suppose that redness and
bjueness are both universal. 3 This seems consistent with (S), since
shared color seems to be a genuine similarity. But the sharing of the
property redness-or-blueness does not seem to count as a genuine
similarity. A red object could be quite dissimilar to a blue object.
Thus, (S) prohibits a universal of redness-or-blueness
. Similar remarks
apply to negations of universal. In fact, for Armstrong there are no
disjunctive or negative universals. 4
For Armstrong, the properties that correspond to universals are an
elite minority of the entire set of properties. 5 Likewise, the perfectly
natural properties are an elite minority of all the properties. This
analogy suggests the possibility of analyzing perfect naturalness in terms
of sparse universals. In the next section, I will discuss this analysis.
There is more to be said about sparseness, but I postpone that
discussion until section 2. Let us move to the second feature of
Armstrong’s view. His universals are immanent - that is, they are "wholly
present in their instances. Armstrong contrasts immanent universals with
transcendent universals. 6 Transcendent universals, or "Forms", are
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supposed to be "separate" front their instances, to which they are linked by
the relation of "participation".
We have what looks like a disagreement: are universal immanent -
"wholly present" in their instances - or are they transcendent -
"separate" from their instances? Let us call the view that universal are
immanent IU
,
and the view that universals are transcendent "TU". So far
my characterization of the dispute over immanence is too vague. What is it
for a universal to be "wholly present" in its instances? What is it for a
universal to be "separate" from its instances?
First, the issue is mereological. The claim that universals are
wholly present in their instances would seem to mean at least that
universals are parts of their instances. If redness is a universal, then
any given red thing has the universal redness as a part. Thus, if x and y
are both red, then x and y overlap. That is, they have a part in common;
namely, the universal redness .
Separate" too may be taken mereologically. In this sense, when the
defender of TU claims that "universals are separate from their instances",
what is meant is that universals are (mereologically) disjoint from their
instances.
According to IU, then, a universal is a part of each of its instances.
Since universals are supposed to be "wholly" present in their instances, it
might be thought that we must add that the whole of the universal is a part
of each instance, i.e. that every part of the universal is a part of the
instance. However, this would be redundant since the phrases:
x is a part of y
every part of x is a part of y
1
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axe equivalent.
Armstrong intends his claim that universal are immanent to mark a
profound metaphysical difference between his view and views that deny this
claim. For example, Armstrong criticizes Platonism, a version of TU, for
its failure to locate an object’s properties ("Forms") in that object:
Is it not clear that a ' s whiteness is not determined by a's
relationship with a transcendent entity? Perform the usual thought-
experiment and consider a without the form of Whiteness It seems
obvious that a might still be white....
It is important to see that this argument succeeds only against a
doctrine of transcendent universals. It would fail... against the
view that the Form is something present as a whole in a ... 7
But I will now argue that if there is nothing to "wholly present" beyond
the present mereological claim, then there is no genuine metaphysical
significance to the question: are universals immanent or transcendent?
Consider the universal redness
, and consider a particular x that is
red. According to TU, redness is not a part of x. But now consider the
fusion of x and all of its universals. Redness is indeed a part of this
entity. Why not consider this fusion the particular? In what follows I
will develop this intuition.
TU countenances particulars; we refer to and quantify over these
objects in everyday language. It also countenances universals in which
those particulars participate; these may be predicated of particulars in
ordinary language. Moreover, no particular overlaps any universal.
Consider any particular x that participates in universals U
,
U
,
....
Let y be the fusion of x and the universals U , U , .... Let us call y a
thick particular — the fusion of a particular with all of the universals
in which it participates. We may also introduce a new term
‘participates a thick particular participates* in a universal iff the
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original particular from which it was derived participates in that
universal.
A hybrid form of TU is "HTU". According to HTU, it is thick
particulars rather than ordinary particulars that are properly called
"particulars"; it is thick particulars that we refer to and quantify over
in ordinary language, we predicate of them the universals in which they
participate*.
Imagine a vocal advocate of IU berating a defender of TU: "You are
mistaken in your belief that universals are transcendent. Change your
ways; admit that universals are in their instances." Then imagine the
reply: 'I accept your criticism. I was wrong in accepting TU. I now
accept HTU. Universals are indeed parts of their instances - universals
are contained in the particulars (that is, thick particulars) that
participate (that is, participate*) in them."
The "concession" by the defender of TU is clearly no concession at
all. He has changed no metaphysical views; all he has changed is what he
calls "particulars". Before he took the term ‘particular’ to refer to
objects without their universals, he now takes that term to refer to
fusions of objects and their universals. But he has accepted no new
entities, and no new facts about entities he accepts.
Thus, if immanence were merely mereological, then there would be no
real metaphysical dispute over immanence.
We can illustrate the situation with a picture. Let us begin with a
particular, x, that instantiates universals Ul, U2, .... To begin on
neutral ground, let us mereologically subtract Ul, U2, ... from x; call the
result TP. TP may be called a "thin particular" since it contains no
universals that it instantiates as parts. 8 According to TU, TP is simply
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X, the object we began with, since Ul, U2, ... weren't part of x to begin
with. According to IU, on the other hand, TP is distinct from x since x
contained those universals. Now consider the following diagram:
TU IU
U1
>
U2
> ••• Ul, U2,...
TP tp
Figure 2
Particulars: TU vs. IU
The circles in the diagram represent what the theory in question calls a
"particular". The diagram makes it plain that the only difference between
TU and IU (as I have so far characterized them) is semantic. Each accepts
the same metaphysical picture; they merely draw the circles differently —
that is, they differ over the reference of ‘particular’.
Surely the dispute over immanence is metaphysically significant. What
has gone wrong? We have left out a crucial element of the claim that
universals are "wholly present" in their instances. David Lewis is clear
on this matter. In his presentation of Armstrong’s view in On the
Plurality of Worlds
,
he says that immanent universals are located exactly
where their instances are located. And it is not merely that part of the
universal is co-located with one instance, part of it with another. The
entire universal shares total spatiotemporal location with each of its
instances. Thus, universals are "recurrent", or "multiply located". 9 A
universal is all here, and also all there.
This added feature provides a genuine metaphysical difference between
IU and TU. Transcendent universals are typically taken to exist "outside
of' the spatiotemporal world. Let us return to the diagram. The
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difference would be in where I draw the universal Ul, U2... On the TU
part I could draw those universal anywhere, indicating that they are not
in space and time. But on the IU part, I need to indicate that Ul, U2...
are co-located with TP. The diagram must reflect the difference.
We may construe the opposing view, TU, as taking the opposite
position: no universal spatially coincides with any particular. In fact,
let us take this to follow from a more basic claim: that universal have
no spatiotemporal location whatsoever.
But I want to draw a moral from our consideration of HTU. We should
separate out two components of the claim that universal are immanent, or
wholly present" in their instances. One component, the mereological
component, is the claim that universal are parts of their instances. The
other component, the spatiotemporal component, is the claim that universal
share spatiotemporal location with their instances. Likewise, the claim of
TU that universal are transcendent, or "separate" from their instances has
two components. The mereological component is the claim that no universal
overlaps any particular. The spatiotemporal component is that no universal
spatially coincides with any particular (in virtue of the fact that
universal lack spatiotemporal location). As we have noted, the
spatiotemporal components seem to provide the real metaphysical difference
between the views.
Here are two questions. Question #1: are universals sparse or are
they abundant? Question #2: are universals immanent or are they
transcendent? Using these questions we can distinguish four possible
theories of universals. The first theory, "sparse IU", takes the first
option in both questions. Armstrong’s theory is a version of sparse IU.
Another theory, which we might call "sparse TU", accepts sparse
147
transcendent universal "Abundant TU" accepts the second answer to both
questions. A fourth and rather odd theory, "abundant IU“, would accept
abundant immanent universal.
Only the first two theories, the ones whose universals are sparse, are
of any help in analyzing naturalness. The next section considers the
possibility of analyzing naturalness in terms of sparse universals. What I
say there applies equally to the first two theories: sparse IU and sparse
TU.
6.2 Universals and Naturalness
In the following section I examine the possibility of using a sparse
theory of universals to analyze naturalness.
The project in which I am interested is that of using a sparse theory
of universals to analyze the concept of naturalness as applied to the
abundant properties (and relations). For example, the universals will be
used to pick out which properties are perfectly natural.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Lewis’s suggestion is that ‘perfectly
natural’ might be analyzed in terms of universals as follows:
(Ul) property (relation) P is perfectly natural iff it corresponds to
some universal
So far, I have only mentioned one constraint on sparseness: (S). This
leaves many questions of the form ‘Does P correspond to a universal?’
unanswered. Indeed, there are various ways to develop a sparse universals
view. On some ways (Ul) might be acceptable; on others it might not.
Armstrong’s leading intuition is that what universals there are is an
a posteriori matter, to be established by "total science". We have reason
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to postulate only those universal required to explain the genuine
similarities in the world. 10
This conception seems to match with Conception 2 of perfect
naturalness from Chapter 3 section 3.1. Conception 2 invokes natural
properties to explain resemblance; Armstrong invokes universals for the
same purpose. On Conception 2, (consistent) conjunctions and structural
combinations of perfectly natural properties and relations are perfectly
natural. With one exception, Armstrong too accepts conjunctive and
structural universals, where a "conjunctive" universal is one that is the
conjunction of others; a "structural" universal is one that is a structural
combination of others, called its "constituents". 11 (The exception to
Armstrong s acceptance of conjunctive and structural universals is that he
does not accept the existence of a universal in a world in which it has no
instances. 12 For example, if something is U, and something else is V, but
nothing is both U and V, then universals U and V will have no conjunction
(at that possible world). I will ignore this complication in what
follows.) So (Ul) provides, perhaps, an adequate analysis of Conception 2-
style perfect naturalness.
(Ul) does not, however, provide an adequate analysis of Conception-
1
style perfect naturalness. Conceptions 1 and 2 disagree. As we saw in
Chapter 3, section 2.1, conjunctions and structural combinations of
perfectly natural properties are not perfectly natural. This means that
(Ul) must be modified, if we are to have an analysis of Conception 1
-style
perfect naturalness. Otherwise, (Ul) would generate perfectly natural
properties corresponding to structural and conjunctive universals. But we
can restrict (Ul):
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(U2) property (relation) P is perfectly natural iff there is some
nonconjunctive, nonstructural universal U such that the set of
P s possible instances is identical to the set of U’s possible
instances
It seems, then, that we can evade the problems caused by conjunctive
and structural universal by offering (U2) as our definition of ‘perfectly
natural’, as construed by Conception 1. (From now on, I consider only
Conception 1-style naturalness.) But there is more to naturalness than
perfect naturalness. I will argue that universal cannot help us in
analyzing the more natural than relation.
Universal, at first blush, seem only to help with the upper end of
naturalness. How to use them to analyze relative naturalness? One
strategy would employ conjunctive and structural universals. The intuition
behind this strategy is that conjunctions are less natural than their
conjuncts, and structural universals are less natural than their
constituents. For any property or relation P that corresponds to a
universal, denote that universal by "univ(P)" (I assume there are no
distinct, necessarily coextensive universals according to the sparse
views). I think that it is plausible that the following gives a sufficient
condition on the more natural than relation:
(Cl) For any two distinct properties (relations) P and Q that
correspond to universals, if univ(P) is a constituent or a
conjunct of univ(Q) then P is more natural than Q
However, this condition does not seem to be necessary. First, suppose
the following are equally natural and correspond to universals: properties
PI and P2, and relations R1 and R2. Now, let Q1 be the property of having
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two proper parts x and y such that Rlxy and Plx and Ply; let Q2 be the
property of having two proper parts x and y such that R2xy and P2x and P2y.
Q1 corresP°nds to a structural universal that has univ(Pl) and univ(Rl) as
constituents. Q2 corresponds to a structural universal that has univ(P2)
and univ(R2) as constituents. Intuitively, PI is more natural than Q2.
Similarly, P2 seems more natural than Ql. PI, P2, Rl, and R2 are all on
the same "level" of naturalness, whereas Ql and Q2 seem to be on a
different "level". And yet, were the ‘if in (Cl) changed to ‘if and only
if, these intuitive judgments would be overruled. Univ(Pl) is neither a
conjunct nor a constituent of univ(Q2).
It might be thought that we can repair the difficulty as follows.
Extend (Cl) into a necessary and sufficient condition for the relation
being more natural* than :
(C2) For any properties (relations) P and Q that correspond to
universal, P is more natural* than Q iff univ(P) is a
constituent or a conjunct of univ(Q)
Then, analyze the more natural than relation as follows:
(C3) For any properties (relations) P and Q that correspond to
universal, P is more natural than Q iff there are properties
(relations) P' and Q' that correspond to universals and are such
that i) P and P' are equally natural, ii) Q and Q' are equally
natural, and iii) P' is more natural* than Q'
In the example above, (C3) yields the result that PI is more natural than
Q2, for PI is equally as natural as P2, Q2 is equally as natural as itself,
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and, by (C2), P2 is more natural’ than Q2 (since univ(P2) is a constituent
of univ(Q2)).
Unfortunately, (C3) saddles us with a new difficulty: that of
providing an analysis of the equally as natural as relation in terms of
universal. I do not see how this could go.
There is another, independent difficulty with the project of defining
more natural than’ along these lines. The proposals so far have only
concerned properties that correspond to universal s. But what about other
properties? For example, it seems intuitive to say that the property being
red or green is more natural than the property being grue or being
identical to George Bush or being five feet away from someone with 6 coins
in his pocket. But neither of these properties corresponds to a universal,
since each fails the similarity test contained in (S). Therefore, (C3) is
silent with respect to them.
An entirely different method for characterizing relative naturalness
would have consequences for properties that don’t correspond to universals.
Begin by using (U2) to characterize perfect naturalness, and then use the
notion of distance from a set to characterize relative naturalness as was
explained in chapter 3 section 3.1:
(5) P is at least as natural as Q iff P is at least as close to N as
Q is
(where N is the set of perfectly natural properties and relations).
This method is fraught with difficulty. First, it doesn’t achieve the
goal of analyzing naturalness in terms of universals, for it invokes an
additional primitive: distance from a set. That notion was used in
Chapter 3 to illuminate naturalness, but in the end naturalness was the
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primitive. In the present case, the goal is to avoid taking naturalness as
a primitive, so we really are engaged in analysis. (5) here is being
offered as a definition of ‘at least as natural as’ and hence we would need
to take as primitive distance from a set (unless some way were found to
analyze it). In addition to appealing to a new primitive, (5) is wrong.
Let us adapt our description of Onion, the world of endless complexity, as
follows: no non-structural universal are instantiated at Onion - rather,
every universal is a structural universal. So, (U2) implies that there are
no perfectly natural properties at Onion. Thus, most properties at Onion
will not supervene on N at all (the only exceptions will be properties that
supervene on the spatiotemporal relations alone), and (5) implies that any
two such properties are equally natural - an unacceptable result.
In chapter 3 section 2.3, I showed how to get around (5)’s problems by
offering the weaker (5a) and (5b). But (5a) and (5b) are of no use to us
here, for they do not give general necessary and sufficient conditions for
one property or relation being at least as natural as another. They merely
give such conditions in certain special cases. Their restricted nature did
not cause problems in chapter 3, since my goal there was not analysis of
naturalness. However, the present goal is analysis.
It seems that, while we can define ‘perfectly natural’ in terms of
sparse universal, we cannot so define ‘more natural than’. Thus, using
universals we cannot match the power of primitive naturalism. Given the
results of Chapter 4 section 2.1, this is a crucial shortcoming. I argued
that the definition of ‘duplicate’ given by Lewis in terms of ‘perfectly
natural was unsatisfactory. A revised version was given, but that version
employed ‘more natural than’. Since the analysis of duplication is one of
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the key uses for naturalness, we cannot simply abandon the more natural
than relation. 13
6.3 Armstrong's Objections to Transcendent Universal
s
6.3.1 Two Theories of Abundant Universal
s
In the previous section I considered the possibilities for using a
sparse theory of universal to analyze naturalness. I argued that the
project had difficulties. I favor instead the view that naturalness should
be taken as a primitive distinction among properties conceived abundantly,
where those properties are not reduced to classes of possibilia.
In this section I say briefly why I favor this view. What I say will
fall far short of a full justification, but that would (thankfully) be
beyond the scope of this dissertation. I want to accept abundant
properties, for they seem theoretically important. 14 These abundant
properties (relations) could be construed as classes of (’tuples of)
possibilia. But in Chapter 5 I raised a difficulty for applying primitive
naturalness to sets of pairs of possibilia, at least when pairs are
constructed arbitrarily from sets. My argument does not apply if primitive
tuples are accepted. But I do not even wish to construe relations as sets
of primitive ’tuples of possibilia, for the simple reason that I am wary of
possibilia. I would rather reduce the possibilia to properties and
relations than vice versa. So I seem to be stuck with the abundant
properties as sui generis entities (here is an exception to my usual
neutrality on such ontological issues). At least, this is the official
view that I want to work with.
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(Since I am no longer discussing sparse properties or universal, 1
now use the terms ‘property' and ‘universal' interchangeably. Likewise, I
will use ‘participates’ and ‘instantiates’ interchangeably.)
One view of abundant properties would have these properties be wholly
present in their instances. This is the view I called "abundant IU” at the
end of section one, the "odd" view. David Lewis mocks abundant IU in Lewis
(1986c) p.67:
...it is just absurd to think that a thing has (recurring
recurring) non-spatiotemporal parts for all its countless
properties.
or non-
abundant
This view may be absurd, but if it is absurd, then it is the spatiotemporal
component of "wholly present" that makes it absurd.
To see this, let us return to the hybrid theory HTU that we
constructed in section one. A "particular", according to this view, is
really a thick particular: a fusion of an ordinary particular with all of
its universal. A thick particular contains as parts all of the universal
in which it participates
. This claim does not become absurd when we add
that these universal are abundant. In fact, if one believes in abundant
universals and arbitrary fusions of things, then one is committed to this
conclusion. What I think appears absurd to Lewis is the claim that a
particular, whether thick or no, shares total spatiotemporal location with
all of its abundant universals.
I want to believe in an abundant conception of universals. But I am
unwilling to accept immanent universals. In part this is because of the
oddness of abundant IU. Another reason is that the spatiotemporal
component of immanence is prima facie implausible in its own right. The
notion that an entity can be multiply located — all of it is here and also
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all of it is there - is one that, other things being equal, we should
reject.
If there are arguments that immanent universals are superior to
transcendent universals then, assuming we need universals at all, this
presumption against immanence would be outweighed. Armstrong offers such
arguments. But I will argue in the next section that these arguments fail.
Thus, I take it that the way is clear to accepting abundant TU. Let
me summarize my choices with respect to properties and relations in this
section. I chose:
i) abundant over sparse (since the latter couldn’t be used to define
naturalness and the former are theoretically useful)
ii) sui-generis over classes of possibilia (because of chapter 5 and
because I am wary of possibilia)
iii) transcendent over immanent (because immanence is prima facie
implausible and is not — contra Armstrong — superior to
transcendence)
6-3.2 Armstrong’s Arguments against Transcendent Universals
In the present section I will critically assess Armstrong’s arguments
against TU, the view that universals are transcendent. This view is
opposed to IU, the view that universals are immanent. The arguments in
this section are designed to apply to TU, but not to IU. Therefore, if the
arguments are convincing, they would point to a superiority of IU over TU.
But I will argue that none of the arguments is convincing. None of the
arguments presents an unsavory bullet for the proponent of TU to bite.
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6.3.2. 1 The Regress Argument
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Once again, however, the problem is reproduced. If this second-order participation is something different in nature from first-order
participation, then it requires to be explained by third-order
partiapation, and so ad infinitum. But if second-order participation
is the same in nature as first-order participation, then the analysis
ot nrst-order participation is proceeding in terms of this (first-
order) participation in a Form, which is circular. 15
This argument is quite straightforward. I will not spend much time
discussing it, since I believe David Lewis’s discussion in "New Work for a
Theory of Universals" (pp. 352-355) to be thorough and conclusive. The
argument fails because it misconstrues TU. It assumes that the TU-ist
attempts to provide an analysis of all predication, of all sameness of
type. Thus, Armstrong assumes that if for various particulars x and Forms
F, x participates in F, the TU-ist must postulate a Form of participation.
If the goal of TU were to analyze all predication, all sameness of type,
then this would indeed follow. But, as Lewis points out, 16
Doing away with all unanalysed predication is an unattainable aim, and
so an unreasonable aim. No theory is to be faulted for failing to
achieve it. For how could there be a theory that names entities, or
quantifies over them, in the course of its sentences, and yet
altogether avoids primitive predication? Artificial tricks aside, the
thing cannot be done.
As Lewis points out, Armstrong’s own version of IU does not accomplish the
task of eliminating primitive predication. The relation that holds between
Armstrong’s universals and their instances, instantiation, is not analyzed.
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Thus, I take it that neither IU nor TU seeks to analyze all
predication. IU takes the relation of instantiation as a primitive; TU
takes the participation relation as a primitive.
This response to the Relation Regress is the same as the response to
another argument offered by Armstrong. He calls it “The restricted third
man" argument: 17
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consistency, therefore, they must all said to participate in a third-
order Form of Formhood. The regress then continues. It is either
vicious or, at best, uneconomical.
Now, if this third-order Form of Formhood" were identical to the original
Form of Formhood, then there would be no regress. But Armstrong argues
that a property cannot have itself as one of its properties. 18 Thus, he
claims, the original argument stands.
Without considering whether Armstrong is correct in rejecting the
notion of a property instantiating itself, I think we can dismiss this
argument in the same way that we dismissed the first regress argument. TU
is not engaged in the project of analyzing all predication. As well as
taking the two-place relation of participation as a primitive, I assume
that the TU-ist also takes the notion of a Form (universal) as a
primitive. 19 So the TU-ist will reject the step in the argument where a
Form of Formhood is invoked. There is no Form of Formhood - the fact that
the various Forms are all Forms is a fact incapable of further analysis.
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6. 3.2.2 The Duplication Argument
Another argument is contained in the following passage:”
Suppose that <2 and b have quite different properties. According to
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I think we may interpret Armstrong as follows. When Armstrong says that x
and y are "in themselves exactly the same", we may take him to be saying
that x and y are duplicates. Thus, the argument seems to be:
Duplication Argument 1
(1) If TU is true, then a and b are duplicates
(2) a and b are not duplicates
(3) Therefore, TU is not true
Premise (2) is true by stipulation: we are asked to consider objects a and
b that are not exactly alike. And premise (1) has some plausibility.
Imagine a TU-ist trying to claim that a and b are not duplicates. He might
point out that only a is white. "But,", Armstrong would respond,
"according to you, whiteness is a relational property. After all, a is
white because of its relation to a wholly separate entity: the form of
whiteness. The "difference" you have pointed out between a and b is not a
difference between the marbles considered in themselves. It is a mere
relational difference."
As initially appealing as premise (1) may seem, the defender of TU has
a response. We must distinguish two senses of ‘relational property’. One
we may call the "trivial" sense:
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P is relational in the trivial sense =
jf
for any object x, if P is had
by x then this is in virtue of x's relations to objects wholly
distinct from x
Clearly, if TU is true then every property is relational in the trivial
sense, for according to TU objects do not contain their properties as
parts.
The other sense we may call the non-trivial sense. How we define this
sense depends on the exact method for drawing the various distinctions that
are the subject of this dissertation; I favor using naturalness to analyze
all the rest. At any rate, one sufficient condition for a property’s being
rco/z-relational (in a non-trivial sense) is its being intrinsic
.
21
What the TU-ist will claim is that it is the non-trivial sense of
‘relational’ that is relevant to the question of whether a and b are
duplicates. Let us suppose that the property being white is an intrinsic
property. 22 Objects a and b, then, are not duplicates, since they differ
over an intrinsic property. Granted, this property is relational in the
trivial sense. But it is not relational in the non-trivial sense since it
is intrinsic, and hence we are free to use it in explaining why a and b are
not duplicates. Thus, we can reject premise (1). TU is consistent with a
and b failing to be duplicates.
Suppose Armstrong were to stipulate that he intends to be using
‘duplicate’ in such a way that relational properties in the trivial sense
are the relevant properties. That is, x and y are duplicates in this new
sense iff they share all non-relational properties in the trivial sense. We
may call this the trivial sense of duplication. The argument now reads as
follows:
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Duplication Argument 2
(1) If TU is true, then a and * are duplicates in the trivial sense
(2) a and b are not duplicates in the trivial sense
(3) Therefore, TU is not true
The TU-ist will presumably grant premise (1) of this version of the
argument. But premise (2) will be rejectable. For a and b to fail to be
duplicates in the trivial sense, they would have to differ with respect to
some property that is non-relational in the trivial sense. But the
defender of TU does not grant the existence of any such property since on
that view every property is relational in the trivial sense.
6.3. 2. 3 The Argument From Causal Powers
A related argument is the following: 23
It is natural to say both that the causal powers of a particular are
etermined by its properties, and that these powers are determined bythe particular s own self and not by anything beyond it. But if the
theory of transcendent universal is accepted, a thing’s properties
are not determined by its own self, but rather by the relations it has
to Forms beyond itself.
Armstrong’s claim here is that TU is inconsistent with the truth of:
(CP) The causal powers of an object are not determined by
objects "beyond" it
From our discussion of the meaning of ‘wholly present in’, we know to
distinguish two senses of ‘beyond’. On one sense, (CP) means:
(CPI) The causal powers of an object are not determined by any objects
not a part of it.
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As I see it, the TU can simply reject (CPI). And furthermore, the
rejection of (CPI) need be no embarrassment. HTU entails (CPI), while TU
(we may grant), entails the denial of (CPI), and yet HTU is no different
metaphysically from TU. So the question of whether (CPI) is true or not is
simply the question of whether we mean thick or thin particulars by
‘object'. In rejecting (CPI), the TU-ist is making a mere semantical
claim, and not going out on a metaphysical limb.
Alternatively, Armstrong may be taken to be claiming that TU is
inconsistent with the following truth:
(CP2) The causal powers of an object are not determined by any objects
not sharing spatiotemporal location with it
I suppose the defender of TU must bite the bullet and reject (CP2). But I
do not see any great disadvantage in doing so. (CP2) does not strike me as
being especially compelling.
I must grant that there is a sense of (CP) in which it may be counted
as part of common sense. For example, the following seems true:
My causal powers are not determined by objects "beyond" me. For
example, my ability to lift this barbell is independent of the outcome
of the Olympic weightlifting championship. 24
But this intuition seems to be captured by the following principle, which
principle may be accepted by the TU-ist:
(CP3) The causal powers of an object are completely determined by what
intrinsic properties that thing has, together with the laws of
nature — that is, two things with the same intrinsic properties
in worlds with the same laws must have the same causal powers
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Since I have my intrinsic properties just in virtue of the way I am in
myself, and not in virtue of my relations to the competitors in the Olympic
championship, this seems to capture the intuition in question.
To see that TU does not in any way preclude (CP3), recall the
discussion of the Duplication Argument, in which it was argued that
universal being transcendent in no way precludes the possibility of a
(nontrivial) distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties.
The TU-ist should reject (CPI) and (CP2). Granted, there is an
intuition that the causal powers of an individual x are determined by what
x is like, considered in itself. But (CP3) vindicates this intuition.
Thus, the TU-ist may do his duty to common sense by accepting (CP3), and
may fairly reject (CPI) and (CP2).
6. 3.2.4 The Subtraction Argument
Next we return to a passage from Armstrong considered above: 25
Is it not clear that a ' s whiteness is not determined by a’s
relationship with a transcendent entity? Perform the usual thought-
experiment and consider a without the form of Whiteness. It seems
obvious that a might still be white. So a ' s being white is not
determined by a’s relation to the Form.
Let a be any white thing. Armstrong seems to argue as follows:
Subtraction Argument
(1) Possibly, a is white but does not instantiate Whiteness
(2) if 1), then TU is false
(3) Therefore, TU is false
At first glance, the Subtraction Argument looks blatantly question
begging. Premise (1) amounts to a flat denial of TU, for according to a
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TU ist, to be white just is to instantiate Whiteness. Surely, a TU-ist
would be within his or her rights in simply rejecting (1).
Can any progress be made? I think so. Armstrong seems to be relying
implicitly on the fact that whiteness is an intrinsic property to justify
(I)
.
26 The idea seems to be that since whiteness is intrinsic, a’s being
white cannot depend on its relations to any object external to a. Thus, a
could be white even if, say, nothing else existed. We can imagine
Armstrong appealing to a principle of isolation : 27
(II) For any possible object x, there is a possible world w containing
just a duplicate of x and its parts
The object guaranteed by (II) would be white, being a duplicate of a, but
the form (universal) Whiteness would not exist at that world, since
according to TU, universal are not parts of their instances.
However, the defender of TU should feel no compunction over rejecting
(II). It is at the heart of TU to admit necessary connections between an
object having a certain nature and it standing in certain relations to
external entities. (Indeed, 0n some versions of TU universal enjoy
necessary existence, and thus we would have an immediate violation of
(11)
.
28
) In place of (II), a more moderate version may be offered. Let
IP(x) denote x s intrinsic profile, where x is any object (see chapter 4
sections 2.2 and 2.3 for information on intrinsic profiles). For any
object x, call the proposition that x has IP(x) "the nature of x".
(12) For any possible object x, there is a possible world w containing
only i) an object, y, that is a duplicate of x, ii) y’s parts,
and iii) any object whose existence is entailed by the existence
and nature of an object mentioned in i) or ii). 29
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(12) does not entail the existence of a world with a white object but no
universal of whiteness because of clause iii): the existence of whiteness
is entailed by the nature of the white object, according to TU.
I think that it is not ad hoc to accept (12) rather than (II). When a
theory accepts the fact that, e.g. the whiteness of an object consists in
its relation to an external entity (a property), then it is clear that all
recombination principles will have to be restricted to take this into
account. And this does not contradict common sense, since our reasoning
about recombination begins by considering rearrangements of particulars,
and thus only supports principles like (12), not unrestricted principles
like (II).
6. 3.2.5 Explanation of Resemblance
In this section I want to address an intuition that I think is common
to the last three arguments. In each argument, Armstrong claimed that some
fact could not be explained by TU. In the Duplication argument, the fact
was that objects can differ intrinsically. In the causal powers argument,
the fact was that the causal powers of an object are in some sense
independent of objects "external" to that object. In the Subtraction
argument, the fact was that the nature of an object is independent of
things external to that object.
In each case, I argued that TU can account for these facts — through
the distinctions that are the subject of the dissertation. Thus, in the
case of the duplication argument, I argued that the TU-ist can say that
ball a is not a duplicate of ball b because a has an intrinsic property
that b lacks.
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However, in each of these cases, we can imagine Armstrong responding
as follows.
In name
,
you can account for these facts. But your explanation of the
facts is inferior because your universal are transcendent. You say
that ball a has an intrinsic property that ball b lacks. But this
property is not in ball a, on your view, whereas the property is in
ball a on my view. My account is the more satisfying one.
I imagine Armstrong replying in similar fashion to my responses to the
other arguments.
The response I imagine Armstrong making, then, concedes that TU has
some way of accounting for the facts in question. But it holds that the
account IU gives of these facts is superior to that of TU.
I will focus on the question of whether IU gives a superior account of
what it is for objects to differ intrinsically. Let us remember the two
separate components of the notion of immanence:
(P) universal are parts of their instances
and
(L) universal share spatiotemporal locations with their instances
I think we can see that (P) does not give immanent universal an edge
over transcendent universal. Let us return to the hybrid theory HTU.
Suppose that (P) represents a superiority of immanence over transcendence
in the explanation of intrinsic difference. Since (P) is true on HTU, it
would seem that this theory can also claim an explanatory advantage over
TU. But surely HTU can claim no explanatory advantage over TU, for these
theories do not differ metaphysically in the least.
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To say that a universal is part of an instance is just to say that the
instance encompasses the universal. This can be true if the universal
"reaches into" the instance, as immanent universal do, but it can also be
true if the instance "reaches out" to the universal. Surely, switching to
the latter descnption gives us no edge in the explanation of intrinsic
difference. But then (P) cannot represent any explanatory advantage, for
(P) is accepted by HTU but rejected by TU.
If IU is superior in explaining intrinsic difference, then it must be
because of (L). It is because immanent universal are in their instances,
in a spatiotemporal sense, that they give a better account of intrinsic
difference. Indeed, when I form a picture of immanent universals being
wholly present in their instances, and this picture seems, offhand, to
provide a superior account of intrinsic difference, I think what convinces
me is the spatiotemporal coincidence between the universals and the
instances in the picture.
However, I think we can form an argument that shows that (L) does not
in fact represent explanatory superiority for immanent universals. Consider
objects that exist outside of space. Disembodied souls might be examples.
I suppose such things are possible. And surely two such objects could have
identical total temporal locations. For such a pair of objects, the
relation of duplication could presumably hold, but could also fail to hold.
But these facts could not be explained by appeal to spatiotemporal
coincidence between universals and instances, for such a pair would have
identical spatiotemporal locations.
Consider a possible world w containing three disembodied souls: Moe,
Larry, and Curly. Let us suppose that all three come into existence at
exactly the same moment, and also go out of existence at exactly the same
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moment. Furthermore, suppose that Moe and Larry are duplicates, whereas
Curly is not a duplicate of either. Let us see if a defender of IU is in a
better position to explain these facts than a defender of TU. I think he
is not. He can say that Moe and Larry instantiate various universal that
Curly does not, but the defender of TU can say this as well. It is true
that he can say that these universals are parts of Moe and Larry, whereas
the defender of TU cannot say this. But I have already argued that this is
no explanatory help. Finally, the IU-ist can not say that there are
universals sharing spatiotemporal location with Moe and Larry, but not with
Curly. All three have exactly the same total spatiotemporal location,
since all three have the same temporal location and none of the three is
located in space. Thus, any universal sharing spatiotemporal location with
Moe and Larry also shares spatiotemporal location with Curly.
It may be denied that entities that lack spatial location are
possible. But this seems bold
.
30
I think this shows that (L) gives immanent universals no explanatory
advantage over transcendent universals. If (L) did represent explanatory
advantage, then this would presumably be so of necessity. But I have
presented a possible case in which IU does not have any explanatory
advantage.
If immanent universals have no advantage in explaining facts of
intrinsic difference, then why did they seem explanatorily superior?. In
particular, why did (L) seem to give explanatory superiority?
Consider a transparent glass globe. Now imagine putting a bright
light inside the globe. The light shines through. Putting the light in
the globe causes the globe to take on a property of the light —
luminescence. If the light were not in, spatiotemporally in, the globe,
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the globe would not be lit. I often imagine immanent universal this way
- as lights that illuminate their instances from inside. Or I imagine
them like the caloric fluid of 18th century physicists. These physicists
thought that heat was a fluid that permeated hot things, and flowed from
hot things to cold things. I imagine an immanent universal as a sort of
fluid that permeates its instance causing it to have a certain nature. Were
the fluid not in the instance, in in a spatiotemporal sense, the instance
wouldn’t be affected. Perhaps our intuition that immanent universal give
a superior explanation of intrinsic difference derives from taking some
picture like this too seriously.
6. 3. 2. 6 The Argument from Causal Impotence
Finally, we have the following argument: 31
A spatio-temporal realm of particulars certainly exists (it includes
our bodies.) Whether anything else exists is controversial. If any
entities outside this realm are postulated, but it is stipulated
further that they have no manner of causal action upon the particulars
in this realm, then there is no compelling reason to postulate them.
Occam’s razor then enjoins us not to postulate them.
This argument does not merely apply to transcendent universals, but I will
only consider this application of the argument. I construe the argument as
follows:
The argument from causal impotence
(1) We have no reason to postulate causally inert entities
(2) Transcendent universals are causally inert entities
(3) Therefore, we have no reason to postulate transcendent universals
Armstrong applies Occam’s razor to (3) to conclude that we should not
postulate transcendent universals, but (3) seems to me to be bad enough.
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Premise (1) is intended to be a plausible principle of epistemology.
Armstrong argues for premise (2) at length. His reasons are complex and
controversial, but they need not concern us. 3* What I have to say will
sidestep the issues he raises.
The argument from causal impotence is not a direct objection to TU. It
does not show TU to be incompatible with any commonly accepted principle,
nor does it reveal any internal inconsistency in TU. The conclusion of the
argument is not that TU is false. Still, I take it that the TU-ist would
feel rather uncomfortable accepting the conclusion. The argument must be
answered.
The argument from causal impotence is a familiar argument against
postulating abstract" entities of all kinds. An equally familiar response
is that the theoretical benefits of postulating causally inert entities
overrides any presumption against them. A common analogy: we can best
understand the truth of mathematics by postulating a realm of sets. 33 As it
is legitimate to postulate sets to make sense of mathematics, so (the
response goes) it is legitimate to postulate propositions, properties,
transcendent universals, possible worlds, etc. to make sense of various
other data. 34 Abstract objects are postulated for their non-causal
explanatory value.
I have nothing new to add to this part of the debate. My only
interest is in formulating a clear version of the argument that is not
subject to other difficulties. Given such a version, I suppose I throw my
lot in with those who appeal to the precedent of postulating sets. But
first we must find such a version.
We must ask what it is for an entity to be causally inert. An
intuitive picture of the opposite of causal inertness, causal potency,
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springs to mind. A billiard ball is a prime example of a causally potent
object. Unlike numbers, transcendent forms, etc., billiard balls are
capable of causing things (typically, movements of other billiard balls).
We might think, then, that an object is causally inert iff it is incapable
of entering into causal relations.
However, philosophers often hold that causal relations hold
fundamentally between events. If a billiard ball’s striking another
billiard ball causes the other billiard ball to move, we might say that
"the billiard ball caused the motion". But surely it was the event of the
billiard ball’s striking the other ball that did the causing.
It is true that we sometimes speak, for example, of a billiard ball
causing something. We might call this "common sense" causation. But just
as particulars enter into common sense causal relations, so do universal.
I might say that heat caused my rash, that greed causes much of the
suffering in the world, or that negative charge sometimes causes
electromagnetic repulsion. So if common sense causation were the relevant
sort of causation, then universal would turn out to be causally potent,
and premise (2) of the argument would be false. Let us then consider only
causal relations that hold between events.
We need a way to talk about events. For the moment, let’s follow
Jaegwon Kim in our talk about events. To an event x’s having P, there
corresponds an ordered pair <x,P> - x an object, P a property. 35 To an
event x and y’s standing in R, there is likewise an associated pair:
< <x,y>,R>. Events, according to Kim, have "constitutive objects" and
"constitutive attributes". The constitutive attribute of the first event
is P; its constitutive object is x. The constitutive objects of the second
event are x and y; its constitutive attribute is R. (Kim would include a
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third entity: the constitutive time - the time of the event’s occurrence.
Because of my assumption of temporally bound individuals, this is
unnecessary). Let us call both the constitutive property and the
constitutive objects of an event its constituents.
If only events stand in causal relations, then we cannot say that an
object is causally inert iff it is incapable of standing in causal
relations. On this definition, billiard balls would turn out causally
inert! For myself, I feel compelled to postulate the existence of billiard
balls, so let us instead consider the following definition:
(Cl) x is causally inert =
df
It would be impossible for there to be
an event E that that "involves" x and enters into a causal
relation with some other event
This leaves us the problem of saying what it is for a event to "involve" an
object.
It is natural to say that:
(II) event E involves x = x is a constituent of E
df
This definition has a result we want: that billiard balls are not causally
inert. For suppose that event E = billiard ball a’s striking billiard ball
b causes the event of billiard ball b’s moving. Billiard ball a is
involved in E, for a is a constituent object of E. Moreover, E causes
something, and therefore billiard ball a is not causally inert. Surely,
such a scenario is possible for any billiard ball. Thus, billiard balls
are not causally inert, given the present definitions.
However, the argument is unsound, given this interpretation. Suppose,
for example, that U is a universal and that a is a particular. Let event E
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be the event of a’s having U. We may further suppose that E causes some
other event. U is the constituent attribute of E. Thus, E involves U, and
hence by (Cl), U is not causally inert. Thus, premise (2) in the argument
is false.
(II) allows that when an event a’s having U causes another event b’s
having V, in addition to the particulars a and b getting "credit" for a
causal interaction, the universal U and V do as well. This might be
thought to be improper. When a billiard ball’s motion causes another
billiard ball to move, it might be argued that we think of the ball
,
rather
than its properties, as doing the causing. Thus, it might be argued that
only the constitutive objects of events are causally potent in virtue of
causal interactions, not the constitutive attributes.
To implement this intuition, we might revise our definition of
‘involves’ to read:
(12) event E involves x =
df
x is a constituent object of E
On this definition, event E in the previous example would not involve U.
Provided that universal are never constituent objects of events, events
would never involve universal, and hence by (Cl) all universal would be
causally inert. (I will indeed assume for the sake of argument that
universal are never constituent objects of events, although this might be
legitimately challenged.) So premise (2) of the argument would be true.
However, this version of the argument from causal impotence is
unconvincing. It has the feel of defining one’s way to a desired
conclusion. (12) definitionally prohibits universal from being involved
in events; therefore, (Cl) definitionally makes universals turn out
causally "inert". 36 This way of talking is fine, provided we are clear that
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we are considering a sense of ‘causally inert’ such that it is definitional
that universals are causally inert. But now consider what premise (1) of
the argument says: that we have no reason to postulate causally inert
objects. Since the conclusion of the argument is that we have no reason to
postulate transcendent universals, the argument begs the question. It
includes a premise to the effect that we have no reason to postulate a
certain kind K of entity, where it is true by definition that universals
are not of kind K. The defender of universals will simply reject line (1)
of the argument.
We need another definition of ‘involves’. Let us shift to an
alternate conception of events: as regions of spacetime. 37 This view of
events gives us a neat definition of ‘involves’: 38
(13) event E involves x = x is (wholly) located in E
Thus, the event of a particular billiard striking another would involve
(the time slices of) the billiard balls.
On this definition, we get our desired result: transcendent
universals are not involved in any events. Moreover, we get another
desired result: immanent universals can be involved in events. This
latter result is desirable because Armstrong’s argument is intended to
apply to transcendent universals but not to his own theory. This last
version of the argument, then, may be close to Armstrong’s intention.
But I have a nagging doubt even about this final version of the
argument. The argument seems to unfairly stack the deck against TU by its
definition of ‘involves’. Why not define the term as follows?:
(14) event E involves x = x is wholly located in E or x is
instantiated by something wholly located in E.
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In a clear sense, the properties of objects in a region of spacetime are
involved in that region: they are instantiated there! Again, if an event,
construed as a region of spacetime, causes something, it seems that the
properties of the objects contained in that region are no less involved
than the objects themselves. After all, the causal powers of such an event
depend on the properties instantiated therein.
Thus, the argument from causal impotence that is based on (13) seems
faintly question-begging - I see no reason to accept (13) over (14), other
than a prejudice against transcendent universal. We seem to have gone
round and round in a vain search for a non question-begging version of the
argument from causal impotence, and I have a diagnosis of this fact. The
basic intuition behind the argument is that we have no reason to postulate
non-spatiotemporal entities — the bit about causal impotence is an
irrelevant detour. 39 Why not be forthright about this?:
The Argument from Spatiotemporal non-Location
(1) We have no reason to postulate spatio-temporally unlocated
entities
(2) Transcendent universals are spatio-temporally unlocated
(3) Therefore, we have no reason to postulate transcendent universals
Quite plainly, the discussion of this argument can focus directly on
premise (1). As I have mentioned, I have nothing new to add to this
discussion. I stand with those who appeal to the precedent of mathematics,
and hold that sometimes it is correct to postulate non-spatiotemporal
entities.
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6.4 Conclusion
The proposal to use universal to analyze naturalness is an attractive
one, but it seems inferior in power to primitive naturalness since
universals cannot be used to analyze the more natural than relation. My
preferred view is abundant TU -- an abundant conception of transcendent
universals - plus a primitive more natural than relation. I argued that
Armstrong’s arguments against transcendent universals fail, and so provide
no barrier to accepting this view.
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Notes
1
^ii^Str°n^ (1989?) ’ £[mstrong introduced a non-mereological relationcalled constituency
. Objects, properties, and relations are
constituents of the states of affairs ("thick particulars") that involve
them. Also, properties and relations are constituents of their
structural combinations. What is relevant to our purposes is that
Armstrong can characterize the claim that universal are immanent as
follows: universal are constituents of the (thick) particulars (i e
states of affairs) that instantiate them.
This affects various points in my discussion. In section 3 2 5 for
example, I ask whether transcendent universal explain resemblance
better than immanent universal. My answer is no, but it is based on
Lewis s interpretation of ‘immanence’. Perhaps Armstrong’s conception
of immanence fares better!
Tlie reason I do not consider Armstrong’s own conception of immanence
is that we are told so little about constituency. Armstrong tells us in
Armstrong (1989a) p. 41 that universal are not parts of their
instances, and yet they are "present as a whole in" their instances
(Armstrong (1978a) p. 68.) What, then, is this relation of
constituency? Before I know more about it, I cannot evaluate a view
based on it.
Note also that the real Armstrong’s view has distinctive features
along other dimensions. For one, Armstrong rejects uninstantiated
universals (Armstrong (1978a) p. 113). For another, he says in
Armstrong (1989a) p. 43 that universals and particulars are
"abstractions from" states of affairs.
2 This idea runs throughout Armstrong (1978a) and (1978b). See, for
example, (1978b) pp. 9-12.
3 Armstrong would not accept a universal redness - see Armstrong (1978b)
p. 117.
4 Armstrong (1978b) pp. 19-29.
5 However, Armstrong would not put matters this way, since he does not
accept the existence of the abundant properties — instead, he accepts
"propositional predicates". See Armstrong (1978a) pp. 3-6.
6 See Armstrong (1978a) Chapter 7.
7 Armstrong (1978a) p. 68.
8 Armstrong uses the term ‘"thin" particular’ in Armstrong (1978a) pp.
114-115, but in a different (and somewhat mysterious) sense. Lewis
mentions what I call thin particulars in Lewis (1986c) p. 65.
9 See Lewis (1986c) p. 64.
10 This idea is implicit in much of Armstrong (1978a) and Armstrong
(1978b). See, for example, the introduction to Armstrong (1978a) and
Armstrong (1978b) pp.7-9.
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11 Armstrong (1978b) p. 30 on conjunctions, and
umversals. pp.
68-71 on structural
12
13
See Armstrong (1978a) p. 113.
In Lewis (1983b), David Lewis details some of the proposed uses for“?S ’ duplication. Moreover, the solution to
the problem of The Content of Thought and Language" on p. 372 in thatpaper requires naturalness to come in degrees (and to apply to
properties that don’t correspond to universal at that). But see note 41
in Chapter 3.
14 See for example, Lewis (1983b) pp. 348 and Lewis (1986c) 66-67 on the
need tor an abundant conception of properties.
15 Armstrong (1978a) p. 70.
16 Lewis (1983b) p. 353.
17 Armstrong (1978a) pp. 72-73
18 Armstrong (1978b) Chapter 19 section VI, and Chapter 23 section II.
19 Alternatively, Formhood might be analyzed in terms of participation.
20 Armstrong (1978a) p. 69.
21 Giving a necessary and sufficient condition for a property’s being
relational is tricky, and I won’t attempt it. The trickiness results
from the fact that some extrinsic properties seem non-relational; e.g.
haecceities like being George Bush.
22 In fact I am not sure that color properties are intrinsic. See Chapter
1 section 1. However, even if they are not intrinsic, surely objects
within a given world that differ in color differ with respect to some
intrinsic properties (microscopic properties of surfaces, for example).
23 Armstrong (1978a) p. 75.
24 The relevant sense of ‘determined’ here is tricky. For example, I might
become depressed upon learning of the outcome of the championship, and
thereby become unable to lift the barbell, and in this sense the outcome
of the championship can "affect" my ability to lift the barbell. But
this would be because the outcome of the championship would cause
certain changes in my intrinsic properties. My causal powers are
determined (in the relevant sense) by my intrinsic properties, and not
by the outcome of the championship. The precise intuition behind the
example of the barbell is contained in (CP3).
25 Armstrong (1978a) p. 68.
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ab?ut . the intnnsicality of whiteness. I thank
lllip Bncker for his help in interpreting Armstrong’s justification
of premise (1) in terms of recombination principles.
27 There is parallel but weaker defense of (1) in terms of recombination
pnnciples. Rather than considering principles that generate worlds in
which whiteness does not exist, we could consider principles that
generate worlds containing duplicates of a that do not bear the
instantiation relation to whiteness. The discussion of this approach
would parallel that in the text.
We may have another, independent, challenge to (II): one who believes
in sets will hold that it is impossible for an object to exist without
its unit set existing. Assuming that sets are never parts of non-sets
(see Lewis (1991) p. 7), this will violate (II).
29 (12) is adapted from Pauli and Sider (1992).
30 Armstrong, for example, accepts the possibility of such entities See
Armstrong (1978a) p. 119.
31 Armstrong (1978a) p. 130. In fact, all of Armstrong (1978a) Chapter 12
is relevant.
3
- One argument is this. If a thing enters into causal relations, then it
must change. Transcendent universal cannot change, so they cannot
enter into causal relations (Armstrong (1978a) p. 128). If sound, this
argument would seem to show that immanent universals cannot enter into
causal relations either! For aren’t immanent universals unchanging?
A second argument seems to be this. Traditionally, the notion of a
God, or a Cartesian soul, acting on Nature has been problematical. If
so, then the notion of transcendent universals entering into causal
relations must be more problematical (Armstrong (1978a) p. 129-130). I
do not find this argument very convincing. Moreover, both arguments
depend on the concept of a non-event acting on another. See below.
33 See Putnam (1971), especially chapters 5, 7, and 8.
34 See Armstrong (1978a) pp. 128-132; Lewis (1986c) pp. 3-5; Lewis (1991)
pp. 57-59; Armstrong (1989a) pp. 7-13.
35 See Kim (1973), pp. 222-226.
36
I assume here that universals are essentially universals.
37 See, for example, Lemmon (1967) pp. 98-99, and Lewis (1986d), note 4 for
more references on this conception of events. Points analogous to those
I make in the text would apply to Lewis’s theory of events as properties
of regions of spacetime.
38 Phillip Bricker suggested defining ‘involves’ in terms of spatiotemporal
location.
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thlS diain0Sis 0nly in the Present case of the argument applied
°^afscfnde"t umversals. The notion of causal impotence may beimportant when the argument is offered with respect to possible worldsnumbers, and even perhaps uninstantiated properties.
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CHAPTER 7
DUNN ON INTRINSICALITY
In a recent paper Michael Dunn has criticized David Lewis’s theory of
intnnsicality and in its place put his own theory based on Relevance
logic. Since I have accepted Lewis’s analysis of intnnsicality in terms
of duplication, Dunn’s criticisms of Lewis are criticisms of me. I will
argue that Dunn’s objections are mistaken and that his own theory is
uninteresting. Finally, I want to examine Dunn’s contention that two
traditional characterizations of intrinsicality come apart.
7.1 Dunn’s Criticisms of Lewis
7.1.1 Dunn’s Formulation of Lewis’s View
As we have seen, Lewis defines ‘intrinsic’ as follows:
(Dl) Property P is intrinsic iff for any possible objects x and y, if
x and y are duplicates then x has P iff y has P
But Dunn construes Lewis’s analysis of intrinsicality differently. Let 0x
be any formula with free occurrences of at most one variable x. Dunn
interprets Lewis as claiming that 0x is a formula of a kind to determine an
intrinsic property iff the following statement is true: 1
(IPD*) 0a -» (x~ a -> 0x) (Indiscemibility of Perfect Duplicates)
where ’ stands for ‘is a perfect duplicate of, a is a name, and 0a is
the result of substituting the name a for all free occurrences of x in 0x.
I discuss below how ‘V is to be interpreted. The variable x is to be
interpreted as implicitly universally quantified, whereas the name a, being
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a name, denotes a particular individual. Thus, (IPD*) seems awkward, since
presumably the intent is that *x is of a kind to determine an intrinsic
property if (IPD*) holds regardless of what a denotes
.
2 Thus, I will
reinterpret Dunn’s construal of Lewis as follows: formula *x is of a kind
to determine an intrinsic property iff
(IPD) VxVyfay -> (x* y -> <£x)]
is true, where <fiy is the result of substituting y for all free occurrences
of x in <t>\. It is clear that Dunn does not intend the quantifiers here to
be possibilist
.
3
Dunn construes Lewis as offering an account of what it is for a
formula to be "of a kind to determine intrinsic properties". But Lewis’s
account is of intrinsic properties. How to move from the former to the
latter? Say that property P is determined by <px iff P is the property
denoted by the phrase: rbeing an x such that </>x\ We may suppose that
Dunn is construing Lewis as follows: property P is intrinsic iff every
formula <p\ that determines P is of a kind to determine intrinsic
properties. This raises a host of questions (e.g. what about properties
for which we have no predicates?), but let us set them aside - what I have
to say will not depend on this.
So, Dunn interprets Lewis’s account of intrinsicality via an account
of what it is for a formula to be of a kind to determine intrinsic
properties, which in turn is analyzed using (IPD). We now turn to the
interpretation of the connective V in (IPD). Dunn says that he engages
in some creative exegesis, and interprets ‘V in various ways. After
raising objections to these interpretations, he finally interprets it in
the sense of relevance logic. Let us look at these allegedly unacceptable
possibilities for V.
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Dunn says: 4
;J‘
‘hat
.
if th
<;
"arrow" in (IPD) is the material conditionalthen the definition allows that Socrates being wise is an intrinsic
’
K?y n Reagan- Even if <* employs strict imptofion
Reagan
WSe °r vwie ends up as “ intrinsic property of
Let us examine Dunn’s points. Dunn asks us to suppose that "the
arrow" in (IPD) is a material conditional. Since there are two arrows, we
may take him to be treating each arrow as a material conditional. Let ‘F’
express the property being wise, and let ‘a’ denote Socrates. Finally, let
</>x = ‘Fa’. Notice that this formula has no free occurrences of x, and
hence <t>\ = ‘Fa’ for any variable v. This formula corresponds to the
property being such that Socrates is wise. Clearly, this is not an
intrinsic property. But under the present proposal, this property turns
out intrinsic, for the sentence:
(1) VxVy[Fa d (x* y d Fa)]
(where the V is understood as expressing material implication) is a
theorem of predicate logic. We should join Dunn in rejecting this
definition of ‘intrinsic’.
Next Dunn considers strict implication, or entailment. Again, I
suppose he means to interpret each arrow as a strict conditional.
That is, (IPD) is to be interpreted as: 5
(IPD') VxVyOy (x* y -3 </>x)]
where ra^ is definitionally equivalent to rD(oo/3)\ First, let us note
that (IPD') solves the problem above — that being such that Socrates is
wise turned out intrinsic. Only if the following sentence is true does the
present interpretation imply that being such that Socrates is wise is
intrinsic:
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(2) VxVy [Fa -3 (x* y -3 Fa)]
Since (2) is false, we do not get this damaging implication. Let x = me,
and let y = my brother Mike. Presumably, there is a possible world w in
which Socrates is wise (the actual world, for example), and another
possible world w' in which i) Mike and I are perfect duplicates, but ii)
Socrates is not wise. (Here I slip into talking as if Mike and I ourselves
inhabit other possible worlds.) Assuming S5 modal logic, (2) is thereby
falsified.
But (IPD') is utterly implausible for reasons other than Dunn
considers. According to (IPD'), almost no properties will turn out
intrinsic. For example, the property roundness is intrinsic, on the
present proposal, only if the following sentence is true (where the
predicate ‘R’ expresses roundness):
(3) VxVy [Ry -3 (x* y -3 Rx)]
Unfortunately, (3) is false. Let y be a certain actual round tennis ball,
and x be another actual tennis ball. Suppose that in world w, while
neither y nor x is round, x and y are perfect duplicates. Again assuming
S5 modal logic, (3) is false. Clearly, we could repeat this procedure for
most properties commonly thought to be intrinsic.
This construal of Lewis’s theory is a clear mistake -- Lewis’s own
definition, (Dl), has no defect of this kind. Moreover, there is no way to
acceptably weaken (IPD'). The following two attempts seem to be the only
possibilities. We could weaken the first or the second ‘-3’ to a V:
(IPD'
a
) VxVy[0y 3 (x~ y d 0x)]
(IPD'
b
) VxVy[</>y d (x» y -3 *x)]
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The problem with (IPD',) is the same as the problem with taking each
conditional in (IPD) to be material - being such that Socrates is wise
comes out intrinsic. For the instance of (IPD' ) in this case is:
a
VxVyfFa s (x~ y u Fa)]
that is,
VxVy [Fa d (x~ y d Fa)]
which is a theorem of modal predicate logic. The problem with (IPD' ) isb
the same as the problem with (IPD') -- almost no properties turn out
intrinsic. Consider, for example, the instance of (IPD'
b
) when we let <py
be ‘Ry’, with ‘R’ interpreted as meaning "is round":
VxVy[Ry :> (x* y ^ Rx)]
This sentence turns out false for essentially the same reasons that (3)
turned out false above. Even if y is in fact round, x’s being a duplicate
of y does not entail that x is round, since x could be a duplicate of y in
a world in which y is not round.
I conclude, then, that Dunn’s interpretation of Lewis along the lines
of (IPD) using strict conditionals is a mistake - all possibilities for
what Dunn could have had in mind are in trouble for reasons that Dunn never
considers. What is the source of this mistake? Dunn obtains his
interpretation, the schematic (IPD), from Lewis’s words "if something has
an intrinsic property, then so does any perfect duplicate of that thing" in
Lewis’s paper "Extrinsic Properties". 6 In that paper, Lewis is not clear
that the quantifiers are possibilist; this seems to be the reason for the
misunderstanding.
Fortunately, Dunn’s major objections do not depend on his mistaken
formulation of Lewis’s view. The objections all apply equally well to
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(Dl), which is what I take to be Lewis’s actual theory. Let us then think
of the objections as directed at (Dl).
7.1.2 Dunn’s First Objection
Let us return to the passage quoted above. Dunn says: "Even if one
employs strict implication, [being such that Socrates is wise or not wise]
ends up as an intrinsic property of Reagan". 7
In general, if N is a necessary truth, then being such that N will be
an intrinsic property, according to (Dl). One might object to Dunn’s
example on the grounds that ‘Socrates is wise or Socrates is not wise’ does
not express a necessary truth because of the possibility of Socrates
failing to exist, so let us substitute the property being such that 2+2=4.
On Lewis’s view, this is an intrinsic property.
There are two other related consequences that we might reasonably
expect Dunn to find objectionable. First, on Lewis’s theory, all
impossible properties are intrinsic. Of course, no impossible property is
an intrinsic property of anything, since no object can have an impossible
property. Still, impossible properties can never differ between perfect
duplicates, so they turn out intrinsic according to (Dl).
Second, if P and Q are necessarily coextensive properties, then
Lewis’s view has the consequence that P is intrinsic iff Q is intrinsic.
But, one might think, this is implausible: consider P =being green, and
Q = being green and being such that there is no largest prime number. Let us
summarize these consequences thus:
(L) Every necessary or impossible property is intrinsic, and if P and
Q are necessarily coextensive properties, then either both or
neither are intrinsic.
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I simply do not find (L) objectionable, at least for the notion of
intrinsicality with which I am concerned. I grant that there may be other
notions of intrinsicality, and maybe (L) would be objectionable for those
notions. But I do not grant that there is only one single notion of
intrinsicality that we all have before our minds, which is such that (L) is
false of it.
The way I see it, ‘intrinsic’ is a term of art. There are some non-
negotiable constraints on how any notion deserving the name "intrinsic"
must behave. For example, on any construal of intrinsicality, relational
properties like being within 10 feet of a perfect sphere should not turn
out intrinsic. But I don’t think that these non-negotiable constraints say
anything about (L), one way or another. (L) is negotiable.
A good distinction to mark is that between those properties that can
never differ between perfect duplicates, and those that can. This
distinction deserves to be called a distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic properties. That (L) turns out true on this distinction seems to
me to be of little import. What is more important is whether this
distinction can do philosophical work. I think it can, and what is more, I
don’t think that (L) impedes this work in the least. So, I regard (L) as a
"throwaway" consequence of the theory.
7.1.3 Dunn’s Second Objection
After dismissing the interpretation of (IPD) as involving a strict
conditional, Dunn suggests interpreting the arrows in (IPD) as being those
of relevant implication. This blocks both of the problem cases from Dunn
that we discussed: neither being such that Socrates is wise nor being such
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that 2+2-4 turn out intrinsic on this view. This is because of special
features of relevance logic that Dunn discusses informally as follows:*
First, the antecedent of a relevant implication is suDDosed to he
a really sufftc ent condition; it, all by itself, is sup^sSTte
nf
f
hfI"
1 for
.
the consequent. There should not be the slightest hint
of background or cetens paribus conditions for a true relevant
conditional, unlike the case with the Lewis-Stalnaker analysis of the
so-called counterfactual conditional". There should be no
suppression of "premisses" merely because they are true
Second the consequent of a relevant implication is' supposed todepend on the antecedent in a somewhat technical sense, butone that
intuitively means that the antecedent can be used in deriving the
consequent. 6
But Dunn has an objection even for his final construal of Lewis’s view
((IPD) with the arrows construed as relevant conditionals). Let b be some
actual black marble. According to Dunn, the property of being a perfect
duplicate of b turns out to be an intrinsic property, on his final
construal of Lewis’s view. For this property corresponds to formula ‘x» b '
,
and the following formula is derivable in relevance logic from the
uncontroversial assumption that duplication is an equivalence relation:
(4) y~ b -> (x~ y -> x* b)
Dunn finds this consequence objectionable. He says that the answer to the
question of whether a given object a has this property "Clearly... does not
depend on a alone, but equally depends on b and its intrinsic properties." 9
This argument appears to apply equally well to (Dl). The property
being a perfect duplicate of b can never differ between perfect duplicates,
for if a and c are duplicates of b
,
then they must be duplicates of each
other (again, we use the fact that duplication is an equivalence relation).
So I will discuss the argument as an argument against what really is
Lewis’s theory: (Dl). The argument seems to be:
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i) If Lewis s theory is true, being a perfect duplicate of b is
an intrinsic property
ii) being a perfect duplicate of b is not an intrinsic property
iii) therefore, Lewis’s theory is not true
Fortunately, defenders of (Dl) have nothing to fear from the argument, for
the argument equivocates. The ambiguous phrase is ‘being a perfect
duplicate of b\ Recall that I assume the thesis of worldbound
individuals, so b exists in only one possible world. Here are two possible
properties this phrase could denote:
PI: the property had by an object x iff x and the counterpart of b in
x’s world are duplicates
P2: the property had by an object x iff x and b itself, the object in
the actual world, are duplicates
To know whether an object in world w has PI, I need to compare it to the
counterpart of b at w. To know whether an object at some world has P2,
we should compare it to b itself (back in the actual world).
It might be thought that it is implausible that PI is the property
Dunn had in mind. But this is not implausible at all. In fact, I think
that PI is the most natural interpretation of the phrase ‘ being a perfect
duplicate of b\ This is just another example of the counterpart
theorist’s interpretation of de re modal claims. For example, when we
discuss what would have happened if Dukakis had won the election, we will
discuss what would have happened to Dukakis, despite the fact that it is
only a counterpart of the Duke in the relevant world. If we discuss the
property of losing an election to Dukakis, we will attribute that property
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to whoever "Dukakis beats" in this possible world, despite the fact that it
isn’t the Duke himself that does the beating.
In everyday English, we do not mention the counterparts of Dukakis.
Rather, we discuss what happens to Dukakis himself in counterfactual
situations. We say: Dukakis might have won. In this counterfactual
situation, Dukakis did win. The counterpart theorist does not deny the
truth of these claims, but he does give an analysis of them on which their
truth is consistent with Dukakis himself being present in only one world.
This analysis is not given in English; it is in a language that, we might
say, is more literal. In this language, we mention Dukakis’s counterparts.
In this language, it is false to say that Dukakis himself wins in other
possible worlds -- rather, only his counterparts do. Let’s call this
language the "possibilist" language.
Whether ‘being a duplicate of b' refers to PI or P2 depends on whether
this phrase is taken as a phrase of English, or as a phrase in the
possibilist language. If we take it as a phrase of English, then it refers
to PI, just as " losing an election to Dukakis * refers to a property had by
people beaten by counterparts of Dukakis. On the other hand, if it is
interpreted as a phrase of the possibilist language, it denotes P2. Let’s
consider how the argument fares on each reading.
If the phrase denotes PI, premise i) is false. Object b, recall, is a
black marble in the actual world. Consider a world w that contains a
marble, c, that is a duplicate of b, and also b'
,
the counterpart of b at
w. Suppose that b' is white. First note that b has PI, for b is a
duplicate and counterpart of itself. 10 But c does not have PI, for Z?’s
counterpart at w, b', is white whereas c is black. Thus, PI differs
between duplicates (
b
and c) and hence is not intrinsic according to (Dl).
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On the other hand, if ‘being a duplicate of b' denotes P2, then
premise 1 ) seems true. Duplication is symmetric and transitive, so if a
and c are duplicates of b, then they are duplicates of each other. But
premise ii) can now be rejected.
Let P be the conjunction of all of b' s intrinsic properties. P is an
intrinsic property (see chapter 4 section 2.3, principle A3). I will show
that P is necessarily coextensive to P2; (L) then implies that P2 is
intrinsic. So, any objection to this reasoning would need to be an
objection to (L), and we have already considered such objections in the
last section.
The argument here employs principles about intrinsic profiles from
chapter 4 section 2.2 and 2.3. Suppose Px. P is an intrinsic profile
(principle (C3)); since b and x share intrinsic profiles they are
duplicates (principle (C2)), hence P2x. On the other hand, suppose P2x.
Thus, x and b are duplicates (since duplication is an equivalence
relation); since P is intrinsic, by (Dl), we have Px. Thus, P and P2 are
necessarily coextensive.
I think that whatever initial plausibility premise ii) enjoys is the
result of thinking of ‘being a perfect duplicate of b ’ as denoting PI, for
this reading implies that there is something special about b that makes a
given object a have the property. Look again at what Dunn says in support
of premise ii): 11
"Consider the question of whether a given object a is a "perfect
duplicate" of an object b... Clearly the answer to this question does
not depend on a alone, but equally depends on b and its intrinsic
properties, [my emphasis]
Dunn does not say what sense of ‘depend’ he intends here, but on a natural
reading, what he says is true only if ‘being a perfect duplicate of b'
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denotes PI rather than P2. This sense is that of counterfactual
dependence. For suppose that a and b exist in the actual world, and are
duplicates. Object a has the property being a perfect duplicate of b
regardless of whether we read this phrase as denoting PI or P2. But now
let us ask whether (5) is true:
(5) if b were to change color but a remained unchanged, a would no
longer have the property being a perfect duplicate of b
(5) expresses the claim that a s having the property being a perfect
duplicate of b counterfactually depends on the color of b. In fact, (5) is
true if the property in question is PI, false if the property in question
is P2. So if Dunn has in mind counterfactual dependence when he says
‘depends’, his defense of premise (ii) rests on reading ‘being a perfect
duplicate of b' as denoting PI. I grant the truth of premise (ii) on that
reading, but on that reading premise (i) is false, as I have already shown.
Premise ii) sounds true, for we usually speak English, not the
possibilist language. But if we fix on the possibilist language, our
intuitions must be distrusted. Consider the property having the same color
as b. In the possibilist language, the property we express is necessarily
coextensive to blackness
,
since b is in fact black. But of course usually
when we use the phrase ‘having the same color as b\ we usually have in
mind the property had by object x in world w iff x has the color of the
counterpart of b at w. To get the other reading in English, we would have
to say
‘having the same color as b has in fact'. This phrase expresses in
English what ‘having the same color as b ’ expresses in the possibilist
language.
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7.2 Dunn’s Theory of Intrinsicalitv
Next I turn to Dunn’s own definition of ‘intrinsic’. Dunn offers two
definitions: 12
a has the property determined by <p intrinsically = Vx(x=a -»
<f>\)
0 is of a kind to determine relevant properties = VxVy[</>y
-> (x =y ->
<£*)]
where the "arrows" are those of relevant implication.
Say that property P is a relevant property iff every formula that
determines that property is of a kind to determine relevant properties.
Dunn’s theory of intrinsically seems to be this: a property is intrinsic
iff it is relevant. The notion of a property had intrinsically by an
object a is slightly different, for he allows that, if wisdom is an
intrinsic property of Socrates, then he has wisdom or being such that 2+2=4
intrinsically, since he has the latter property purely in virtue of
himself. But the latter property would not be a relevant property. 13
(Notice that we can offer a parallel analysis of the notion of
"object-relative" intrinsically within the Lewis framework:
(RI) a has P intrinsically = every possible object that is a perfect
duplicate of a has P
Notice also that a property is intrinsic simpliciter (as defined by (D 1))
iff it is intrinsic to every possible object that has it. 14)
We should be clear that Dunn’s theory is a theory of a different sense
of ‘intrinsic’ than the one in which I have been interested in this
dissertation. One of the consequences of Dunn’s analysis that he favors is
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that haecceities are intrinsic (see Dunn (1990) p. 186). He defends this
position with a quotation from G.E. Moore: 15
It is obvious that there is a sense in which when two things are
exactly alike, they must be ‘intrinsically different’ and have
different intrinsic properties, merely because they are two... the mere
fact that they are numerically different does in a sense constitute an
intrinsic difference between them, and each will have at least one
intrinsic property which the other has not got - namely that of being
identical with itself.
Now, in that paper, Moore is merely pointing out that there is a sense of
‘intrinsic’ according to which the property being identical to Ted is
intrinsic. I am perfectly willing to grant that there is such a sense.
Perhaps Dunn has given a correct theory of it. The sense of ‘intrinsic’ in
this dissertation, Lewis’s sense of ‘intrinsic’, might be called a
qualitative sense of ‘intrinsic’, and Dunn’s account fails to capture this
sense of ‘intrinsic’. Of course, this is no objection to Dunn’s theory as
a theory of some other sense of ‘intrinsic’.
Whatever sense of ‘intrinsic’ Dunn is interested in, his theory is in
the end of little importance to the project of this dissertation — it is
of no help to the metaphysician who seeks a reductive definition of
‘intrinsic’. His definitions are stated for a formal language; the
definitions involve formulas of that language. But we need to choose
primitive predicates of that language. If the primitive predicates are
chosen to express extrinsic properties, then the definition will yield the
result that these are relevant properties. So his definitions are of no
help in distinguishing the intrinsic properties unless we already
understand the distinction.
Dunn knows this. Consider the following quotations:
These observations seem finally to constitute a definition of
intrinsic property, at least for an ideal language where complex
relational ideas are not expressed deceptively by monadic predicates. 16
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But it is not the business of logic, but rather of metaphysics (orperhaps of whatever field whose subject matter is being formalized
e.g., physics) to determine what formulas "really" determine
properties, logic should tell us only that if certain formulas are
postulated to really determine properties, then it follows that
certain other formulas "really" determine properties". 17
But Lewis is, and I am, of course, engaged in metaphysics, not logic. Why
Dunn offers his theory as a competitor to Lewis’s theory I cannot fathom.
7.3 Two Conceptions of Intrinsically
There are several traditional ways of distinguishing intrinsic from
extrinsic properties. Dunn claims that these do not always yield mutually
consistent results. In particular, he mentions the "metaphysical" and
"syntactical" criteria: 18
Metaphysically, an intrinsic property of an object is a property that
the object has by virtue of itself, depending on no other thing....
Another common way of characterizing the intrinsic properties of an
object (let us call it "the syntactical criterion") is to say that
they are non-relational.
According to Dunn, these two criteria do not always agree because of the
possibility of "a relation that an item a has to an item b, but which
depends in some sense on only a itself...." Dunn’s example is a non-Humean
notion of causality; he quotes Kripke as follows: 19
Indeed to say that a by itself is a sufficient cause of b is to say
that had the rest of the universe been removed a still would have
produced b.
Consider the property causing b. It seems like a relational property, and
hence an extrinsic property according to the syntactical criterion. But,
if we accept this view of causation, we seem to want to say that a has the
property of causing b "purely by virtue of itself'. The metaphysical
criteria then would call this property intrinsic.
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I do not accept these traditional conceptions as conceptions of the
notion of intrinsically of this dissertation. The syntactic criterion
seems to me to count haecceities
,
properties like being Ted
,
as intrinsic,
since these do not seem relational (in a sense of ‘relational’ that might
be elaborated as ‘involving relations to distinct things’). The
metaphysical criterion is close to the criterion I accept, but I dislike it
for two reasons. The first is that it, too, seems to make haecceities
intrinsic. The second is that some properties are extrinsic and yet are
sometimes "had by an object by virtue of itself...". Consider a green
object that has the property being green or being 10 feet from some red
thing. The related criterion I accept is that an intrinsic property is one
such that whenever it is had by an object, it is had just in virtue of the
Qualitative way that object is in itself. But I do want to consider and
reject Dunn s example, for I think it illustrates a misunderstanding of the
notion of an intrinsic property.
I find the example unconvincing for two reasons. The first is that
Dunn seems to have misunderstood the intent of the metaphysical criterion.
When we say that an object has an intrinsic property "by virtue of itself,
this is intended to have strong modal force. Suppose that my father is
extremely dignified. Because of his stem demeanor, he has the property of
being respected by me. In a sense, this is in virtue of himself, since he
is so dignified. But of course, it is only because of certain facts about
me as well that his dignity inspires my respect. It would be possible for
him to remain as dignified as he in fact is, and yet for me to disrespect
him.
In the case where a causes b there is an analogy. The non-Humean will
claim that, in some sense, this occurs purely by virtue of a ' s nature. But
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she will presumably not claim that it would be metaphysically impossible
for a to occur without causing b (if she does, then I find that notion of
causation implausible). In rough form, since a might have occurred without
causing b, causing b isn’t an intrinsic property.
Of course, this isn’t right. If this were the argument, I would be
appealing to the principle that an accidental property of an object can’t
be intrinsic, and this is clearly false. One of my intrinsic properties is
my mass, but I could have had some other mass. What I mean to argue is
that it is possible that a occur, with the same intrinsic nature as it has
in fact
,
and yet not cause b, and that this fact implies that causing b
isn t an intrinsic property of a. That is, there is a possible world in
which (a counterpart of) a is a duplicate of its actual self but does not
cause b.
Now of course, this looks question begging. For a to have the same
intrinsic nature as it has in fact is for it to have the same intrinsic
properties as it has in fact. So I seem to be directly asserting as a
premise that causing b isn’t an intrinsic property.
I am. The claim that causing b is intrinsic, as I see it, is so
clearly and basically wrong that arguments against it are bound to beg the
question. But I am hoping that the way I am denying it will jar the reader
into fixing on the concept of an intrinsic property. Think about my claim
that a might been a perfect duplicate of its actual self, without causing
b. Isn’t that clearly true? Imagine a world where a causes b. Now remove
b. You didn’t have to change a did you?
Perhaps a causes b in any world with the same laws as our world —
this may be what is indicated in the Kripke quotation by the counterfactual
locution "...had the rest of the universe been removed a still would have
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produced b [my emphasis] This may indicate a belief that particular
instances of causation are independent of matters of particular fact, so
long as the causal laws are held constant. Or, perhaps the non-Humean
believes that it is possible for a to cause b even when there are no other
objects or laws. But surely it is not the case that in every
metaphysically possible world in which a occurs and has its actual nature,
b occurs as well.
My second objection to Dunn’s example is similar to the first. Surely
the non-Humean would allow that even though a in fact causes b, it is not
necessary that it cause b in particular. Couldn’t a have had its actual
nature, but caused some other event instead? Perhaps even a duplicate
event. For example, Bob’s swinging his fist caused Rob’s pain. Now
imagine a world where the person Bob hit was not Rob, but someone else.
Then, Bob’s swinging his fist didn’t cause Rob’s pain; it caused, say,
Nob’s pain.
In the end, one with a radically non-Humean view of causation can
consistently maintain that causing b is intrinsic. But she would be
committed to theses that, I say, are rather unintuitive. In particular,
there would be metaphysically necessary connections between states of
affairs like
a’s having such and such an intrinsic nature
and
b’s occurring
So, the radical non-Humean would be committed to severe restrictions on
possibility, for we normally think that such distinct states of affairs are
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metaphysically compossible, if not physically compossible. Since I find
this implausible, I find Dunn’s example implausible.
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Notes
Dunn (1990) p. 184.
See Dunn (1987) p. 361, formula (7v). This is Dunn’s analog of Lewis's
definition Why he does not formulate Lewis’s theory in a parallel
fashion, I do not know.
His Socrates example that I consider below makes this clear.
4 Dunn (1990) pp. 184-5.
5 Note: we must recall an issue from Chapter 2. Here are using a
language with quantification across the modal operator *’. Given the
usual possible worlds understanding of the meaning of *’, this means
that we must make sense of the notion of an object x having property P
in a world in which x does not exist (since we are assuming the thesis
of worldbound individuals). As I mentioned in chapter 2, I understand
this in terms of counterpart theory: to say that x has P at w is to say
that x has a counterpart at w that has P.
6 Dunn quotes this on p. 184 of Dunn (1990); the quotation is from Lewis
(1983a) p. 197.
7 Dunn (1990) p. 185.
8 Dunn (1990) pp. 180-181.
9 Dunn (1990) p. 185.
10 We may stipulate that b has no other counterparts in the actual world.
11 Dunn (1990) p. 185.
12 For the first, see Dunn (1990) p. 180. Dunn says for the left hand side
of this definition "a has </> intrinsically" rather than "a has the
property determined by
<f> intrinsically", but <p is assigned a formula,
not a property. For the second definition see Dunn (1990) p. 1 85 formula
(II). As before, I substitute a universally quantified variable instead
of the name ‘a’ that appears in Dunn’s paper.
13 See Dunn (1987) p. 363 and Dunn (1990) p. 183.
14 In conversation Lynne Rudder Baker has suggested to me that some uses of
‘intrinsic’ in everyday language involve an object-relative notion of
intrinsicality.
15 Moore (1951a) p. 262.
16 Dunn (1990) p. 202.
17 Dunn (1987) p. 355.
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18 Dunn (1990) p. 178
19 Dunn (1990) p. 179.
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CHAPTER 8
ANALYSIS OF THE NOTIONS
In this chapter I discuss two related questions. The first is the
question of whether certain attempts to analyze naturalness succeed, and
the second is the question of whether certain attempts to analyze
intrinsicality succeed. My answer in each case is no. In Chapter 6 I
considered and rejected the proposal that naturalness be analyzed using a
sparse theory of universals. Obviously, it is impossible to review all
proposals for analyzing the notions of intrinsicality, naturalness, and
duplication. Still, I hope that the results of these two chapters,
together with my claim that naturalness is an important and fruitful
notion, justify my taking naturalness as a primitive. 1
8.1 Can We Define ‘Natural’?
The notion of naturalness that is up for analysis is that
characterized in Chapter 3 as "Conception 1". First, let’s focus on the
perfectly natural properties and relations. I characterized these as the
"most fundamental properties". The general idea underlying the hope that
naturalness can be analyzed is this: once we fix the facts about perfectly
natural properties and relations, we thereby fix all other facts of a
certain sort.
It must be emphasized that the qualification "of a certain sort" is
necessary. The perfectly natural properties and relations do not form a
supervenience base for all properties whatsoever. In Chapter 3 section 2.1
I showed that haecceities do not supervene on the set of perfectly natural
properties and relations. Moreover, perhaps there are possible worlds that
are alike in their distribution of perfectly natural properties and
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relations, but differ with respect to the laws of nature that hold there,
with respect to the causal relations that hold there, or with respect to
the objective chances of various events there
.
2 If so, then properties and
relations involving laws, causation, or objective chance will be
instantiated differently in the worlds in question, and so won’t supervene
on the perfectly natural properties and relations.
Thus, we have the requirement that all facts of a certain sort
supervene on the perfectly natural properties and relations. What sort of
facts? Qualitative facts. For the kinds of facts just mentioned that fail
to supervene on the set of perfectly natural properties and relations seem
non-qualitative.
Suppose we were to succeed in defining ‘natural’ in terms of
‘qualitative’. This would not be an achievement quite so momentous as that
of defining ‘natural’ purely in terms of supervenience and other "quasi-
logical" notions. The notion of a qualitative property or relation seems
to be of a piece with that of naturalness. Still, such a definition would
be important. But I will argue that ‘natural’ cannot be so defined.
The working idea here is that the set N of perfectly natural
properties and relations at any world w forms a supervenience base for the
set Q of qualitative properties at that world -- N is a "Q-base" for w . 3
But not just any Q-base for w is the set of perfectly natural properties at
w. Any set is a supervenience base for itself. Hence, the following
definition:
(Nl) Property or relation P is perfectly natural iff it is a member of
a Q-base for some world
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would err in making every qualitative property perfectly natural. In fact,
(Nl) makes every property and relation perfectly natural since the set of
all properties and relations is a supervenience base for any set of
properties whatsoever.
(Nl) makes too many properties natural. We should therefore limit our
attention to certain special Q-bases -- the properties in these Q-bases
will be the natural properties. Intuitively, these will be the "non-
redundant" Q-bases. But there are problems in carrying this out.
First, there is a problem with stating an appropriate necessary
condition for perfect naturalness along these lines. The following
necessary condition was suggested in chapter 3 section 2.1:
(1) for any world w, the set of perfectly natural properties and
relations at w is a minimal Q-base for w.
Let us consider this extended into a definition:
(N2) Property or relation P is perfectly natural iff it is a member of
a minimal Q-base for some world w.
where a minimal Q-base for w is defined to be a Q-base for w that has no
other Q-base for w as a subset. The difficulty with the necessary
condition for perfect naturalness contained in (N2) involves the "problem
of minimality" I discussed in section 2.1 of Chapter 3. What if one
perfectly natural property or relation can be analyzed in terms of others?
Then, there may be a world at which the set of perfectly natural properties
is not a minimal Q-base.
I suggested a solution to a special case of this problem - the
problem of "permutations" — by revising the definition of ‘minimal’ to
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allow that a relation R and a permutation of R might both be present in a
minimal supervenience base. However, it still seems an open possibility
that some other instance of the problem of minimality might falsify (1). To
the extent that this possibility is a genuine possibility, (1) is to be
distrusted.
Whether or not the problem of minimality can be solved, I think it is
clear that the sufficient condition laid out by (N2) is unacceptable. 4
Let N be the set of perfectly natural properties and relations at some
world w; let A be the set of qualitative properties and relations at w;
suppose that N contains some property P. In section 2.1 of Chapter 3 it
was argued that the negation of a perfectly natural property is not
perfectly natural, so ~P<?N. Let N' be the result of replacing P by ~P in
N. (N2) implies that N is a minimal Q-base for w, and we will show that it
then follows that N' is as well. (N2) then implies that ~P is perfectly
natural, and is therefore refuted.
We first note the following lemma:
(*) for any sets A and B and property P, B supervenes on Au{P} iff B
supervenes on Au{~P}
which follows from principle (S5) of Chapter 3 section 2.1. Now, since A
supervenes on N, by (*) it also supervenes on N'. Moreover, N' is a
minimal supervenience base for A. For suppose N"cN' and A supervenes on
N". If ~P*N" then N"cN, and we contradict the fact that N was a minimal
supervenience base for A. On the other hand, if ~P€N", then by (*), A
supervenes on (N"-{~P})u{P}. Since this latter set is a proper subset of
N, we again have a violation of N’s minimality.
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It should be noticed that this example refutes a strengthened version
of (N2):
(N3) Property or relation P is perfectly natural iff it is intrinsic
and a member of a minimal Q-base for some world w.
for the property in question, ~P, is intrinsic (~P is intrinsic since P is
perfectly natural and hence intrinsic -- see Chapter 4 section 2.3 where it
is shown that Boolean combinations of intrinsic properties are intrinsic
and that perfectly natural properties are intrinsic). It should also be
noticed that we cannot block this example by banning "negations" from the
minimal Q-bases we consider, for every property P is the negation of ~P.
So, the definition we have been considering cannot account for the
fact that the negation of a perfectly natural property is not perfectly
natural. The trouble is caused by the fact that the negation of a property
is, to put it colorfully, as good as the property itself as far as
supervenience is concerned. I do not see how any definition of ‘natural’
along the lines we have been considering can get around this problem. The
prospects, then, for defining ‘natural’ in terms of ‘qualitative’ and
‘supervenience’ look dim.
8.2 Can We Define ‘Intrinsic?
A property is intrinsic iff it never differs between any two possible
duplicates. Objects are duplicates iff they share all their intrinsic
properties. We have a circle of interdefinability between ‘intrinsic’ and
‘duplicate’. Given either, we may define the other (and given naturalness,
we may define them both). But this may seem like defining the obscure in
terms of the obscure. Who would understand ‘duplicate’ if she did not
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understand ‘intrinsic’? I myself think I understand both notions. I also
think that the equivalences relating these concepts increase my
understanding of each. But some philosophers have desired more than mere
equivalences relating these two notions. They have sought reductive
definitions of ‘intrinsic’ and ‘duplicate’ in terms of modal concepts,
property exemplification, the part-whole relation, etc.
I believe that all such attempts must fail. But my goal in this
section is more modest. I will review two proposed sets of definitions,
one by Jaegwon Kim and one by Michael Slote. Each proposal will be shown
to be flawed. In Slote’ s case I will discuss extensively the possibilities
for revising the analysis; it will be seen that the prospects are not good.
8.2.1 Preliminaries
In this section I will use both of the languages I mentioned in
Chapter 2. I will engage in some use-mention sloppiness in the interest of
smooth exposition.
The actualist language is a standard modal language with the ordinary
apparatus of the predicate calculus, plus the modal operators ‘D’ and ‘o’.
Quantifiers that range over objects range over objects in "the world of
evaluation". For example, "3xFx" is true at a world iff some object is F
at that world. "oVxFx" is true iff it would be possible for every object
that would then be actual to be F; that is, iff there is some possible
world such that every object that exists at that possible world is F. This
language has a temporal existence predicate -- "Exist(x,t)" means that x
exists at time t.
The possibilist language is my usual language. It contains no modal
operators; in their place we have quantifiers that range over possible
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worlds (variables: ‘w’, ‘w7 ’, etc.), and quantifiers that range over all
possible objects (variables: ‘x\ ‘y\ etc.). The sentence "VxFx" says
that every object, both actual and possible
,
is F.
I will also employ lambda abstraction". For example, where
<t> is some
formula with no occurrences of free variables other than ‘x’ and ‘t\ the
expression rAxAt
<f>' shall be understood as denoting the property had by
possible individual z at time t7 iff <p is true when z is assigned to ‘x’
and t7 is assigned to ‘t\
In this chapter only I will speak of properties of objects at times
rather than the properties had simpliciter by the temporal slices of those
objects. I do this to match the language of the philosophers I discuss. To
this end, each language contains variables that range over times: ‘t’,
‘t
7
’, etc. The sentence "t>t7 " means that time t is after time t7 . Where
‘P’ names a property, I will take the liberty of using "P(x,t)" to mean
that object x has property P at time t; "R(x,y,t)" means that x and y stand
in relation R at t. I will also allow quantifiers over places, with
corresponding variables ‘p’, ‘p 7 ’, etc.
8.2.2 Kim’s Definition
In discussing Kim’s definition we may be brief, since it has already
been adequately discussed by David Lewis in Lewis (1983a). Kim offers a
sequence of definitions building on a suggestion by Chisholm. 5
I follow Kim in using an actualist modal language. We need the
concept of two objects being "wholly distinct". An object is not wholly
distinct from other objects that it overlaps; neither is it wholly distinct
from, say, its unit set. I will say x and y are wholly distinct at time t
(”Dist(x,y,t)") iff a) both are contingent objects and b) x and y have no
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parts in common at t, and c) neither is such that its existence entails the
other’s existence.
Here are the definitions; the first is Chisholm’s; the others are
Kim’s:
Dl: G is rooted outside times at which it is had =
df
VxVt[ G(x,t) -> 3V (t*t' & Exist(x,f))]
D2: G is rooted outside the objects that have it =
df
VxVt[G(x,t)-> 3y3t'Dist(x,y,t')]
D3: G is internal (i.e. intrinsic) = G is neither rooted
df
outside times at which it is had nor outside the objects
that have it
David Lewis, in ‘Extrinsic Properties’, notes that Kim’s analysis is
unsuccessful. The property of loneliness
,
had by x at t iff at t, there
exists no contingent object that is wholly distinct from x, satisfies D3.
But loneliness is not intrinsic. Imagine two possible worlds w and w'
containing duplicate black balls at some time t. In w the ball is entirely
isolated, whereas the ball has plenty of company in w'. Only the first
ball is lonely, so loneliness can differ between perfect duplicates and
hence is not intrinsic.
Similarly, many disjunctive properties incorrectly turn out intrinsic
according to Kim’s definitions. As Lewis notes, the property that is the
disjunction of loneliness and the property of coexisting with exactly six
pigs (wholly distinct from oneself) also satisfies those definitions.
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Let us leave Kim's definition, and discuss instead some definitions
proposed by Michael Slote.
8.2.3 Slote’ s Project
Slote does not directly concern himself with the project of defining
either duplicate’ or ‘intrinsic’. But he does attempt to define certain
related notions in Chapter 8 of Metaphysics and Essence. I shall
critically examine these definitions, as well as the question of whether
they can be extended to define ‘duplicate’ and ‘intrinsic’.
Slote’s goal is to define the locution ‘objects x and y are exactly
alike at time t’, where x and y are understood to be objects in the same
possible world. The definition of this locution employs the concept of an
alteration
;
this also is analyzed by Slote.
The definitions have an idiosyncratic form, for they do not mention
properties or related entities. I will take the liberty of changing their
form to one more standard. Most of what I say about the definitions I
discuss applies straightforwardly to Slote’s original definitions.
8.2.4 Slote’s Analysis of Alteration
Slote begins with an analysis of what it is for a single object x to
be at some time intrinsically unlike the way it was at some earlier time.
This Slote calls "alteration". This term is somewhat unfortunate, for on
at least one natural use of this word, a ball that changed from being green
at t to being blue and then back to being green by t' could be said to have
"altered" between t and t', even if it was exactly similar at t to how it
was at t'. It should be kept in mind, therefore, that such a case would
not count as alteration in Slote’s sense. In other terminology, an object
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x alters in Slote’s sense between t and t' iff it is not the case that the
stage of x at t is a perfect duplicate of the stage of x at t'. 6
I take it that we have a pre-theoretical grasp of the concept of
alteration against which proposed philosophical analyses may be evaluated;
likewise for the concept of alikeness in the next section. To fix on that
notion, I will sometimes appeal to the familiar notions of intrinsically
and duplication in my discussion of Slote’s definition. Of course, these
notions will not be used in the definitions. That would be circular.
Slote’s definition runs as follows : 7
'a alters between tO and iV means about the same as There are an x
identical with a, a t identical with tO, and a t' identical with tl
such that there are a y at t and a z at t' that are incompatible and
both dependent on x; y and z are both not temporally bound; for all
places p and times t"", x, y, and z can each exist at p and t"" and y
and z can exist even if x never moves; and neither y nor z depends on
anything c such that of necessity if one of y or z exists at some time
t" and the other at some other t"' and c exists at both t" and t"'
then either x or c is somewhere at t'" where it is not at t" 1
When Slote says that object x is temporally bound
,
he means that x is
either (a) essentially unceasing, or (b) such that if it exists at some
time t then it essentially exists only at t . 8 Object x depends on object y
iff necessarily, if x exists at some time then y exists at that time.
Objects are incompatible iff it would be impossible for them to exist at
the same time.
Slote’s idea is that this definition will be satisfied in virtue of
the variables ‘y’ and ‘z’ being assigned certain states of affairs . Suppose
that x undergoes a genuine change -- say a change in color from red to
blue. Then the definition will be satisfied in virtue of the states of
affairs x’s being red and x’s being blue, respectively, being assigned to
the variables ‘y’ and ‘z’. On the other hand, suppose x merely changes its
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position without changing any of its intrinsic properties. Then the
assignment of the states of affairs being at position pi and x’j being
in position p2 to ‘y’ and ‘z’, respectively, will not satisfy the
definition, nor will any other assignment to ‘y’ and ‘z\ So the first,
but not the second, will count as a genuine case of alteration.
Slote’s definition does not mention states of affairs. This is not
because he does not believe in these entities. Indeed, his intention is
that the definition will be satisfied in virtue of certain states of
affairs being assigned to the variables ‘y’ and ‘z\ But he believes that
the definition works adequately as it is - phrased only in terms of modal
notions, spatiotemporal notions, and logical notions. The notion of a
state of affairs is not a primitive notion for Slote.
But it is not part of my project to eliminate states of affairs or
related entities from primitive ideology, so I will develop a more
intuitive definition that is based on Slote’s definition but makes
reference to properties. First, some terminology. I continue to use an
actualist modal language. Say that a relation (property) is existence
entailing iff necessarily, if x^x^.x stand in that relation (property)
at a time, then x ,x ,...x must all exist at that time. Properties P and
Q are incompatible iff it would be impossible for any object to have both P
and Q at the same time. Property P is temporally bound iff vxvt [P(x,t)
-» vt' > t P(x,t')]. 9 I will denote the location of x at time t by
"loc(x,t)". 10 I will write "P(x,t,p)" iff loc(x,t)=p and P(x,t). I
represent Slote’s definition thus:
Analysis of Alteration 1
Alter(x,tO,tl) = df 3P3Q such that
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a P(x,tO) & Q(x,tl)
b P and Q are existence-entailing 11 and incompatible and neither is
temporally bound
c vpvt [ oP(x,t,p) & oQ(x ,t,p) ]
d o [3tP(x,t) & 3tQ(x,t) & x never moves ]
e ~3z vtvt'( [P(x,t) & Q(x,f) & Exist(z,t) & Exist(z,r)]
poc(x,t)*loc(x,t') v locfoO^locfot')] )
As an example of the application of this definition, let us return to
the case where x changes position between times tO and tl without altering.
Let P = having position pi and let Q = having position p2. Conditions a,
b, d, and e seem satisfied, but c is not. If other assignments to the
variables also fail to satisfy the definition, then it yields the correct
result: x does not alter between tO and tl.
As stated, however, the definition is inadequate. Suppose that x
never alters throughout its existence, but at tl it is moving while at t2
it is stationary. Suppose x’s color (all over) is blue. Consider the
following assignments:
P = moving or being non-blue
Q = being stationary and being blue
As near as I can tell, the conditions above are satisfied, and hence the
theory gives the incorrect result that x alters between tl and t2.
The difficulty can be fixed by adding condition d':
d' o [ 3tP(x,t) & 3tQ(x,t) & x moves whenever it exists ]
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Intuitively, d is in the same spirit as d: they each rule out properties
that entail certain states of motion. Condition d' prohibits Q in my
example.
There is another difficulty with this definition. Suppose x remains
in place for its entire life and never changes any of its intrinsic
properties. But suppose at tO there is a red ball (called "A") ten feet
from x, whereas at tl there is nothing ten feet from x. This is the sort
of situation for which condition e is designed: when P = being ten feet
from A and Q = not being ten feet from A, condition e is not satisfied. But
now consider the following assignment to ‘P’ and ‘Q’
P = the property of having something or other within ten feet
Q = the property of having nothing within ten feet
Under this assignment, condition e in the definition is satisfied, for
there is no one object such that, necessarily, if x has P and Q at two
times t and f, and that object exists at t and t', then either x or it
must have moved. As far as I can see, the other clauses in the definition
are satisfied as well, and so the definition again gives the incorrect
result that x alters between tO and tl.
Let us then add the following two conditions that are in the spirit of
Kim’s definition (recall that Dist(x,y,t) iff x and y are contingent
objects that share no parts at t, and are such that neither’ s existence
entails the other’s existence):
f o [3tP(x,t) & 3tQ(x,t) & ~3y3t Dist(x,y,t)]
g o [3tP(x,t) & 3tQ(x,t) & 3y3t Dist(x,y,t)]
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(It is necessary to add both conditions for reasons analogous to those that
necessitated our adding d' to supplement d). These conditions will rule
out properties like having something within ten feet. In fact, these
conditions seem to rule out the cases that the original condition e was
intended to rule out, 12 so I propose that we drop condition e. Here is the
modified analysis.
Analysis of Alteration 2
Alter(x,tO,tl) = df 3P3Q such that
a P(x,tO) & Q(x,tl)
b P and Q are incompatible and existence-entailing
c vpvt [ oP(x,t,p) & oQ(x,t,p) ]
d o [3tP(x,t) & 3tQ(x,t) & x never moves ]
d' o [3tP(x,t) & 3tQ(x,t) & x moves throughout its existence]
f o [3tP(x,t) & 3tQ(x,t) & ~3y Dist(y,x)]
g o [3tP(x,t) & 3tQ(x,t) & 3y Dist(y,x)]
It should be noticed that by adding f and g, we have employed a new
primitive: the part-whole relation.
From our discussion of Kim’s definition above, we should notice that d
and d' do not rule out the property P = either being stationary or moving
with velocity 5 meters per second. However, this causes no problem in the
present context. If Q is to satisfy condition b, it must be incompatible
with P, and hence must entail the property neither being stationary nor
moving at 5 meters per second. But then Q will fail condition d.
Similarly, the conditions f and g do not rule out the case where P is the
disjunction of loneliness and coexisting with six pigs. But again, if Q is
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to satisfy condition b then it must entail the property neither being
lonely nor coexisting with six pigs, and hence will fail to satisfy
condition f. Indeed, a major reason for examining this definition is that
it avoids the problems Lewis presents for Kim.
Our new conditions f and g also rule out counterexamples to Slote’s
original definition that were noticed by Frederick Schmitt. 13 Here is the
general form of Schmitt’s counterexamples. Let x and y be objects, and P'
and Q' be incompatible intrinsic properties. The properties
P = Ax(y is P') (being such that y is P’)
Q = Ax(y is Q') {being such that y is Q')
seem to satisfy the original definition. So suppose that x never changes
any of its intrinsic properties during its lifetime, but y changes from
having P' to having O'. This means that x goes from having P to having Q,
and the original analysis counts this as an alteration to x.
The Analysis of Alteration 2 is a significant improvement over Slote’s
original definition. Unfortunately, it is still inadequate. It cannot
rule out cases based on Nelson Goodman’s grue/bleen examples. 14 Let tO be
some time, and define P and Q as follows:
P = AxAt[(Green(x,t)&t<tO) v (Blue(x,t)&t^tO)] (Grueness)
Q = AxAt[(Blue(x,t)&t<tO) v (Green(x,t)&tetO)] (Bleenness
)
Suppose that object x does not alter at all between times t. and t where
t. < tO < t
f
. Further suppose that x is green during this interval. Properties
P and Q fit the definition of alteration, and hence that definition yields
the incorrect result that x alters between t and t
.
i f
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We can generalize further. Let
<t> be any function from objects and
times to propositions, and F be any intrinsic property. Further suppose
that object x does not alter between times tO and tl and has F during that
period, but that </>(x,tO) is true while <£(x,tl) is false. It seems to me
that the following P and Q will satisfy the Analysis of Alteration 2:
P = AxAt[(F(x,t) & 0(x,t) is true) v (~F(x,t) & <p(x, t) is false)
Q = AxAt[(~F(x,t) & <f>(x, t) is true) v (F(x,t) & <*>(x,t) is false)
provided that, for any x and t, <£(x,t) and the proposition that x is F at t
are logically independent, and provided that neither F nor its negation is
essential to x.
I see no way around this problem, and so I believe that Slote’s
analysis of alteration is a failure. It should be noticed that the
property grueness is also a counterexample to Kim’s definition of
‘intrinsic’ above. A formidable task for any reductive definition of words
like ‘intrinsic’ and ‘duplicate’, or others of their ilk, is to solve this
problem.
8.2.5 Slote’s Analysis of Alikeness
Slote uses his analysis of alteration to analyze the notion of
distinct objects being exactly alike at some given time. In more familiar
terminology, x and y are exactly alike at time t iff x’s stage at t is a
perfect duplicate of y’s stage at t. We found reason to reject Slote’s
analysis of alteration, but I will consider his analysis of alikeness
anyway. Perhaps an adequate analysis of alteration is possible after all.
Also, it is interesting to see whether duplication may be analyzed in terms
of alteration, for the concept of alteration could be taken as a primitive
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notion. If analyses of duplication and intrinsicality were then
forthcoming, these would not be entirely reductive, since the notion of
alteration seems in the same boat with duplication and intrinsicality.
Still, there may be some merit to taking alteration as our primitive.
A new notion employed in Slote’s definition of ‘alike’ is that of two
objects being "incongruous". The idea here is a spatial one: left
hand/right hand mirror images are incongruous despite perhaps being
otherwise exactly similar.
His definition is as follows : 15
r
a and b are non-identical mutable unbound entities exactly alike at
tO’ means about the same as There are an x identical with a, a y
identical with b, and a t identical with tO such that x and y’are non-
identical mutable unbound entities and there is at t a temporally
unbound z dependent on x and y but not depended on by either x or y; z
cannot exist at all times when either x or y exists if x alters
between some two times and y does not (or vice versa); z can exist at
some time, or during some period, even if both x and y are altering at
that time, or during that period, and even if both x and y are not
altering at that time or during that period; z can exist between some
t' and t" only if for every two times t"' and t"" between t' and t" or
identical with f or t", it is not the case that x at t"" is (to some
degree) unlike x at t"' but y at t"" is not (to any degree) unlike y
at t"'; z does not depend on any temporally unbound immutable entity w
that depends on x and y; and at t, x and y are not incongruent or
incongruous1
The intent is that the definition will be satisfied when ‘z’ is assigned
the state of affairs: x and y’s being exactly alike.
I represent this definition as follows. An object is mutable iff it
is possible that it alters. For any objects z and z', let t.(z,z') be the
earliest time when either z or z' exists; let t
f
(z,z') be the latest time
when either z or z! exists. When we have R(x,y,t") for every t" between t
and t' (inclusive), I will write "R(x,y,[t,t,])".
Furthermore, I extend the notion of alteration from the previous
section as follows: when t=t', I interpret "Alter(x,t,t,)" as meaning that
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X is altering at t. Slote does not define the locution "x is altering at
t
. He alludes to the possibility of such a definition in terms of
"Alters(x,t,t')" and spatiotemporal terms on p. 141 footnote. 14. One
presumably would go about it thus, x is altering "’from the past ” at t iff
there is some t' < t such that for any t" e [r,t) Alter(x,t",t). The
definition of "x is altering at t from the future" is analogous.
Presumably, x is altering at t iff x is altering at t from either the past
or the future.
Analysis of Alikeness 7: 16
Let x and y be non-identical mutable temporally unbound entities.
Alike(x, y,tO) = df 3R such that R is existence entailing and:
a R(x,y,tO)
b VtoR(x,y,t)
c Vto [Exist(x,t) & Exist(y,t) & ~R(x,y,t)
d { R(x,y,[t.(x,y),t
f
(x,y)]) -» VtVt'(t*t' -> [Alter(x,t,t') «
Alter(y,t,t')] )}
e o 3t,t'[R(x,y,[t,t']) & Alter(x,t,t') & Alter(y,t,t')]
f o 3t,
t
7[R(x
,y , [t ,
t
7
]) & ~Alter(x,t,t') & ~Alter(y,t,t')]
g Vtvt'[R(x,y,[t,t']) vrvr'eft,!'] (Alter(x,r,r
#
)
*
Alter(x,t",t/,/)}]
h The state of affairs R’s holding between x and y does not entail
(include) any "temporally unbound immutable state of affairs"
i x and y are not incongruous at t
The idea here is that R will be the relation being exactly similar to.
Condition h is obscure. It is intended to rule out the following case
which I will discuss below:
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R - AxAy(x and y are exactly alike except that x is the determinate
shade green and y is the determinate shade red )
R is ruled out by condition h because the state of affairs x and y’s
standing in R entails the state of affairs x’s being the determinate shade
green^ and y’s being the determinate shade red which, according to Slote,
is a "temporally unbound immutable state of affairs". It is immutable,
presumably, because there are two "determinate" intrinsic properties,
namely, greenness and redness
,
such that it entails that x has the first
n n ’
while y has the second. I do not know how to further clarify this notion,
and I will not even attempt to, since, as I will argue below, condition h
should be dropped anyhow.
This definition is somewhat daunting. But we can make some
simplifications. First, g together with the fact that R is existence
entailing entails d; 17 hence, the latter can be eliminated. Moreover, g is
is equivalent to the simpler g':
g' VtVt' [(t*t' & R(x,y,[t,t'])) (Alter(x,t,t') « Alter(y,t,t'))]
So we have:
Analysis of Alikeness 2:
Let x and y be non-identical mutable temporally unbound entities.
Alike(x, y,tO) = df 3R such that R is existence-entailing and:
a R(x,y,tO)
b VtoR(x,y,t)
c Vto [Exist(x,t) & Exist(y,t) & ~R(x,y,t)
e o 3t,t'[R(x,y,[t,t']) & Alter(x,t,t') & Alter(y,t,t')]
f o 3t,t'[R(x,y,[t,t']) & ~Alter(x,t,t') & ~Alter(y,t,t')]
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g' VtVt' & R(x,y,[t,t']))
-4 (Alter(x,t,t') » Alter(y,t,t'))]
h The state of affairs R’s holding between x and y does not entail
(include) any "temporally unbound immutable state of affairs"
i x and y are not incongruous.
This definition will not do in its present form. Condition i is
present to rule out the case of two perfect mirror images of each other --
say a left hand and a right hand that are exact duplicates except for being
mirror images. For let R = being a perfect mirror image of, R satisfies
all of the conditions before condition i. In particular, R satisfies
condition g', since any alteration in one of the hands would need to be
accompanied by an alteration in the other, if they were to continue being
perfect mirror images. 18
Similarly, condition h is intended to rule out the case where
R = AxAy(x and y are exactly alike except that x is the determinate
shade green and y is the determinate shade red )
n n
since, again, this relation satisfies the conditions before condition h. In
particular, notice that it satisfies g'. For suppose it holds between
objects x and y during some time period. Any alteration in the color of
exactly one of x and y would make R cease to hold, and any other alteration
in exactly one of x and y would also make R cease to hold.
But these cases can be generalized in ways that get around conditions
h and i. For the sake of definiteness, let us develop a specific objection
that generalizes the mirror image case. Suppose that there is some
fundamental intrinsic magnitude called "parity" that comes in two degrees:
on or off. Further suppose that an object’s parity is independent of its
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other intrinsic properties (except those like being on and being green),
and let:
R = AxAy(x and y are intrinsically exactly alike except that x is on
iff y is off)
Now suppose that x is on and y is off, but they are otherwise exactly
alike. Our definition gives the wrong answer: that x and y are perfect
duplicates. In particular, notice why R satisfies g\ If x but not y
altered by changing its parity then R would cease holding between them. On
the other hand, if x but not y altered in some other way, then again R
would cease to hold between them, since R requires that its relata be
exactly alike in respects other than parity. Also notice that R seems to
satisfy h. The state of affairs x and y’s standing in R does not entail
any determinate parity for either x or y.
We may generalize the color case if we help ourselves to a set of
determinate shades of red. where the index i ranges over, say, the real
numbers between 0 and 1. The following relation satisfies the conditions
in Slote’s definition:
R = AxAy(x and y are exactly alike except that vie(0,l) x is red.
iff y is red., where j = (i + l)/2.
The cases can be generalized further. We need the concept of an
intrinsic profile from section 2.2 of chapter 4. An intrinsic profile is a
maximally specific intrinsic property. I note two facts about intrinsic
profiles:
(FI) every (possible) object has exactly one intrinsic profile
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(F2) a possible object alters iff it changes intrinsic profiles
(FI) follows from principle (C2) from section 2.3 of Chapter 4, which says
that a property P is an intrinsic profile iff the set of P’s (possible)
instances is a maximal set of possible duplicates (provided we assume, as I
do, that properties are individuated by necessary coextension). For the
set of maximal sets of possible duplicates is a partition of the set of
possibilia, and thus every possible object falls into exactly one of these
sets. (F2) also follows from (C2), since an object alters between tl and
t2 iff its instantaneous stage at tl is not a duplicate of its stage at t2.
Call the set of intrinsic profiles "IP". A function f is a
permutation of IP iff f is a bijection from IP onto itself. For any such
function f, if the relation:
(*) R = AxAyAt[vPeIP P(x,t) iff f(P)(y,t)]
holds between objects x and y at some time, then all of the conditions
before condition i will be satisfied. 19 In particular, condition g' will be
satisfied. For suppose that x, but not y, were to alter between tl and t2.
We show that it follows that R cannot hold between x and y throughout the
closed interval [tl,t2]. Suppose otherwise. Call x’s intrinsic profile at
tl "P", its profile at t2 "Q", and call y’s profile at both tl and t2 "S"
(we here appeal to (FI)). Since y does not alter during this interval, we
know that y has the same profile at tl and t2 because of (F2). From (F2),
we can infer that P*Q, since x does alter during the interval. Since R
holds between x and y at tl, we have S = f(P), by (*) and (FI). Similarly,
since R holds between x and y at t2, we have S=f(Q). But since P*Q and f is
a bijection, we have a contradiction.
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So let x and y be any objects that exist at time t and are not
incongruous pairs (say, my head and the Eiffel Tower). Let f be any
permutation of I such that f(x’s intrinsic profile at t) = y’s intrinsic
profile at t, and define R as in (*). Slote’s definition yields the result
that x and y are exactly alike at t.
It seems that conditions h and i must be replaced by some more general
condition that will rule out all these counterexamples. Notice that there
is one permutation of I such that, when relation R is defined in as in (*),
then R must be the relation being a perfect duplicate of. This is the
identity permutation: f(F)=F, for all Fel. For on that choice, R holds
between x and y iff they have the same intrinsic profile -- i.e. iff they
are duplicates, whereas for other permutations, the resulting R can
sometimes hold between objects when they have different profiles — i.e.
when they are not duplicates. So I suggest that we add the following
condition:
j R is (necessarily) reflexive
Intuitively, the situation is this. Condition g' insures that, if the
relation R holds between two objects through some period of time, any
alteration in one of the objects must be exactly accompanied by
simultaneous alteration in the other object. This is satisfied when R = is
a perfect duplicate of. But, as we saw in (*), this can be achieved by any
other choice of R that sets up a "determinate correspondence" between the
intrinsic profiles of its relata. Requiring that R be reflexive rules out
all relations of the form specified by (*) except the the one corresponding
to the choice of f as the identity function, and this is the one choice
that yields the correct answers.
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It is unclear whether or not Slote could make use of condition j in
his original project. Recall that he does not use the notion of a relation
in his definition. Whether or not condition j could be adapted to suit
Slote’s purposes, I do not know.
Given condition j, we can simplify the definition. Condition e is
intended to rule out the case where R = AxAyAt(neither x nor y is altering
at t). Condition f is intended to rule out the case where R = AxAyAt(both
x and y are altering at t). Since there are objects that can exist without
altering, and objects that can exist and alter, condition j rules these
cases out. So I propose we drop conditions e and f.
Furthermore, I recommend that we strengthen g' to a stronger claim
that is every bit as intuitive as the original:
g" Vx#Vy'VtVt'( [t*t' & R(x\y, ,[t,t/])] ->
[Alter(x',t,t') «* Alter(y',t,t')])
So, I propose the following adaptation of Slote’s definition:
Analysis of Alikeness 3:
Let x and y be non-identical mutable temporally unbound entities.
Alike(x, y ,t0) = df 3R that is existence-entailing and such that
a R(x,y,tO)
b vtoR(x,y,t)
c Vto [Exist(x,t) & Exist(y,t) & ~R(x,y,t)
g" Vx'Vy'VtVt'( [t*t' & R(x',y',[t,t'])] -> [Alter(x',t,t') «*
Alter(y/ ,t,t/)])
j R is (necessarily) reflexive
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I have not been able to create problems for this analysis of
alikeness. But the concept of alikeness is not as general as the concept
of duplication
. The actualist modal language, the language used by Slote
to state his definitions, has quantifiers that range, at any given time,
over objects in a single world. In this language, when one says
"Necessarily, x and y are alike iff x and y are assumed to be in the
same possible world. So the concept of alikeness that I have been
analyzing applies only to objects in the same possible world. Moreover,
the concept only applies to objects at a single given time. But we might
want to ask whether objects that exist at different times, or in different
possible worlds, are duplicates - i.e. exactly alike. Furthermore, we use
the concept of duplication to analyze the concept of an intrinsic property.
Can the concept of alikeness do this job just as well?
One might think to generalize from Slote’ s definition as follows.
First use ‘alike’ to define ‘intrinsic’:
P is intrinsic iff VxVyVt [Alike(x,y,t) -> (Px«Py)]
(That is, intrinsic properties are those that can never differ between
worldmates that are exactly alike at a time.) Then go on to define
‘duplicate’ (here I use possibilist quantifiers). For any times tl and t2,
and possible objects x and y (perhaps in different worlds), let us use
”Dup(x,y,t,t')" to mean "x as it is at t is a duplicate of y as it is at
t'". (The cumbersome locution must be used since we are following Slote in
thinking of objects as temporal continuants, and thinking of properties as
being had relative to times.)
Dup(x,y,t,t') iff for any intrinsic property P, P(x,t) iff
P(y,tO
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Roughly, this says that objects are duplicates (relative to two times) iff
they have the same intrinsic properties (at those times).
This attempt is a failure. Take a clearly intrinsic property -- the
property roundness. Now consider any possible world w such that for every
time t, there are no distinct x and y such that Alike(x,y,t). We define a
new property as follows:
x has P at time t iff either (x’s world is not w and x is round at t)
or (x’s world is w and x is not round at t)
Surely roundness never differs between pairs of alike objects (since alike
objects are, in my terminology, duplicates that inhabit the same world and
time). But then P never differs between alike objects either. For P could
never differ between alike objects in any world other than w since it has
the same extension as roundness in those worlds. But it can never differ
between alike objects in w either, since in w, at no time is there a pair
of distinct alike objects. Thus, P satisfies the current definition of
‘intrinsic’. This seems incorrect. And there is more trouble. Let x be
an object in w that is round at time t, and let y be a round object in some
other possible world that is, intuitively, at time t exactly like x is at
t. By the definition of ‘P’, y does not have property P whereas x does
have property P, and thus x and y turn out not to be duplicates at t.
A better strategy would be to rework Slote’s definition from the
beginning to apply to objects in different possible worlds. To do this, I
will use the possibilist language with possibilist quantifiers. I will
also assume that we can speak meaningfully of crossworld and crosstemporal
relations (e.g. x at tO is redder than y at tl, where x and y are in
different worlds). Let x and y be any two possible objects. When relation
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R holds between object x at time t and object y at time t', I will write
"R(x,y,t,t') M
.
Finally, I need notation for the crossworld and crosstime analog of
R(x,y,[t,t/]). Intervals [t,t'] and [t",t'"] are congruent iff they have
the same (temporal) length. Let [t,t'j and [t",t"'] be congruent
intervals; for any t*
€
[t,t'], let "t"+t*-t" denote the time in the
interval [t",t"'] that is as far from t" as t* is from t. I will write
"R(x,y,[t,t/],[t,, ,t/,/])" when i) the intervals [t,t'] and [t/, ,t/,/] are
congruent, and ii) for every t*e[t,t'], we have R(x,y,t*,t"+t*-t).
Analysis of generalized alikeness:20
Let x and y be non-identical mutable temporally unbound entities.
GenAlike(x, y,tO,tl) = df 3R that is existence-entailing and such that:
a R(x,y,tO,tl)
b VtVt, 3x /3y /(R(x , ,y
/
,t,t')
c VtVt,3x,3y,(~R(x/ ,y
,
,t,t
/
)
g" vx'vy'vtvt'vrvt"' {t*V & R(x'
,
y'
,
[t, t']
,
[t" , t"'])) -> (Alter(x',t,t')
«* Alter(y, ,t",t,/'))}
j R is (necessarily) reflexive (i.e. VxVtR(x,x,t,t))
(The quantifiers here are possibilist.) The intention is that the
definition will be satisfied just when R is the relation bom by x at t to
y at t' iff x’s stage at t is a perfect duplicate of y’s stage at t'.
But there is a problem even with the new definition. The notion of
generalized alikeness is still not general enough. It is restricted so as
not to apply to immutable objects, objects that cannot alter. This is no
accident. Let R' be any binary relation that satisfies conditions b and c,
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and holds between two immutable objects a and b. Now consider a new
relation R, defined as follows:
R(x >y,t>t') iff EITHER (i) either x or y is mutable, and x at t and y
at t' are duplicates, OR ii) both x and y are immutable and
R'(x,y,t,t'))]
This relation R satisfies the conditions in the definition. Moreover, a
and b stand in R; thus, a and b would be said to be GenAlike by that
definition, despite the fact that R' was an arbitrarily selected relation
and a and b were arbitrarily chosen immutable objects. In particular,
notice why R satisfies g". Consider any two possible objects x' and y', and
suppose we have R(x ,
,y
/
,[t,t
/
],[t
/
',t'"]). If either x' or y' are mutable,
then clearly Alter(x',t,t') iff Alter(y , ,t,, ,t,,, ) in virtue of clause i) of
the definition of R above. But if x' and y' are each immutable, then this
will also hold trivially, because of the fact that neither can alter.
Our concept of generalized alikeness, then, is restricted to mutable
objects, and therefore is less general than the notion of duplication,
which applies equally to mutable and immutable objects.
One might follow the generalizing strategy outlined above. First
define ‘intrinsic’ using generalized alikeness, and then analyze the more
general notion of duplication in terms of intrinsicality. The proposal is
this:
P is intrinsic iff vtvt'vxvy [(x and y are mutable and
GenAlike(x,y,t,t')) -> (P(x,t)«P(y,t'))]
Dup(x,y,t,t') iff for any intrinsic property P, P(x,t)«P(y,t')
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(The quantifiers here, remember, are possibilist. The definitions say the
following: a property is intrinsic iff it can never differ between mutable
GenAlike objects, two objects, even immutable objects, are duplicates iff
they share all intrinsic properties.)
This approach will fall into error if there are some properties that
are not intrinsic, but which are particular to immutable objects. For let
P be such a property. P will never differ between mutable generalized
alike objects, since no such object ever has P, so we get the incorrect
result that P is intrinsic. Moreover, this will create problems for the
definition of ‘duplicate’, since this intuitively extrinsic property will
be required to be shared by duplicates.
The question, then, is: are there any extrinsic properties particular
to immutable objects? I think there are. The property being an
instantaneous stage of Ted is extrinsic, for I might have had an exactly
similar identical twin whose stages would be duplicates of my stages, but
would not have this property. But no mutable object ever has this
property, because of the fact that instantaneous stages cannot change,
being unable to persist through time
.
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I think, then, that we cannot analyze intrinsicality and duplication
along Slotean lines. I argued above that Slote’s analysis of alteration is
unsuccessful. Even if we grant ourselves that concept, I have failed to
use this concept to analyze intrinsicality and duplication. I suggest that
Lewis’s view on this matter is correct: ‘intrinsic’ and ‘duplicate’ cannot
be defined in terms of "quasi-logical" notions.
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Notes
1 On p. 63 of Lewis (1986c) David Lewis discusses attempts to define
‘natural’ in terms of "robust" notions such as laws of nature and
resemblance. His objection is that naturalness should be used to
analyze these robust notions, rather than the other way around. Quinton
discusses what he calls "formalistic" analyses of naturalness -- those
that do not appeal to any such robust notions — in Quinton (1957) pp.
53-58. Since these proposals have already been discussed, I will focus
on proposals of different kinds.
2 See Lewis’s discussion of "Humean Supervenience" in the introduction to
Lewis (1986b).
3 In fact, because of the possibility of a "world of endless complexity",
these remarks need to be complicated, but I will ignore this twist for
simplicity. See Chapter 3 section 2.2. The argument I give here
applies equally well to the more complex versions.
4 Phillip Bricker made an important suggestion here.
5 See Kim (1982) pp. 59-60 and Chisholm (1976) p. 127.
6
I will take this to entail that x’s passing into or out of existence
counts as an alteration in x.
7 Slote (1975) p. 138.
8 Slote (1975) p. 101.
9 The second half of Slote’ s definition of ‘temporally bound’ can be left
out because of condition c.
10 Let us introduce some object that is not a place to be the value of
loc(x,t) when x does not exist at time t. Thus, if x exists at t but
not at t', then loc(x,t)*loc(x,t')
11
I include the assertion that P and Q are existence-entailing to mirror
Slote’ s assertion in his definition that y and z depend on x. In
Slote’s original definition, the intended values for ‘y’ and ‘z’ are
states of affairs involving x.
12 The example Slote gives on p. 137 is essentially the example I gave
above involving the properties being ten feet from A and not being ten
feet from A. There is another reason to drop condition e. Let z = any
object that cannot exist at two different times, (e.g. an instantaneous
time stage). In this case, the conditional in e has an impossible
antecedent, the statement beginning with *’ is true, and the condition
is failed, for any properties P and Q.
13 See Schmitt (1978) pp. 406-407.
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14 See Goodman (1983) p. 74. Phillip Bricker suggested looking at
grue/bleen.
15 Slote (1975) pp. 142-3.
16 Clauses a, b, and c are intended to capture Slote’s condition a (p.
139). c is slightly stronger than what Slote says, however.
17 Suppose R(x,y,[t'(x,y),tf(x,y)]). Since R is existence-entailing, x and
y come into and go out of existence at the same times. Let t*t7 . If
both t and t7 are not in [t‘(x,y),t
f
(x,y)] then clearly neither x nor y
alters between t and t7 . If exactly one of t and t7 is in this
interval, then both x and y alter between t and t
7 (in note ?? it is
mentioned that coming into existence shall be taken to be an
alteration). Finally, if t and t7 are each in [t‘(x,y),tf(x,y)] then it
follows from g that Alter(x,t,t
7
) iff Alter(y,t,t
7
).
18 It is not clear that mirror images are not duplicates. In fact, the
analysis of duplication I accept in Chapter 4 section 2.1 is consistent
with mirror images being duplicates. And this consequence seems
acceptable.
19 Actually, in some extreme cases condition e might fail. Suppose R is
defined as in (*) via some function f such that, necessarily, if R holds
between objects x and y, then for any intrinsic profile F that x could
then alter to have, it would be impossible for y to alter to have f(F)
(perhaps because the complement of f(F) is an essential property of y).
20
I ignore the fact that the original definition involved de re modality
— this was irrelevant to the substance of the definition.
21 Another sort of example appeals to "purely" abstract entities, if there
are such things. Impure sets are perhaps not immutable; perhaps when I
get a haircut my unit set alters. But numbers, on the other hand, seem
different. Surely, orthodoxy says that the number 9 is immutable. So,
if the property numbering the planets is an extrinsic property, we have
another example. However, I do not urge this example since I am wary of
applying the notion of intrinsicality to purely abstract entities.
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and holds between two immutable objects a and b. Now consider a new
relation R, defined as follows:
R(x,y,t,t7 ) iff EITHER (i) either x or y is mutable, and x at t and y
at t' are duplicates, OR ii) both x and y are immutable and
R'(x,y ,t,t'))]
This relation R satisfies the conditions in the definition. Moreover, a
and b stand in R; thus, a and b would be said to be GenAlike by that
definition, despite the fact that R' was an arbitrarily selected relation
and a and b were arbitrarily chosen immutable objects. In particular,
notice why R satisfies g". Consider any two possible objects x' and y', and
suppose we have R(x ,
,y
,
,[t,t
,
],[t
,,
,t
,//
]). If either x' or y' are mutable,
then clearly Alter(x',t,t') iff Alter(y',t",t"') in virtue of clause i) of
the definition of R above. But if x' and y' are each immutable, then this
will also hold trivially, because of the fact that neither can alter.
Our concept of generalized alikeness, then, is restricted to mutable
objects, and therefore is less general than the notion of duplication,
which applies equally to mutable and immutable objects.
One might follow the generalizing strategy outlined above. First
define ‘intrinsic’ using generalized alikeness, and then analyze the more
general notion of duplication in terms of intrinsicality. The proposal is
this:
P is intrinsic iff Vtvt'VxVy [(x and y are mutable and
GenAlike(x,y,t,t')) (P(x,t)«P(y,t'))]
Dup(x,y,t,t') iff for any intrinsic property P, P(x,t)«P(y,t')
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(The quantifiers here, remember, are possibilist. The definitions say the
following: a property is intrinsic iff it can never differ between mutable
GenAlike objects; two objects, even immutable objects, are duplicates iff
they share all intrinsic properties.)
This approach will fall into error if there are some properties that
are not intrinsic, but which are particular to immutable objects. For let
P be such a property. P will never differ between mutable generalized
alike objects, since no such object ever has P, so we get the incorrect
result that P is intrinsic. Moreover, this will create problems for the
definition of ‘duplicate’, since this intuitively extrinsic property will
be required to be shared by duplicates.
The question, then, is: are there any extrinsic properties particular
to immutable objects? I think there are. The property being an
instantaneous stage of Ted is extrinsic, for I might have had an exactly
similar identical twin whose stages would be duplicates of my stages, but
would not have this property. But no mutable object ever has this
property, because of the fact that instantaneous stages cannot change,
being unable to persist through time . 21
I think, then, that we cannot analyze intrinsicality and duplication
along Slotean lines. I argued above that Slote’s analysis of alteration is
unsuccessful. Even if we grant ourselves that concept, I have failed to
use this concept to analyze intrinsicality and duplication. I suggest that
Lewis’s view on this matter is correct: ‘intrinsic’ and ‘duplicate’ cannot
be defined in terms of "quasi-logical" notions.
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Notes
On p. 63 of Lewis (1986c) David Lewis discusses attempts to define
natural in terms of "robust" notions such as laws of nature and
resemblance. His objection is that naturalness should be used to
analyze these robust notions, rather than the other way around. Quinton
discusses what he calls "formalistic" analyses of naturalness — those
that do not appeal to any such robust notions -- in Quinton (1957) pp.
53-58. Since these proposals have already been discussed, I will focus
on proposals of different kinds.
2 See Lewis’s discussion of "Humean Supervenience" in the introduction to
Lewis (1986b).
3 In fact, because of the possibility of a "world of endless complexity",
these remarks need to be complicated, but I will ignore this twist for’
simplicity. See Chapter 3 section 2.2. The argument I give here
applies equally well to the more complex versions.
4 Phillip Bricker made an important suggestion here.
5 See Kim (1982) pp. 59-60 and Chisholm (1976) p. 127.
6
I will take this to entail that x’s passing into or out of existence
counts as an alteration in x.
7 Slote (1975) p. 138.
8 Slote (1975) p. 101.
9 The second half of Slote’s definition of ‘temporally bound’ can be left
out because of condition c.
10 Let us introduce some object that is not a place to be the value of
loc(x,t) when x does not exist at time t. Thus, if x exists at t but
not at t', then loc(x,t)*loc(x,tO
11 I include the assertion that P and Q are existence-entailing to mirror
Slote’s assertion in his definition that y and z depend on x. In
Slote’s original definition, the intended values for ‘y’ and ‘z’ are
states of affairs involving x.
12 The example Slote gives on p. 137 is essentially the example I gave
above involving the properties being ten feet from A and not being ten
feet from A. There is another reason to drop condition e. Let z = any
object that cannot exist at two different times, (e.g. an instantaneous
time stage). In this case, the conditional in e has an impossible
antecedent, the statement beginning with ‘D’ is true, and the condition
is failed, for any properties P and Q.
1 3 See Schmitt (1978) pp. 406-407.
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14 See Goodman (1983) p. 74. Phillip Bricker suggested looking at
grue/bleen.
15 Slote (1975) pp. 142-3.
16 Clauses a, b, and c are intended to capture Slote’s condition a (p.
139). c is slightly stronger than what Slote says, however.
17 Suppose R(x,y,[t'(x,y),tf(x,y)]). Since R is existence-entailing, x and
y come into and go out of existence at the same times. Let t*t7 . If
both t and t7 are not in [t‘(x,y),t
f
(x,y)] then clearly neither x nor y
alters between t and t\ If exactly one of t and t7 is in this
interval, then both x and y alter between t and t
7 (in note ?? it is
mentioned that coming into existence shall be taken to be an
alteration). Finally, if t and t7 are each in [t'(x,y),tf(x,y)] then it
follows from g that Alter(x,t,t
7
) iff Alter(y,t,t
7
).
18
It is not clear that mirror images are not duplicates. In fact, the
analysis of duplication I accept in Chapter 4 section 2.1 is consistent
with mirror images being duplicates. And this consequence seems
acceptable.
19 Actually, in some extreme cases condition e might fail. Suppose R is
defined as in (*) via some function f such that, necessarily, if R holds
between objects x and y, then for any intrinsic profile F that x could
then alter to have, it would be impossible for y to alter to have f(F)
(perhaps because the complement of f(F) is an essential property of y).
20
I ignore the fact that the original definition involved de re modality
— this was irrelevant to the substance of the definition.
21 Another sort of example appeals to "purely" abstract entities, if there
are such things. Impure sets are perhaps not immutable; perhaps when I
get a haircut my unit set alters. But numbers, on the other hand, seem
different. Surely, orthodoxy says that the number 9 is immutable. So,
if the property numbering the planets is an extrinsic property, we have
another example. However, I do not urge this example since I am wary of
applying the notion of intrinsicality to purely abstract entities.
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CHAPTER 9
NATURALNESS AND METRICAL REALISM
The usefulness of the natural/nonnatural distinction is not limited to
its relations to intrinsicality, duplication, and related notions. In "New
Work for a Theory of Universals", David Lewis finds an abundance of
applications for the distinction. Indeed, the philosophical utility of the
concept of naturalness is a primary reason for its importance. In this
chapter I discuss yet another of its applications.
9. 1 Preliminaries
First, let me review some of the assumptions that I laid out in
Chapter 2. I assume that necessarily coextensive properties and relations
are identical; this means that I may conveniently single out a property or
relation by specifying its extension in every possible world. In fact, for
convenience I will often talk as if I identify properties with the sets of
possibilia that instantiate them; similarly for relations. Unless
otherwise indicated, my quantifiers are possibilist.
The natural properties and relations are the most fundamental
properties and relations — Chapter 3 lays out my theory of naturalness. In
this chapter I will ignore the fact that the natural/nonnatural distinction
is best construed as a matter of degree, so when I say ‘natural’, I mean
‘perfectly natural’. Some take naturalness to be an unanalyzable
primitive; I call these theorists primitive naturalists.
We must be clear on the distinction between mathematical and physical
spaces. Mathematical spaces are abstract mathematical objects. Physical
spaces may be represented by mathematical objects, but they are themselves
"concrete". 1
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Let us look at an example (the mathematics is simplified for clarity).
The mathematical Euclidean 3-space may be thought of as the pair <R3 d > [R
’ E
is the set of real numbers, so !R
3
(i.e. RxRxiR) is the set of three-tuples
of real numbers. A member of R3
,
<x,y,z>, is a "point" in the space, d.
is the "Euclidean distance function": the real-valued two-place function
over [R
3
defined as follows:
dE(<x,y,z>,<x , ,y, ,z/ >) = J(x-x')2 +(y-y')2 + (z-z')2
Once, people thought that the physical space of the actual world was
Euclidean. Let’s suppose for the sake of the example that they were right.
We may take the physical space of the actual world to be the pair <S,D>,
where S is the set of the actual world’s physical points, and D is the
actual two-place physical distance function defined over the points in S. 2
S and D are not thought of as being purely mathematical entities. The
members of S are real points in space, not representations. The value of
the function T> for arguments pi and p2 is the actual distance between
points pi and p2. I consider in Section 1 below just what it is for a
function to be the real distance function for a physical space.
The claimed relation between the mathematical Euclidean 3-space and
the physical space was one of representation', to say that physical space is
"Euclidean" is to say that the mathematical Euclidean 3-space correctly
represents physical space. "Representation" here means isomorphism, so the
<1
mathematical space <1R ,d > correctly represents physical space <S,D> iff
E
there is a one-one map f from S onto IR such that for any points pi and p2
in S, 2)(pl,p2)=d
E
(f(pl),f(p2)).
Modem differential geometry teaches us of other mathematical spaces
besides Euclidean 3-space. For example, if the Euclidean distance function
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d
E
in <R ,d
E
> *s rePlaced by an appropriate distance function d; the
resulting space <!R ,d> will be "non-Euclidean". The claim that the
geometry of physical space might be non-Euclidean is the claim that a non-
Euclidean mathematical space might correctly represent (be isomorphic to)
physical space. There are constraints d must satisfy in order to qualify
as a distance function — these constraints are laid out by mathematicians.
For example, d must always assign positive numbers. Another example: if
point p2 is (linearly) between points pi and p3, then d(pl,p2) + d(p2,p3)
must be equal to d(pl,p3). 3 But many distance functions are possible that
satisfy the constraints. The distance function that is paired with the set
of points in a mathematical space is that space’s metric. The physical
distance function, as well, is called the "metric" for that physical space.
I will discuss only space, ignoring time and spacetime. I intend what
I say to carry over to time and spacetime. I generalize this simple
discussion of mathematical and physical spaces in section 1.3.
I now want to explore the application of naturalness to a problem in
the philosophy of space and time: the statement of metrical realism. 4
Along the way we will learn a good deal about primitive naturalism and
naturalness. Section 2 introduces the problem of the statement of metrical
realism and gives a solution involving naturalness. In sections 3 and 4 I
reply to objections to the proposal of section 2.
9.2 Metrical Realism
9.2.1 Introduction to Metrical Realism
The absolutist believes that points of space exist. The relationalist
denies this -- there are spatial relations between material objects, but
the only "points of space" are mathematical surrogates we introduce for
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convenience in science. Let us be absolutists, realists with respect to
the existence of points of space.
We could go further. We could be realists with respect to the metric
structure of space as well, countenancing objective facts about distances.
There are the various Euclidean and non-Euclidean mathematical spaces.
The natural expectation is that, just as there are various mathematical
spaces, so there are various possible physical spaces. But some have
denied this. According to Hans Reichenbach, for example, there is no non-
conventional answer to the question: Is space curved or flat? Suppose
that I say that space is flat, whereas you say that it is curved. We still
may not disagree on any prediction of the outcome of any possible
observation if I invoke "universal forces" that systematically distort
physical objects. Where you say that an object retains its geometrical
properties but moves through curved space, I say that it moves through flat
space but is distorted by universal forces. According to Reichenbach, we
do not really disagree. Our theories are the same theory expressed in
different vocabulary
.
5 Since geometrical theories can always be protected
from refutation in this way by appropriate adjustments in physical theory,
Reichenbach’ s positivistic view is that the various geometrical theories do
not correspond to different physical possibilities.
Others say that there is a fact of the matter as to the metric
structure of space. Some possible worlds have Euclidean spaces, others
have Riemanian spaces. At some possible worlds, physical space is curved;
at others it is flat. If we agree then we are metrical realists.
Let us be realists in this way as well. It is surely the natural
view. But how shall we understand this realist thesis? The claim we need
to make is that the different mathematical metric functions correspond to
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different possibilities for physical space. More specifically, let Vf be
the class of possible worlds, and y be the class of mathematical spaces. In
a strong and crude6 form, the claim would be:
Metrical Realism 1: there is a function f from W onto y, such that
VweW, f(w) is the unique member of y that correctly represents the
physical space of w.
9.2.2 Physical Distance Functions
On the face of it, this claim of the metrical realist seems a little
mysterious. In the introduction I said that mathematical spaces
"represent" physical spaces by isomorphism. I called the "physical space
of the actual world" a pair <S,D>, where S is the set of the actual
physical points, and D is the "real distance function". But this raises
two related issues. First, we need to know what makes a function the "real
distance function" of a given possible world. Second, we need some account
of how we single out this correspondence with our language. The issues
might be stated in question form: i) what facts about w’s physical space
make D its distance function? and ii) how do we single out D with words
like ‘distance’? The second question becomes pressing when it is recalled
that distance between spatial points only indirectly connects up with
observable states of affairs. We cannot sense points in space. Distances
between points in space cannot be identified with, say, results of
measurements using standard apparatus, for it is possible for that
apparatus to be physically distorted and give results that deviate from
true distances. We seem to have no direct "access" to metric facts about
space, so how can we link up our words with spatial relations?
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Here is our predicament. Consider a possible world w. As metrical
realists, we believe in a distance function D for the physical space of w.
What makes T> the real physical distance function of w, and how do we single
it out with our word ‘distance’? Here is a first stab at an answer to both
questions. Maybe there is exactly one function from pairs of physical
points of w to real numbers with the characteristics appropriate to
distance functions. This, the realist could claim, is the real distance
function. We achieve reference to this function by stipulating that ‘the
distance function’ refers to the one and only function with such and such
characteristics.
This of course would be a mistake. Suppose S is the set of w’s
physical points and D is such a function. Then the image of D under any
one-one map of S onto S will be such a function as well. But the
correction is close at hand. I will complicate my proposal in later
sections, but the basic idea is that the realist’s claim should be that
there is exactly one natural function from pairs of w’s physical points to
real numbers with the appropriate structure, and this is the real physical
distance function. We achieve reference to this function by stipulating
that our word ‘distance’ is to refer to the unique natural function with
the appropriate characteristics. We should treat claims about physical
distance using the Ramsey-Lewis method for defining theoretical terms. 7
The sentence
a and b are three feet apart
would be analyzed as
There is exactly one natural function f from pairs of w’s physical
points to numbers with such and such characteristics, and f(a,b)=3.
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9.2.3 The Proposal Generalized
Some comments should be made about geometrical concepts other than
metrical concepts, such as the concept of betweenness. First, I would
treat references to such concepts in the same way as references to metrical
concepts: using the Ramsey-Lewis method. For example, as a first
approximation,
physical point pi is between physical points p2 and p3
could be interpreted as meaning:
there is exactly one natural relation R over triples of w’s physical
points with such and such characteristics, and R(pl,p2,p3)
This is a "first approximation" since I must immediately refine the
claim. All geometrical concepts should be "Ramsified" at once. Suppose
there are m geometrical concepts Cl, C2,...Cm. Let sentence
<f> be a
complete geometrical characterization of these concepts. For each
geometrical concept C (distance, betweenness, etc.) <p will have a conjunct
<P
c
that characterizes C, and a free predicate variable V
c
that stands for
C. <P
c
characterizes C in part by having free occurrences of variable V
c
;
for example,
<t>Q
could require that C be a transitive binary relation by
containing the following conjunct: rVxVyVz[(1/
c
xy & l^yz) ** ^
c
xz^-
specifying the characteristics of C. But <t>Q
may contain free variables
corresponding to other geometrical concepts as well, since constraints made
on one concept may involve its relations to another concept. (For example,
I noted above that a distance function V is constrained by the requirement
that, if point pi is between points p2 and p3, then D(p2,pl) + D(pl,p3) =
D(p2,p3).)
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The geometrical concepts Cl...Cm will be defined to be the unique m
natural relations/functions satisfying <p. Any sentence 0 containing
references to some geometrical concepts will be interpreted as meaning:
there are exactly m natural relations/functions V ,V ,...v over
Cl’ C2 Cm
w’s physical points such that <p, and
where V is the result of replacing every term purporting to refer to a
geometrical concept C in i// by the variable V
We may now generalize our analysis of the claim that a given
mathematical space represents a given physical space. The mathematician
explores affine structure, topological structure, etc. in addition to
metric structure. 8 But when I characterized mathematical spaces as pairs
of the form <IR ,d> for various distance functions d, I was focusing on a
special case. A more general way of characterizing a mathematical space
would be to take it to be a pair <if,Q> of a set if and a set Q. if could be
any set whatsoever, thought of as the the set of "points" of the space, and
Q would be a set of mathematical entities defined over the members of if
that specifies the structure of the space. We have focused on one sort of
member of Q: distance functions. But Q could also include a 3-place
betweenness relation, or other, more complicated, mathematical entities. 9
There is a corresponding generalization of the concept of physical space:
take the physical space of world w to be the pair <S
w
,Q
w
>, where is the
set of w’s physical points and is the set of physical geometrical
relations/functions restricted to the points of S . For example, Q might
w w
include the physical distance function over points of w, the physical
betweenness relation over points of w, etc. The members of Qw are defined
all at once to be the unique natural relations satisfying such and such
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restrictions, as I outlined above. And to say that mathematical space
<^,Q> represents <S
,Qw >
is
> ^ before, to say that the two are isomorphic.
A goal for metrical realism was to interpret the claim that world w
has such and such metrical structure. Notice that the view I am proposing
lets us interpret analogous claims for non-metrical structure. For
example, to claim that the physical space of a certain world has certain
topological features would be to claim that its physical space is
represented by a mathematical space with those topological features. This
claim, on the present view, is the claim that there are certain natural
relations over physical points with certain properties.
Notice another feature of the view: some claims about physical space
will be claims that there are no natural relations over physical points
with such and such properties. For example, suppose we want to claim that
a world w has a neo-Newtonian space. Along with the claim that certain
entities are natural, this will involve the claim that no entities are
natural that would correspond to absolute velocities or positions. 10
9.2.4 Thg Proposal Refined
For the rest of the paper, I will mostly discuss distance functions,
but it should be kept in mind that I envision all geometrical concepts
being Ramsified at once, as in the previous section. For simplicity, I
will pretend that geometrical facts about a world w may be described
completely by a two place real-valued distance function over the physical
points of w’s space. Hence, the simple theory I am working with at present
is the theory Metrical Realism 1 from section 1.1, conjoined with the claim
that the physical distance function at a world w is the unique two-place
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real-valued natural function D defined over w’s physical points with
characteristics appropriate to distance functions.
There are several refinements to our proposal that we must make. The
first deals with units. Surely there is nothing special about using feet
as our unit of distance. Hence it is implausible that there is a natural
distance function in terms of feet, but not one in terms of meters. The
realist’s claim might be modified: there is exactly one family of natural
functions from pairs of points to real numbers (with the appropriate
structure), such that the functions in the family are suitable
transformations of each other. In our simple case of three-dimensional
space, the suitable transformations would be exactly the scalar
transformations : function D is a scalar transformation of function D' iff
there is a real number k such that VxVy [D(x,y)=kD'(x,y)].
But there is another problem. I argue in Chapter 5 that natural
properties and relations cannot involve numbers if numbers are entities
that can be constructed in various equivalent ways from sets. The brute
force solution would be to accept real numbers as primitive entities. There
is, however, a more moderate solution.
In measurement theory, questions of the following form are answered:
given a certain class of entities and relations among those entities, what
numerical measurement functions can be defined over those entities
corresponding to those relations, and to what extent are those functions
unique? For example, given the relation of greater than or equal length
and the operation of concatenation, and their formal properties, what
corresponding real valued length function can we construct for a given set
of measuring rods? 11 The length function to be constructed must
"correspond" to the original relations in the following sense. Let "Rxy"
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mean that rod x is at least as long as rod y, and let "x = yoz" mean that rod
x is a concatenation of rods y and z. Length function / corresponds to the
original relations iff for all rods x,y,z, i) if Rxy then l(x) 2=l(y), and
ii) if x=y°z then l(x) = l(y)+l(z).
I had imagined the realist claiming that the distance function, a
function from pairs of physical points to numbers, is the entity to which
naturalness accrues. But the realist could avoid this by using measurement
theory. In the measuring rod example, relations among the set of measuring
rods enabled definition of a corresponding length function. The metrical
realist would pursue an analogous strategy based on natural relations among
physical points of space. If certain natural relations among physical
points satisfy certain formal constraints, then distance functions will be
definable. In fact, there will be a family of definable functions
corresponding to different arbitrary choices of units. The realist’s
claim, then, should be modified: the distance functions of a world are
those definable from certain natural relations over that world’s physical
points using measurement theory.
I will illustrate this proposal with an example: the definition of a
metric for a three dimensional Euclidean space, taken from Suppes, Luce,
Krantz, and Tverski’s Foundations of Measurement Volume 2, pp. 84-111
("FM2"). Suppose at world w there are just two natural relations over the
set S of w’s space points: a ternary relation B and a quaternary relation
W
Intuitively, B is betweenness and ~ is congruence; we have Bxyz iff y
is between x and z, xy~zw iff the distance between x and y is equal to that
between z and w. I say ‘intuitively’ for I assume no primitive grasp of
these relations, nor any operational definitions in terms of measurements.
These relations are singled out as being a betweenness relation and a
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congruence relation solely by the fact that they are natural relations
satisfying certain formal constraints. FM2 lists these constraints; here
are a few examples:
if Bxyx then x=y
xy~yx
if Bxyz, Bx'y'z', xy~x'y', and yz~y'z\ then xz~x'z'
If natural relations B and ~ satisfy these constraints then, I say, they
are a betweenness relation and a congruence relation, respectively. Now
suppose further that that these relations satisfy certain additional formal
constraints. These further constraints have the result of determining
whether or not the space is Euclidean. Here is one example, which we may
suppose holds of the physical points from w:
(*) if Bxvw, Byvz, and x*v, then there are u and t such that Bxyu,
Bxzt, and Buwt
(*), in fact, corresponds to Euclid’s famous parallel postulate, which
requires that for any point p not on line 1, there is exactly one parallel
to 1 through p.
Say that D is an acceptable distance function for w iff D is defined
over all pairs of points of S^, and D(x,y)=D(z,w) iff xy~zw. FM2 theorem
13.11 implies that for any acceptable distance function D, the physical
space <S ,D> is isomorphic to the mathematical Euclidean 3-space <lR3 ,d
E
>
defined above. That is, D is a Euclidean distance function. Were (*)
above replaced by something different, the acceptable distance functions
for w might be non-Euclidean.
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This example showed how we may start with a pair of relations (B and
~), assumptions about those relations’ formal properties, and prove that
the resulting distance functions have a certain structure (in the example,
they were Euclidean). Rather than claiming that there are natural
functions relating physical points and numbers, I construe metrical realism
as accepting natural relations over physical points, and constructing
corresponding functions involving numbers using measurement theory.
An important fact from measurement theory is that that there are often
different ways to construct a given measurement function. A certain system
of relations may suffice, but there may also be some other system of
relations that will do the trick as well. The metrical realist should not
focus on any one system of relations. If one set of relations among a
given world’s physical points is natural and has the appropriate formal
properties to enable construction of distance function D, then this would
be enough for the realist to say that K is a physical distance function for
w. And if more than one set of natural relations can do the job, then this
would be fine as well, so long as the resulting distance functions agree. 12
These distance functions are only required to be unique up to certain
transformations (recall the arbitrary choice of units).
Presumably, if at a given possible world there is no such set of
natural relations, or if there are more than one that yield incompatible
metrics, then realism should have the consequence that there is no fact of
the matter at that world about the metric structure of space. Our
statement of metrical realism, then, is as follows. Let “W be the set of
possible worlds, and y be the set of mathematical spaces.
Metrical Realism 2: there is a function { such that for every weW, £
assigns to w the set of members of y that represent (are isomorphic
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t0) <SW,»>, where is the set of w’s physical points of space, and D
is some physical distance function for w.
(Rl) D is a physical distance function for world w iff i) there is a
family of natural relations R over w’s physical points of space
sufficient to define 2) (unique up to an appropriate
transformation) and ii) no other such family of natural relations
R' allows definition of a function £>' (unique up to an
appropriate transformation) that is not an appropriate
transformation of d.
Notice that f(w) will be empty if no mathematical spaces represent the
physical space of w. This might be if there are systems of relations at w
that allow definition of conflicting metrics, or if w has no physical space
at all. Remember that this is all done for a special case — physical
spaces of the form <S,D>. I indicated in section 1.3 how this may be
generalized.
My proposal is schematic at certain points. For example, I say that
the distance function definable from some set of natural relations must be
unique up to an "appropriate transformation", but I never say what
transformations are appropriate. I expect that this and similar questions
will be answered by the mathematicians. Also, I take as unanalyzed the
notion of a point of space. (It would be interesting to investigate how
this could be avoided.)
9.3 The Problem of Extra Relations
In the next two sections I discuss problems for this approach to
metrical realism. The first is the problem of "extra relations". My
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approach to metrical realism will fall into error if there is some spurious
natural relation that, intuitively, has nothing to do with distance or
metric, but gets mistaken for a real distance relation because it just
happens to have formal properties that enable definition of a metric. Let
R be such a relation; suppose it has formal properties adequate for the
definition of a bogus metric M. If no other natural relations enable
definitions of conflicting metrics, then (Rl) entails that M is the metric
of the actual world, despite the stipulated fact that R has nothing to do
with distance or metric. On the other hand, if there are other natural
relations that enable definition of a conflicting metric (intuitively, the
real metric), then (Rl) says that our space has no metric structure. Either
way, we have bad news. This is the problem of extra relations.
There are several responses to this problem; I remain undecided. One
would be to claim that we have some way of singling out, from all the
natural relations among points with the appropriate structure, the ones
that correspond to real facts about distance and metric. This would be an
admission that (Rl) is unacceptable as stated, and needs to be
supplemented. But how could we single out the "real" metrical natural
relations from the bogus ones? Not perceptually. Not by means of formal
structure, since the problem is that these bogus relations have the same
formal structure as real metrical relations.
Another response to the problem of extra relations is to deny the
possibility of extra relations. Perhaps it is a reasonable conjecture that
the only natural relations holding between space points with formal
properties adequate to define metrics are the right kind of relations, and
not spurious relations that happen to have the relevant formal properties.
The only other natural relations among space points that one can think of
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seem not to have the right formal properties for definition of metrics
(consider betweenness, simultaneity, etc.) And, it may be a reasonable
conjecture that all natural relations are spatiotemporal. We seem to have
no clear counterexamples.
Finally, there is biting the bullet — standing by the consequences of
(Rl), come what may. Dialectically, this response is in fairly good shape.
"You who maintain that there could be an extra, "bogus" natural relation:
what makes that relation bogus? What distinguishes it from a real metrical
relation? If some relation over spatial points is natural, and has formal
properties that enable definition of a distance function, then I am
prepared to stand by (Rl) and call it a genuine metrical relation; I am
perfectly happy to call the resulting function a genuine distance function.
My concepts of metricality and distance extend no further." 13
9.4 Primitive Naturalism and Contingency of the Metric
9.4.1 An Argument
In this section I want to consider the following objection. The
metric structure of space is surely a contingent fact. But (Rl) does not
seem, on the face of it, to allow for the metric to vary properly from
world to world. Suppose that the physical space of our world is Euclidean.
According to (Rl), this is because a certain system of natural relations
among our world’s physical points enables definition of a Euclidean
distance function. But on my conception of naturalness, naturalness is a
property of properties and relations; not a relation between these entities
and possible worlds. So, since the relations are natural not just at our
world, but natural simpliciter -- natural at every world — it seems that
they will make the spaces of those worlds Euclidean as well.
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I believe, however, that there is no problem here. Furthermore,
showing that there is no problem will, I believe, bring to light some facts
about naturalness.
First, we must get clearer about the objection. Let us accept (Rl),
for the present. Further suppose that the metric of the space of @, the
actual world, is Euclidean. To simplify matters, suppose that this is
because there is exactly one natural relation R relating @’s points with
the formal structure necessary to enable the definition of a distance
function, and that the function is Euclidean. Where w is any world, the
conclusion of the following valid argument implies that w cannot have a
non-Euclide. .... space. But w was an arbitrarily selected world. So if I am
committed to each premise, then this would show that I cannot account for
the contingency of the metric.
The Argument Against Contingency
(1) R relates the physical points of w.
(2) If (1), then (a): R enables the definition of a Euclidean
distance function over the physical points of w.
(3) If (a) then the metrical structure (if any) of w’s physical space
is Euclidean
(4) Therefore, the metrical structure (if any) of w’s physical space
is Euclidean
The idea behind the argument is as follows. (1) is true because R, being a
natural relation, cannot have "gaps" in its spread over logical space. (2)
is also defended by appeal to R’s naturalness: a natural relation ought to
have the same formal properties from world to world. Finally, I am
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committed to premise (3) since i) natural relations are natural
simpliciter
,
so ii) R is a natural relation allowing definition of a
Euclidean distance function over w’s points, and hence iii) (Rl) implies
that w’s distance functions (if there are any) will be Euclidean. (The "if
any" proviso is present because if there are some other natural relations
that relate the points of w and enable definition of a distance function
that is not an appropriate transformation of the Euclidean distance
function definable from R, then (Rl) has the result that w has no physical
distance function).
As I see it, the first two premises are open to question. The
justifications for the premises will be explained in more detail when I
consider attacks on those premises. Suppose that w is a world that we
would want to say has a non-Euclidean space; I consider premises (1) and
(2) in turn.
9.4.2 Rejecting Premise (O - Relation splitting
I see no reason why I cannot hold that R contains no ’tuples of points
from w. R only relates points from Euclidean worlds like There may be
other relations that relate w’s points, and have over w’s points the same
formal structure as R has over @’s points. Indeed, if w has as many
physical points as there must be some such relations. 14 But I can claim
that R is not among these relations, and moreover that none of these
relations are natural -- hence, I am not forced by (Rl) to hold that w has
a Euclidean metric.
Let us focus on one of these relations that relates w’s points and is
a formal analog of R. Indeed, let us focus on a relation that is like this
not only in w, but in every world that is non-Euclidean - call it R'. We
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can think of R' as the twin of R. Like R, R' enables definition of
Euclidean metrics in worlds whose points it relates. R' relates only
points in non-Euclidean worlds, while R covers the Euclidean worlds;
together, R and R' span all of the worlds with physical spaces that have
metrics
.
15 Indeed, one might have expected the union of R and R' to be a
natural relation. But the primitive naturalist can deny this, and claim
that R is a natural relation, but neither R' nor RuR' is natural. Premise
(1) is false, for R only relates points from Euclidean worlds.
I call this the "relation-splitting" approach. The natural
expectation is that a single natural relation relates points from both w
and @. But the relation-splitter denies this, claims that the relation
RuR' is not natural, splits it into R and R', and claims that only the
first is natural.
One might have doubts about the claim that R, but not RuR', is
natural. Natural relations, I said above, should not have "gaps".
Fragments of more inclusive relations might seem, intuitively, to be
unnatural. The subrelation gotten by restricting being ten feet from to
objects in one possible world would be highly unnatural. Convinced by such
a case, one might go on to argue that since R is a fragment of RuR', it
can’t be natural.
In this general form, however, the objection is clearly mistaken. The
principle:
(PI) if a property or relation P is a subset of some other property or
relation P/
,
then P is not natural
is obviously false. For any natural binary relation we can construct a
superset by arbitrarily adding extra pairs.
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We might try to modify the objection, employing instead the principle:
(P2) A proper subset of a natural property or relation is unnatural.
Unlike (PI), (P2) has some plausibility, at least if the natural properties
are construed as the most fundamental properties. 16 Unfortunately, it does
not help the argument. We would need to claim that RuR' is natural, and
then employ (P2). This, however, would blatantly beg the question against
the relation splitter.
One might instead try to modify (PI). That principle is clearly
false, but there is a sound intuition behind it. Natural relations should
not be arbitrarily restricted, split, or fragmented. There should be no
arbitrary gaps in their span across logical space. The difficulty here is
to say what constitutes an "arbitrary" restriction, split, or gap. The
following terminology will let us make an attempt.
Consider any relation ft, formal property P of relations, and world w.
Say that ft has P at w iff the subrelation of ft restricted to w’s objects
has property P. Say that ft has P uniformly iff ft has P at every world that
contains some objects related by ft. Say that P is metrical iff there is
some distance function D such that every relation among space points that
has P suffices to define D. An example of a metrical property is the
property of being Euclidean, which is had by a relation iff its formal
properties suffice for the definition of d. over the set of objects it
relates. 17
Let us recall what the relation splitter has said so far. R is
uniformly Euclidean, as is R', although the class of worlds with points
related by R is completely disjoint from the class of worlds with points
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related by R'. But R is natural, while R' is not; this is why @, but not
w, has a Euclidean space.
The criticism I want to consider invokes the following principle:
(P3) If the relevant formal properties of a relation are uniform, then
any proper subset of that relation is unnatural.
Since R and R' are both uniformly Euclidean and never relate points that
are worldmates, RuR' is also uniformly Euclidean. If we grant that being
Euclidean is a "relevant" property, then (P3) implies that R is unnatural,
contradicting the claim of the primitive naturalist.
Above we noted the intuition that natural properties and relations
should not be arbitrarily split. (P3) is an attempt to say when a split is
arbitrary. It says it is arbitrary to split up a relation when that
relation’s relevant formal properties do not vary from world to world. The
relations that result from such a split, says (P3), are always more
unnatural than the unsplit relation. Of course, we need an account of what
formal properties of relations are "relevant". I will not attempt this
(among other reasons, because I think (P3) is false, provided that
‘relevant’ is not so defined as to trivialize the principle). For present
purposes I will assume that, for relations involving space points, metrical
properties are relevant properties.
Though (P3) may represent a gallant attempt to say when a split of a
relation is arbitrary, we can argue against (P3). Imagine a "mush world"
w
.
No natural relation or system of relations that enables definition of
m
a distance function relates the points of w
m
’s space. The realist who
adopts (Rl) would describe the mush world by saying that there are no facts
of the matter about the metric of its space. There are no distances at the
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mush world; just point soup". Now, suppose there is some natural relation
"R that is uniformly Euclidean. 18 Of course, R relates none of w ’s points.
But we can form a new relation R' by adding ’tuples of points from w
m
taking care to only add ’tuples that will keep R' uniformly Euclidean. R'
cannot be natural, since no natural relation enables definition of a metric
for w^. But it has a natural proper subset, namely R, and R has the same
"relevant" (in this case, metrical) formal properties as R'. This is a
counterexample to (P3).
It must be admitted that this counterexample depends on a rather
exotic possibility. The defender of (P3) may reject the possibility of the
mush world. Even in the absence of a counterexample to (P3), however, I
think the relation splitter can simply reject (P3). It is no part of
common sense! Moreover, (P3) seems to be loosely based on the intuition
that what makes a relation natural is something about its formal
properties. I discuss this intuition in the next section. It is mistaken.
9.4.3 Rejecting Premise (2)
So far I have been exploring the relation-splitting method of allowing
for contingency of the metric. On this approach, the Argument Against
Contingency is rebutted by rejecting premise (1). Throughout, you may have
noticed, it was assumed that metrical properties of natural relations are
uniform. For example, in the counterexample to (P3), I assumed that there
was a uniformly Euclidean natural relation, and in the overall discussion I
assumed that the relation R is uniformly Euclidean. Another approach, one
that I favor over relation-splitting, questions this assumption. I turn
next to this approach, which rejects premise (2) instead.
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Let us forsake relation splitting, and grant premise (1). Thus R, the
natural relation that is Euclidean at @, relates points of w. Indeed, let
us assume that R relates the points of every world with a physical space. 19
Premise (2) of the Argument Against Contingency claims that R is Euclidean
at w. This claim might be defended by appeal to the following principle:
(P4) A natural relation has its relevant formal properties uniformly
‘Relevant’ is intended here in the same sense as in (P3). In particular, I
assume that being Euclidean is relevant in the case of R. Hence, (P4)
implies (2).
I see no reason to accept (P4). Moreover, I think we can provide
arguments against it. I will consider two examples.
It is plausible that the topological relation of betweenness among
spatial points is a natural relation. In our world, that relation
presumably has a certain property of denseness: between any two points
there lies a third. But at a world with discrete space, betweenness lacks
this property. Assuming that denseness is "relevant", (P4) is false.
Secondly, a more abstract counterexample. Imagine the following
situation that a universal theorist would describe as follows. There is
an alien natural dyadic universal U, not instantiated in our world, which
has no necessary (relevant) formal constraints. Think of U as being an
ethereal rubber band linking its relata; the bands can be present in any
combination. In terms of primitive naturalism, every (relevant) formal
property of a certain alien natural relation is non-uniform. The
universal view can clearly admit the possibility of this example.
Primitive naturalism is intended to be the equal of the universals view in
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power; surely we do not want it to preclude this possibility. But if (P4)
were true, then such an alien relation would be impossible.
Someone might object to the first counterexample using the distinction
between rigid and nonrigid designators. 20 Consider any term t and object o
in world w. Intuitively, we say that t rigidly designates o iff t picks
out o and only o in every possible world. But this is too loose, for
various reasons. Supposing o to be some concrete possible object, say that
t "rigidly designates o" iff i) in any possible world containing exactly
one counterpart of o, t denotes only that object, and ii) t denotes no
other object in any other world. On the other hand, if o is a property or
relation that exists "from the point of view of' every world, we may simply
say that t rigidly designates o iff at every world, t designates o and only
o.
Consider the counterexample involving the relation betweenness. The
objector would claim that all I have established is:
(a) In the actual world, the betweenness relation is dense, but, at
w, the betweenness relation is not dense
But what I need for a counterexample to (P4) is
(b) The relation that in fact is the betweenness relation is in fact
dense, but it is not dense at w.
(a) implies (b) iff ‘the betweenness relation’ is a rigid designator, and a
defender of (P4) might claim that ‘betweenness’ indeed is not a rigid
designator. At the actual world, a certain relation is the betweenness
relation, but since relations have their relevant properties uniformly, the
betweenness relation at the discrete world is a different relation.
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First, I think that ‘the betweenness relation’ is a rigid designator.
Consider how one argues that a certain singular term
,
say, the proper name
‘Bush’, is a rigid designator. One says: "in any possible world, if that
guy [pointing to Bush] exists, then he would be Bush; moreover, show me a
possible object properly called ‘Bush’ — it must be that guy." I think
‘the betweenness relation’ passes the analogous test for relations. Suppose
x is between y and z, and consider any world in which three points x', y',
and z' are related in that same way. I think that x' would be between y'
and z'. Similarly, it seems convincing to me that if x' is between y' and
z
,
then x', y', and z' have to be related in the same way that x, y, and z
are in the actual world.
A different argument may be given against (P4) involving betweenness,
but we need some machinery from Chapter 4 section 2.2. An internal
relation is one whose holding supervenes on the intrinsic nature of its
relata: if it holds between x and y, then it must hold between any
duplicates of x and y, respectively. An external relation is a non-
internal relation that supervenes on the intrinsic nature of the
mereological sum of its relata. That is, if an external relation holds
between x and y, then it must hold between the corresponding parts of any
duplicate of the fusion of x and y. Hence, we have:
(E) If R is external or internal and holds between x and y, then R
must hold between the corresponding parts of any duplicate of the
mereological sum of x and y
21
Notice that (E) quantifies directly over relations, not names of those
relations.
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We will need a recombination principle for the argument. Recombination
principles underlie the inference that, for example, if a cat and a dog are
possible objects, then it would be possible for there to be twenty
duplicates of each, for there to be a duplicate of the cat’s head attached
to a duplicate of the dog’s body, etc. One recombination principle, called
the principle of isolation
,
says that, given any possible object c, there
is a possible world containing a duplicate of c and that object’s parts,
but no other objects besides those entailed by the existence and nature of
those objects already mentioned (this is principle (12) from chapter 6
section 3. 2. 4). 22
Finally, we need a principle from Chapter 4 section 2.3: every
(perfectly) natural relation is either internal or external. This
principle is a straightforward consequence of the definitions of
‘internal’, ‘external’, and ‘duplicate’ in terms of naturalness.
Let us rigidly designate the relation that, at the actual world, is
the betweenness relation by ‘betweenness®’. Presumably, betweenness® is
dense in the actual world. And surely, it is a natural relation - the
spatiotemporal relations are our only clear examples of natural relations.
(Moreover, if such relations are not natural, then the idea in this chapter
for stating metrical realism, embodied in (Rl), will not work! In section
1.3 I indicated how I intend my proposal to be generalized. On this
approach, the betweenness relation is defined to be the natural relation
with such and such formal properties.) Thus, betweenness® is either
external or internal. Suppose that in the actual world x is between and
distinct from y and z, and let XYZ be the fusion of x, y, and z. The
principle of isolation applied to the case of XYZ implies the existence of
a possible duplicate of XYZ existing in isolation; call that duplicate
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XYZ
,
call the possible world at which it exists "w". Since XYZ' is a
duplicate of XYZ, and betweenness® is either external or internal, XYZ' is
made up of three distinct parts, x', y', and z' where, by (E), x' is
between® y and z'. We are entitled to infer that x' is between® y' and
z
,
rather than x' is between y' and z', because of the fact that the
variable ‘R’ in (E) ranges over relations, not relation names --
betweenness® is an allowable substitution for ‘R\ Since XYZ' exists in
isolation, nothing is between® y' and x'; hence, betweenness® at w is not
dense. (P4), therefore, is false.
I say that I may fairly reject (P4), and also premise (2) of the
Argument Against Contingency. I may claim that R is a natural relation,
and yet varies in its metrical properties from world to world. At @ it is
Euclidean, but perhaps at w it is Riemanian instead.
I imagine a complaint: "R seems unnatural. It seems a conglomeration
of different relations all with different formal properties. For example,
it has a Euclidean subrelation of pairs of points from @, and a Riemanian
subrelation of pairs of points from w. What makes a relation natural, if
not its formal properties?"
Well, whatever makes a relation natural, formal properties cannot be
the whole story. Let S be the set of spacetime points from some possible
world. There are many bijections from S onto itself. Each such bijection
induces, for any relation defined over the members of S, an image of that
relation, a "scrambled" version of that relation. The scrambled version
will, in general, be radically different from the original. For example,
if one began with the betweenness relation, the resulting relation would in
general not be the betweenness relation. However, the scrambled relation
will have the same formal properties as the original. For example, if the
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original was transitive, connected, and asymmetric, then the scrambled
version will be transitive, connected, and asymmetric. If the original
enabled definition of a Euclidean metric, then so will the scrambled
version. So, take any natural relation R. Arrive at a new relation R' by
arbitrarily scrambling R within each possible world whose points it
relates. R' will have the same formal properties as R, but clearly will
not be a natural relation. Hence, formal properties are not the sole
determiners of naturalness.
What does make a natural relation natural? There are two answers,
depending on how this question is interpreted. It may be interpreted as a
request for an intuitive picture of why relations are natural. The answer,
then, is that the facts make relations natural. R is natural because it
corresponds to real metrical facts involving points. This of course is no
analysis
;
according to (R 1 ) metrical facts are analyzed in terms of
naturalness, so an analysis of naturalness in terms of metrical facts would
be circular. But I am a primitive naturalist, and no analysis of
naturalness is ever offered by a primitive naturalist. The second way to
interpret the question "What makes a relation natural" is as a request for
analysis. The reply here is that there is none to be had. Naturalness is
a primitive.
Consider the analogous situation with respect to the naturalness of
the property unit positive charge. The primitive naturalist gives no
analysis of why this property is natural. Someone might object: consider
the set S that is the property unit positive charge. Exchange one member
of S with some electron, to form a new set S'. Why isn’t the property
corresponding to S' natural? One answer is that the members of the set
share no common feature; the set is heterogeneous. This is of course no
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analysis, since heterogeneity would presumably be analyzed in terms of
naturalness. But do not demand analysis from the primitive naturalist.
If we consider S and S' in abstraction from facts about charge, then
nothing will tell us which is a natural property. We can point out that the
members of S share a common feature - charge - while the members of S' do
not, but this is no analysis. In the same way, if we consider R and
another relation in abstraction from facts about metric and distance, then
nothing will tell us which is natural. For the primitive naturalist, there
is a brute fact that R is natural, and this fact is not reducible to any
claim about R’s formal properties. Again, we can point out that the
’tuples of points in R all share a common feature, a feature involving
metric and distance. But again, this is no analysis.
The primitive naturalist, then, can escape the Argument Against
Contingency and account for the contingency of the metric, either by
relation-splitting, thereby rejecting premise (1), or by rejecting premise
(2) (I prefer the latter approach). Obstacles to each of these paths were
presented, most formidably in the form of (P3) and (P4), but each, I think,
is false. Finally, I argued that the primitive naturalist can feel free to
claim that the naturalness of relations is not a mere matter of those
relations’ formal properties.
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Notes
1 The word ‘concrete’ is a bit of a weasel-word. See Lewis’s tirade in
Lewis (1986c) section 1.7. All I mean by calling physical spaces
concrete ' is to distinguish points of physical space from the
mathematical objects that represent them in a mathematical space.
Actually, there will be a family of such functions corresponding to
arbitrary choices of units.
3 Betweenness in IR
3
may be defined in terms of the usual structure of R3
.
4 Phillip Bricker suggested to me the idea of using naturalness and the
Ramsey-Lewis method for defining theoretical terms.
5 See Reichenbach (1958) chapter 1, and Sklar (1974) pp. 88-146.
This is crude firstly because some worlds might have no spacetimes at
all, secondly because of the problem of the arbitrary choice of unit,
and thirdly because the notion of a mathematical space must be
generalized. These issues are addressed below.
7 See Lewis (1970).
8 See Sklar (1974) pp. 46-54 for a brief nontechnical survey.
9 In my simplified example where R3 was the set of points, I was assuming
its usual structure. In the general case, this structure would need to
be put into Q, for in the general case the set ? of points is merely a
set with no tacitly assumed structure.
10 See Sklar (1974) pp. 202-209 for a brief introduction to neo-
Newtonian spacetime.
11 See Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tverski (1971) for specifics on the theory
of measurement.
12 Recall the problem of minimality from Chapter 3 section 2.1.
13 Phillip Bricker has convincingly defended the third option (which,
perhaps, is a dramatic version of the second option).
14 Let R® be R restricted to points of @. R® has formal properties that
enable definition of a Euclidean metric. Now, let f be any one-one
correspondence between the points of @ and the points of w. The "mirror
image" of R® under f will have the same formal properties as R®.
15
I ignore worlds with two physical spaces, one Euclidean, the other non-
Euclidean.
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16 Chapter 3 section 2.1. However, notice that I do not defend (P2) in
that chapter; instead, I defend the weaker principle that conjunctions
of distinct perfectly natural properties are not perfectly natural.
Keep in mind that by ‘natural’ here I mean perfectly natural. Some
fairly natural properties have even more natural subsets. For example,
determinate shades of red are subsets of redness, and yet the
determinate shades seem more natural than redness, their disjunction.
17 These definitions can and should be extended to apply to sets of
relations. Recall that I have simplified things by imagining that a
single relation, R, enables definition of a Euclidean metric.
18 If you deny that any natural relations among points have uniform
metrical properties, then be patient. You will agree with the rejection
of premise (2) of the Argument Against Contingency instead.
19 Perhaps: of every world whose physical space has appropriate non-
metrical (e.g. topological) structure. Let us ignore relativistic
considerations.
20 Phillip Bricker pressed this objection to the first counterexample.
21 See Lewis (1986c) p. 62.
22 The related principle of isolation in Pauli and Sider (1992) was not
intended to apply to points of space.
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